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                                                                              7 October 2010 
 
Fernando’s book sees broken technologies in a quite wide sense and in 
a very thorough examination through history and cultures, traces a wide 
swath of brokenness. It might be noted that some years ago, Carl 
Mitcham did a most thorough history of the philosophy of technology, 
Thinking Through Technology (1994) in which he differentiates between an 
‘engineering’ and a ‘humanities’ philosophy of technology. Fernando’s 
‘humanist as engineer’ echoes this distinction but makes the varieties of 
brokenness pervasive through both levels-first, second and third-and 
through a phenomenological analysis which is deeply penetrating. 
 
Fernando’s own experience helps make this approach insightful and 
relevant both an engineer and later a philosopher and historian of ideas by 
background, he ranges over both historic and contemporary technolo-
gies. His use of illustrations, visuals and examples enriches his approach 
as well. 
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Introduction 
 
About the benefit of humanity studies  
The question “Which is the benefit of humanity studies?” is of course rhetor-
ical because, how could this question be answered if the benefit was not obvious? 
Any answer supposes that we understand what we are asking for and the study of 
“what we mean” is one of the axes of the epistemology of the humanities. Anyway, 
we can also put the rhetorical character of the question between brackets and try to 
answer it. It has to be done beginning with a historical recount of the development 
of the empirical sciences from the womb of theology and philosophy. This “inde-
pendence process” started first with the natural sciences, which were “natural 
philosophy” to become positive empirical sciences of nature; next step was the in-
dependence process of the social sciences, which being “moral sciences” become 
“positive sciences” inspired in the epistemological model of the “empirical sciences 
of nature”. The study and knowledge of the world then, changed from a speculative 
to an empirical paradigm and the study in humanities loosed the traditional central 
place in the education of the youth to become a more or less “magnificence of cul-
ture”, that only rich people and rich societies could cultivate. Human studies are 
understood today as the development of the “individual” against the demands of 
the development of “society”. The situation is that most of the people in our days 
have very little training in human studies. The people of our century are trained to 
use language only for communication. The employment of language to understand 
the human mind is lost.  Our time’s people have some schematic knowledge about 
some crucial historical events, but these “historical” facts are only riddles and chro-
                                               
1 Heidegger, Martin. Being and time. State University of New York, 1996; p. 348. 
The “antiquities” preserved in museums (for example, household things) belong to a “time past,” 
and are yet still objectively present in the “present.” How are these useful things historical when they 
are, after all, not yet past?  
                                    Martin Heidegger1 
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nologies. We can ask ourselves, which are the consequences of this for the future of 
society? The referred process of epistemological independence that many new sci-
ences followed since Galileo’s time was in fact possible because new objects of 
study emerged from new praxis. New social problems demanded new solutions and 
a new corpus of knowledge was the consequence. However, this explanation is tau-
tological. We have to move further and deeper. We say that during this time, 
humanity studies survived as studies of language, history and philosophy occupying 
an increasingly small part of the time of study of the youth because this process fol-
lowed a kind of cosificación (that is, the process which make something thing–like) of 
knowledge. The more things-like the object of study is, the less “human” it become. 
“Human” here means “phenomenal” or belonging to the Everyday world. Making 
science in positively terms, means to isolate some part of the Everyday world and 
make it abstract and independent of human intentions. That is the process behind 
the “experiment” and the development of the laboratory-milieu. In this sense, hu-
man studies have been deprived during Modern history of larger parts of its 
traditional sphere of study, those parts that easily could be isolated from the com-
mon sense of the Everyday world ’s experience.  The development of mechanical 
methods to the study language during the 20th Century, make language studies the 
next sphere of the human studies that shall disconnect their activities from tradi-
tional human studies.  
We live in a world that is increasingly materialized and in which cosificación is 
inevitable. A feeling of benefit is obviously attached to this process in that sense 
that the more materialized everything becomes, the more sanctioned it is. It is good 
for society that the world became materialized because immateriality cannot be 
measured and weighed. In this sense, art is more materialized than philosophy or 
history because art works through modelling matter, as the artisan produce arte-
facts.  However, what is the future of the remaining parts of traditional human 
studies, of history, literature and philosophy? Will these studies also experience the 
process of cosificación? We think that this process has already begun and the time of 
isolation of human studies is ending. With the last developments in informatics, the 
mind has arrived to the state in which an important part of their immaterial corpus 
of intentions, feelings, and knowledge will become materialized as “virtual realities”. 
Ideas and images, structures and their rhythms will become noematized in computer 
programs that more or less analogically will reproduce their mechanisms and reduce 
their secrets to “procedures”. Philosophy, history, and literature will become “lan-
guages”. In other words, the epistemological process since the beginning of Modern 
times consists in the transformation of the dimensionalities of the object of study 
increasing their dignity (power). The goal is to work with realities that “can be 
touched and manipulated”. The more manipulated, the more beneficial they are. 
However, there are irreducible differences between the human science and the oth-
ers. Human studies differ from natural and social studies in the grade of focalisation in 
the object of study. Human studies focalize in the interconnections, in the borders, bound-
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aries or frontiers of the objects of study. Human studies focalize in the differences and 
therefore have “ambiguity” as their natural object of study; this makes the humani-
ties a science of coherence. The humanities create coherence because only knowing 
about differences can give us the whole picture. That is why the humanistic engi-
neer will be an “engineer of brokenness”. 
How we understand “technology” 
There are many possible definitions of “technology” and I will discuss some 
of these in this book. However, in this introduction let me use a definition of 
Svante Lindqvist2 who defines technology very intuitively as “those activities, di-
rected towards the satisficing of human wants, which produce change in the 
material world.” He says also “the distinction between human “wants” and more 
limited human “needs” is crucial, for we do not use technology only to satisfy our 
essential material requirements.” Consequently, from this perspective, a technology 
that is “broken” could be defined as those activities, directed towards the satisficing 
of human wants that are intended to produce changes in the material world that ei-
ther do not manage to satisfy these wants or do not produce changes in the material world, or both. 
Any definition of technology implies the use of terms as “activity” and expressions 
as “directed towards” that are very difficult to define without coming into deep 
philosophical considerations. We are going to see that to avoid a philosophical dis-
cussion it will become more and more impossible as we go through the different 
aspects of broken technologies.  
We can assume that the intentionality embedded in tools and machines is the 
same as the “effective procedures” that work beyond human capabilities. However, 
a tool or a machine can do worse than the human body or than another tool or ma-
chine. When tools or machines do worse than the human body does, or when they 
do better than the human body but worse than other tools or machines, they be-
came broken technologies; otherwise they are whole technologies.  
We can use this principle to define operationally what a “whole technology” 
is and what distinguish it from a “broken” one.  
 
 
                                               
2 Lindqvist, Svante. Technology on Trial. The Introduction of Steam Power Technology into Sweden 1715-1736. 
Uppsala Studies in History of Science I, Uppsala 1984; p. 14. 
 
Suppose that any two technologies can be compared in reference to a task. That which works better 
is a whole technology the others are broken. The “market” decides this almost instantaneously be-
cause the market is the place in which docking (the “coupling” between the artefact and the world) is 
automatically tested. Obviously, no technology works forever and ultimately all whole technologies 
become “broken”. 
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Another approach to a definition of brokenness is the term “usability” which 
improves studying the interacting between the artefact and its user. In engineering, 
the usefulness of an artefact is determined by two qualities: its utility and its usability. 
From our perspective there is utility when the artefact is efficiently designed to dock 
with another artefact or with the world; at the other side, usability describes the arte-
fact’s qualities from the point of view of the user. The three goals of the engineering 
of usability are directed to produce artefacts that fulfil the following conditions: a) 
the artefact should be “more efficient to use (it takes less time to accomplish a par-
ticular task); b) it should be “easier to learn (the operation can be learned only by 
observing the object)” and the artefact should be “more satisfying to be used.”3 Us-
ability then, is measured through: “Learnability: How easy is it for users to 
accomplish basic tasks the first time they encounter the design; Efficiency: Once users 
have learned the design, how quickly can they perform tasks; Memorability: When us-
ers return to the design after a period of not using it, how easily can they re-
establish proficiency; Errors: How many errors do users make, how severe are these 
errors, and how easily can they recover from the errors; and Satisfaction: How pleas-
ant is it to use the design.”4 In the case of broken technologies and broken artefacts 
their usability is broken in all or some of these aspects. Because of that, they are not 
more efficient to use; they are not easier to learn and they are not more satisfying to 
use. 
As broken technological examples, we can name some that are very easy to 
grasp and to understand intuitively. Let us consider first the case of old technologies, 
as the steam locomotive. This technology still “works” today and it could be used in 
the same way that it was used hundred years ago. Why should it be called “broken”? 
The answer is “because of its age”, we would say that it belongs to a world that 
does not exist anymore. Then, it could be described as “time-broken”. But, what 
about the technologies of Leonardo’s machines that are artefacts from the 16th Cen-
tury? They are in some sense old technologies too, but we notice that they are different 
from cases like that of the steam locomotive. Which are the differences between 
these two cases? We know that many of Leonardo’s machines were only sketches 
and never were constructed. We also believe that if they had been constructed, they 
would not have worked “properly”. The differences between these two cases of 
brokenness can say something about the world as such. We notice that an im-
portant aspect of these two technologies is how their constitutive parts work with 
each other. A steam motor is an old technology but it still works properly because 
its constituent parts are “adequate to each other” and “adequate to the surrounding 
world”. We name this adequacy as “congruency”. We say that the steam engine and 
                                               
3 Nielsen, Jakob. Usability Engineering. Academic Press, 1993;  p. 10. 
4 Ibid. 
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the world still “dock congruently”. In the case of Leonardo’s artefacts, that does not 
occur, because they were designed ignoring many physical laws. The fact that “old” 
technologies should be included in the family of broken technologies actualizes the 
importance of time and especially of “history” in this study. We know that the 
steam engine is a historic vestige of another time. That means that “with time”, full 
working technologies of today will be converted into broken technologies too. Ob-
viously, is not “time” itself that changes them, but what changes is the way humans 
wants and needs develops in history. We notice now that Lindqvist’s definition 
above contemplated the changes that technology makes on the world but did not 
say anything about the changes occurring between the world of artefacts and the 
“human world” and how these changes affected technology. To avoid this problem 
we will try to ground the phenomena of technology in praxis with historical conno-
tations. We will call this approach “phenomenological” and present technological 
artefacts as the consequence of human intentionality embedded in tools and machines. 
“Technology” for us means the development of “intentional effective procedures” 
that work within and beyond the human capabilities. In this sense, broken technologies can 
also be seen as the result of the situation in which intentional effective procedures of 
any kind, do worse than the human body does, or when they do better than the hu-
man body, they do worse than other intentional effective procedures. At the other 
side “technology” for us can also mean “knowing how” and in this case technology is 
the name of some cognitive (not intentional) act. 
First-level brokenness 
Let us now consider another example, the “technologies of poverty” which for 
us are broken technologies too. Any materials that society discards as garbage are 
suitable for being reprocessed using technologies of this category. What is broken 
here is the amount of forms (noemata) that are available to be used as artefacts and tools. 
Using a “knife” as a “screwdriver” could be a good example of how this technology 
redirects intentionality. The immediate question is the following: what screwdriverhood-
qualities does the “knife” have? Moreover, what is it that is not working here: is the 
knowledge of the possibilities of the knife respectively the screwdriver’s possibilities to 
“dock properly” with the world that which is wrong? Is this case, as in the case of Le-
onardo, a case of lack of knowledge, which causes this brokenness? Alternatively, is it 
the system of beliefs, which is not congruent with the tools? Can it be so that deprived 
people believe that a knife is the same tool as a screwdriver? The answer is simpler, de-
prived environments do not offer the full range of tools that match the everyday 
world of “regular” environments. There are no problems with the system of beliefs or 
with the implied knowledge, what happens is that the technical means that are for 
disposal are incomplete to match the world of garbage. But this insufficiency is noe-
matic; an initial lack of “forms” demands the recourse of a redirection of 
intentionality. Because of this case of brokenness, it necessary to distinguish be-
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tween that which depends on knowledge and that which depends on praxis; Knowledge 
can be manifested as a clear idea or form about how the laws of the world work. I call 
this clear idea a “noema”. To e.g. “tele-transport” a material object to a new place 
by decomposing its molecular structure, is a technological idea that belongs to the 
fantastic. The idea or noema of this technological procedure exists but not their 
“pragma”. As pragma, we understand the technological procedure itself that permits 
the idea or noema to be pragmatically real. We say that fantastic technologies are 
pragma-broken because “they know what they want” but they do not know “how 
to manage” to produce these outcomes. Magical technologies at the other side are 
the opposite case. They have a pragmatic solution (that is the “ritual”) but they have 
not a clear noema or cognitive base to produce this. The acting of cutting a surro-
gate person to “cure” the disease of a third sick person, is a magical procedure that 
shows a “precise procedure” for the expected outcomes of this praxis, but “we” 
(the referent which makes the classification) know that this procedure is not con-
gruent with the world. We say that the magician “knows how to do” but he does 
not know “what he wants,” and that magical technology is noema-broken. Of course, 
not every case is transparent and each case is different from the others. We can cer-
tainly find cases of magical technologies that “really work”. Nevertheless, in those 
cases the connection between pragma and noema will be accidental because “work-
ing” magic is always an exception. Other cases are more complex than this because 
both the noema and the pragma are in some degree congruent with the world. That 
is the situation of the technologies of Leonardo’s machines, which show the pres-
ence of both noema and pragma. In any case, we can say that this presence is weak 
even if we cannot precisely indicate in what sense they “are weak”. We deduce that 
their weakness affects their wholeness but more in respect to their pragmatic aspects 
than to their noematic aspects.  
Then one can say then that Leonardo’s artefacts are ontological-broken because 
they do not work properly in spite of having a nearly clear idea about how they should 
work. Ontological-brokenness is a higher level of the pragma-brokenness. It is a 
matter of degrees that makes the one different from the other. Leonardo’s machines 
are a little more pragmatic-open than fantastic machines. Following the same path, we 
say that the technologies of poverty are ontical-broken because they are more weak in 
respect to their noematic aspects that to their pragmatic aspects. Noema-
brokenness, pragma-brokenness, ontical-brokenness and ontological-brokenness 
constitute for us the first-level of brokenness. 
 
Second-level brokenness 
In the case of outdated technologies as the steam locomotive; the problem 
deserves a deeper analysis because there is nothing wrong with their noematic and 
their pragmatic aspects. These levels work “properly” notwithstanding that these 
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technologies, are useless. Time- or historical-brokenness cannot be explained in 
terms of noematic and pragmatic aspects nor with reference to their onticality or 
ontologicity. We identify this second-level of brokenness as the level in which what is 
broken is dimensional. It is a kind of brokenness that affects the dimensions of time 
and space, of duration and extension. Explaining that steam technology is “old” is 
to say nothing new; to solve this problem we need to introduce the idea of enigma or 
“historical riddle”. We mean that outdated technologies are enigmatic in the sense 
that they work “properly” but only in a reconstructed scenario. In some cases the recon-
struction needs to be significant and in some cases will be impossible. For instance 
if the technological procedures used during the classical time of the Incas in Peru to 
construct their ships are forgotten, it might be impossible to reconstruct a ship in 
exact the same way as they did. Another example could be that if some primitive 
plant used in the preparation of food become extinct, the situation makes the prep-
aration of this kind of food impossible. We can reconstruct the ship and the meal, 
but we will never manage to restore the authentic phenomena into our own reality. 
Of course, our analysis is historical as well, and what we classify and organize de-
pends on our perspective of the historical facts. That which for us is broken today 
was certainly not broken for a man in another time-scenario.  
Third-level brokenness 
The idea of “praxis” is very central to our study of technologies, and we need 
to devote some time to secure this idea. Praxis for us is an act and it is always some 
kind of acting. Furthermore, acting is spontaneously related to technology and labour. 
That is obvious for the case of any study of machines and tools. We are not trying 
to develop a theory of acting here, but it is important to be acquainted with what 
“to act” means to us. We accept that the mind is split in an intentional sphere and a 
cognitive sphere. These two divisions of the mind are not always separable from each 
other but some criteria can be used to recognize them. The intentional sphere is the 
place of belief and acting because as we understand the divided mind’s behaviour, to 
act supposes the recourse of some extraordinary charge of motivated energy moved 
into the world of ideas. This surplus of energy is what integrates the human body into 
the world of everyday life. Without the human body’s engagement in the world of 
ideas, no acting can be possible. For us acting are directed throughout an object and we 
call this the act of animation. For us to think pragmatically is to act right through something 
making the noema of thought a pragma. On the other hand, knowledge is not de-
manding this engagement and the connection to the human body can remain static. 
The sphere of knowledge for us is the sphere of information too.  
Another interpretation could be that the sphere of knowledge and infor-
mation has the form of fractured intentionality, the combination of the fragments of 
earlier acting. In any way, this division of the mind that requires the absence of act-
ing is a state of contemplation. Therefore, “technology” as knowledge, is never an act 
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but a cognitive state of the mind that makes acting possible. Human labour uses 
technological means as patterns of movement, as structures of acting that secures 
some expected results. To implement a technology is then always a special kind of 
acting that we give the name of “labour”. There may be acting that may not be im-
plementations of technologies but if they do implement technologies, they are 
labour-acts.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The structure of brokenness 
 
 
 
In the highest level of brokenness, we find the value-broken technologies. This 
is the third-level of brokenness, in which everything happens in the social and cul-
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tural level of the “now”. We say that broken technologies can be listed as perfor-
mances of brokenness of the higher level if they also are socio-cultural--broken. We are 
thinking of a special kind of brokenness, which involve socio-cultural categories as 
e.g. “labour” connected to the problematic of technology. That is the case of family 
labour, which employs technologies that are home-adjusted, and are in some sense 
different from their professional correlatives. We say that these family-technologies 
produce a form of labour that is value-broken. “Value” in this case refers to the ex-
change value of an artefact on the market. Value-broken means that this artefact has 
not a “price”. Technologies of poverty can be a case of the third level if the product 
of their work is not remunerated. Outdated technologies can also show third-level 
brokenness if they are worthless.  
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Part I: The Encyclopaedia of 
Broken Technologies 
 
An outline of first-level 
brokenness 
In our classification, the first group consists on the first-level brokenness, as we 
understand it. Phenomenological aspects and epistemological aspects are the fun-
damental characteristic of this level. We refer to noemata without pragmata, and to 
pragmata without noemata. We refer to manifestations in which the ontical level 
dominates over the ontological level and vice versa. A complete typology of broken 
technologies is certainly impossible and we will not try to give here a definitive one. 
The one thing we can say about our typology is –following Jorge Luis Borges– that 
in some sense it will be like his Chinese Encyclopaedia.”5 Our typology is as much rhi-
zomatic as that of Borges because “brokenness” is a property that includes itself in 
the set of “broken technologies”. Because to make an “encyclopaedia” is to create a 
“mechanism”, a technical device to manage the everyday life efficiently, a “broken 
encyclopaedia” will be a device to manage to reconstruct or reproduce the jump into 
nothingness that characterizes broken technologies. Nevertheless, a typology, which in 
itself is not a mechanism has to be a rhizome as Deleuze and Guattari described it in 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.6  Their principles for a classification 
are: 
 
                                               
5 http://www.crockford.com/wrrrld/wilkins.html (2008-06-20). 
6 University of Minnesota Press, 1987 and in Spanish:  Mil Mesetas. Capitalismo y Esquizofrenia. Pre–
Textos; 2004. 
 
1 and 2. Principles of connection and heterogeneity: any point of a rhizome can be connected to 
anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an 
order. The linguistic tree on the Chomsky model still begins at a point S and proceeds by dichotomy. 
  
3. Principle of multiplicity: it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "mul-
tiplicity," that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, 
image and world. Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what 
they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject.  
 
4. Principle of asignfying rupture: against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cut-
ting across a single structure. A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up 
again on one of its old lines, or on new lines.  
 
5 and 6. Principle of cartography and decalcomania: a rhizome is not amenable to any structural 
or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like 
an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages are organized; a deep structure is more like a 
base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product 
passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension. 
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A rhizome is a “classification” that we could describe as transcriptional be-
cause it works between dimensions. In our classification of first-level brokenness, 
the first group consists of the creations of pure fantasy. We refer to noemata without 
pragmata, technologies resembling art and literature that are meant to describe a 
fantastic reality without any connectivity to praxis. The noemata of e.g. science fic-
tion belongs to this group. Many of these products of fantasy, later became a 
technological reality such as Hugo Gernsback’s TV–set.7  We name these fantastic 
technologies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Hugo Gernsback’s “teleyeglasses”8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Shamanism’s technologies 
 
 
A second group of broken technologies is the group of magic pragmata. This 
is collective of artefacts that archaic societies and traditional narratives and myths 
developed as fundamental tools of some rituals. Magic artefacts belong to the field 
of archaic technologies and are a central part of the study of old cultures and of un-
conscious tendencies in the mind of the modern man. This is the group of 
                                               
7 http://www.davidszondy.com/future/Gernsback/gernsback.htm  (2006-02-16). 
8 http://davidszondy.com/future/Gernsback/teleyeglasses.htm 
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technologies working with pragmata but without noemata. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hugo Gernsback’s 
TV–set 
 
 
A third group consists of the corpus of sketches and drafts of artefacts of any 
kind; we name these tentative technologies. These are collected in archives and mu-
seums because they reveal the origins of some technology. As an example, we could 
name the Museum of Sketches and Archive of Public Art on the University of Lund.  The 
art theorist Ragnar Josephson analysed in his book Konstverkets födelse the importance 
of the sketch for the birth of the work of art. In his classical work, Josephson wrote, 
“It is the sketch that which awakes the concept. The artist sees during the drawing 
process.”9 Josephson tried a classification of different types of sketches and their 
importance for different works of art. Sketches and drafts uncover the deep struc-
tures of proposed artefacts and are precious in a study of the act of intending in the 
production of artefacts and technologies. The study of industrial sketches and their 
value as broken technologies is an area of specialization for humanists that Moder-
nity has not developed at all. In the age of Postmodernity, it would be necessary to 
repair this misconception by opening the mind to the development of culture engineer-
ing, the systematic study of the massive production of tentative technologies.  
As a fourth group, we will a closer look at the technologies of poverty. This 
includes any materials unused and rejected as worthless or unwanted by society 
which could be reused by deprived people as useful material serving other purposes. 
For example, discarded metal suitable for reprocessing in houses or in furniture, 
boxes, wood, textiles, in fact everything that has been destroyed or is broken and 
cannot work as originally intended, but which can be reused in some other redi-
rected way.  
 
 
 
                                               
9 Ragnar Josephson; Studentlitteratur; Lund 1991; p. 28. 
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Figure 5: Photo by Dionisio González, Favela do Gato II, 2004  
http://fiedler.null2.net/index.php?id=329&sel=1377&type=1 (2008-11-25) 
 
 
A fifth group of broken technologies consists of the artefacts that in spite of 
being thought of as technological products do not work successfully as such, nor 
can be used in any other way. We will name these fruitless technologies. These quasi–
technological products remain fruitless artefacts with a historical and artistic value 
but without any obvious technological value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Leonardo’s Aerial screw 
 
 
A sixth group consists of the set of works of art and as an especial part of it, 
modern art and the ready-mades. Art is always an exploration of the limits of the 
world, a study of its dimensions, both empirical and phenomenological, an explora-
tion of the medium of each art form and of its communicating possibilities.  
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Entry 1: Fantastic 
Technologies 
 
 
Some technologies are broken because they fail to produce pragmata. That is 
the case of fantastic technologies. They delimit a field and a possible world with arte-
facts as noemata, which are only pure entertainment of thought. The group of the 
creations of pure fantasy, in which the noemata of art and literature are meant to 
describe a fantastic reality, is very important as an inspiration tool for the develop-
ment of new technologies. Specific for the process of producing fantastic stories is 
the combination of the dimensional levels of the noemata of the original materials 
transformed into new specific dimensional coordinates adequate for the new prod-
uct. In this case, pragmata is absent and the connectivity with the noema takes place 
on an intellectual level.  Ideas as “faster-than-light space travels” or that of “tele-
portation” have their roots in the pure noematic solution of a technological 
problem. It is the empirical problem itself, understood from the point of view of 
perception, which creates the solution without any regards to the means available 
for the development of some related pragma. In some sense, fantastic technologies 
put the pragmatics of the real world between parentheses. When noema relates to 
other noema, it follows “noesis”, that is, the perceived as cognition.  Maybe this is 
why every technology has its origins in a fantastic proposition; therefore we think 
that fantastic technologies are the simplest forms of broken technology. The cogni-
tive sphere of the mind dominates the intentional part of it and the process of work 
is pure intellectual.  
The literary genre of Science Fiction is one of the most important fields for 
this front of finding new ways to dock things with each other forming new pure in-
tellectual constellations of artefacts. The literary genre of Science Fiction – also 
known as the “literature of ideas” – characterizes by the use of current develop-
 
Pragma–broken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fantastic technology 
 
Pragma is the usability of a noema revealed through the acting of using the artefact.  
Noema is the “perceived as perceived”, a pure phenomenological “form”. 
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ments on the field of science and technology as the source to future developments. 
Many different families of topics belong to this field of brokenness. We are going to 
follow Richard L. McKinney’s study from 197610 and list these families according to 
the possible future scientific and technological developments. This unique and al-
ready “old” book is especially interesting because some of the presented “future 
visions” have become real artefacts today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: From the Earth to the Moon Jules 
Verne 
 
 
 
 
 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:From_the_Earth_to_the_Moon_Jules_Verne.jpg 
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25) 
 
 
 
                                               
10 Richard L. McKinney. Science Fiction as Futurology; Lund University 1976.  
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As we said, we can see in this list that some of the goals of future science and 
society are now a reality. That is the case of “Personal computer terminals” and 
“World–wide communications network”. Others, which are very old, can be con-
sidered a heritage from the time of the magicians. This is the case of “Gravity 
control” and “Control of aging”.  
The origins of the literary genre of science fiction have roots in traditional fic-
tion stories of all kinds. However, it is first with the development of modern science 
that the genre became established properly as a kind of literary futurology. They are 
the broken technologies of the future for us; they anticipate the future because their 
visions do not involve pragmata. Ideals and goals are open for the mind inde-
pendently of any representation of the necessary involved praxis. Obviously the 
presence of pragma is the necessary condition that connects the noema to the to-
day’s conditions of the world. Paul K. Alkon presented an interesting chronology of 
 
Possible scientific and Technical developments in the future 
 
I-Primarily Physical and mechanical sciences: 
1. Faster than light space drive; 2. Gravity control; 3. New energy source;  4. Matter transmitter; 5. Teleporta-
tion;  6 Transmutation; 7. Weather and climate control;  8. Unified field theory; 9. New chemical elements. 
II- Primarily Medical and Biological Sciences: 
1. Perfected and simple birth control method; 2. Successful suspended adnimation techniques;  3. Control of ag-
ing; 4. Organ transplantation; 5. Ability to breath and live underwater; 6. Intelligent animals;  7. Increased 
human intelligence; 8. Human cloning; 9. Other bio-engineering & genetic manipulation-techniques; 10. Creation 
of viable biologic life, including human; 11. Virtual immortality through cure of all disease; 12. Cyborgs. 
III- Primarily Communications and Computer sciences 
1. Personal computers terminals; 2. Translation machines; 3. Perfected spy and surveillance devices; 4. Man–
machines symbiosis; 5. Intelligent computers; 6. Robots; 7. Recording of personality on computer tape; 8. World–
wide communications network; 9. Multinational data banks. 
IV- Primarily sociological and psychological sciences 
1. Understanding of the brain and its working; 2. Understanding of the group and group dynamics;     3. 
Mind–reading devices; 4. Mind–control devices; 5. Controllable and useable extra sensory perception; 6. Under-
standing and control of human motivation; 7. Knowledge of the role milieu contra genetic make-up plays; 8. New 
methods of crime prevention or law enforcement; 9. New methods of punishment or imprisonment for law breakers. 
V- Developments not specifically classified 
1. Weapons and weapon systems; 2. Contact with aliens; 3. Contact with parallel or alternative worlds; 4. Un-
derstanding of the nature of time; 5. Time travel; 6. Invisibility 
7. New value orientations for individual and society. 
 
Table 1: From Richard L. McKinney. Science Fiction as Futurology, Lund University 1976 
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the development of the genre of Science Fiction in his book Science Fiction Before 
1900. Imagination discover technology, from 1994.11  Some of his highpoints are Thomas 
More’s Utopia from 1516; Cyrano de Bergerac’s Comic History of the States and 
Empires of the Moon from 1657; Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe from 1719; Jona-
than Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels from 1726; Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein from 1818; 
Jules Verne’s Around the World in Eighty Days from 1873 and H. G. Wells’ The 
Time Machine from 1895. Obviously the list could be much longer. It is obvious that 
the genre follows the path of Modern time’s issues and is influenced by the techno-
logical developments and the achievements of the sciences.    
At the beginning of the 20th Century, a new type of actor appeared in the sce-
ne of science fiction and fantasy. They were the “amateurs”, the non-professional 
scientists and the autodidact technicians. They revolutionized the process of think-
ing, designing and producing artefacts for consumption outside the scientific 
laboratory and outside the industry. This new group of amateurs can be illustrated 
by the figure of Hugo Gernsback (1884–1967) born in Luxembourg and immigrat-
ed to the United States in 1905 who speculated with a future society and its needs 
both as a entrepreneur and as science fiction writer. At the beginning of the 20th 
Century, Gernsback started a company in the U.S. with the name The Electric Import 
Company.  The catalogue of the company named Modern Electrics printed during the 
year 1908 included genuine products and future developments that were nearly fan-
tastic and the first magazine about electronics. In 1926, Gernsback started a new 
magazine Amazing stories, this with an unmistakeable fantastic character. Gernsback 
is considered the founder of the modern genre of “science fiction” and the prestig-
ious award “Hugo” is called after Gernsback. Richard L. McKinney’s study, tell us 
that fantastic anticipations of the future foresee even future possible catastrophes:  
 
 
 
                                               
11 Twayne’s Studies in Literary Themes and Genres; University of Southern California.  
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Figure 8: Future scenarios according to the visions of the fantastic  
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Entry 2: Magic technologies 
 
 
The broken technologies of magic pragmata concern the collection of arte-
facts that archaic societies and traditional narratives and myths developed as tools 
of some rituals. Magic artefacts remind especially of the technologies of poverty, 
but also to the technologies of art. Specific for the process of producing magic solu-
tions is that it is the opposite case of fantastic technologies. In the case of magic 
technologies, the solutions follow the combination of the dimensional levels of 
some pragmata and are not related to noemata at all. The noema of magic technol-
ogy does exist, but it is originated in pragma, which in this example works as “ritual”. 
Magic technologies as e.g. the rituals of “enchantment”, are not related to any con-
sistent perceptive sphere and therefore have not any connectivity with the world. 
That does not mean that magic rituals should not work, but if they do, they work 
within the ritual itself. Here lies the problem in itself; the magic ritual that creates 
the solution is now subordinating the empirical sphere to praxis. In this case, the 
unconscious mechanism of intentionality dominates the sphere of empirical 
knowledge. In this form magical technologies are the consequence of bricolage, in 
the sense that Lévi-Strauss gave the term:  
The “bricoleur” has no precise equivalent in English. He is a man who under-
takes odd jobs and is a Jack of all trades or a kind of professional do-it-
yourself man, but, as the text makes clear, he is of a different standing from, 
for instance, the English `odd job man' or handyman.12 
Archaic onticality is not congruent with today’s “modern” onticality because 
it ignores the dimensions provided by modern science and modern technology. In 
the modern world, archaic onticality survive in a new shape, as the spontaneous 
                                               
12 Claude Lévi-Strauss. The Savage Mind, London 1962; p. 16-17. 
 
 
 
Noema –broken 
 
 
 
 
 
Magic technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Noema is the “perceived as perceived”, a pure phenomenological “form”. 
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thought of everyday life. We can see that the characteristics of archaic thought are 
congruent with the onticality of modern mind when it is embedded in everyday 
praxis and in immediate knowledge. We are speaking of a common sense onticality 
in which e.g. music is still “music” and not sounds, vibrations, frequencies etc.  Sig-
fridus Aronus Forsius born in Helsinki in the year 1550, professor of astronomy of 
Uppsala, worked during a transition time with cosmology. His presentation of an 
archaic onticality is representative of any old onticality but it has developed at the 
same time in which the old cosmology became “broken” and therefore obsolete. For-
sius was contemporary with Copernicus, Tycho Brahe and Galileo, the principal 
developers of the new cosmology that modernized the world definitively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The world of Sigfridus Aronus Forsius, Physica: fol. 16 
 
 
 
 
 
In Forsius’ book Physica, written as late as in the year 1600, the primary quali-
ties of matter are still classified as heat, cold, dry and moist.13 Further these qualities 
could be active or passive. Forsius found fourteen secundae qualitates or qualitates tangi-
biles, which also worked in pairs, e.g. thick and thin, heavy and light, difficult and 
easy, strong and weak, etc. The principles of this classification of the things and 
events of the world followed the everyday life and their direct experiences and 
therefore the conclusions are valid for everyone in any culture. We can recognize 
here the technologies of the bricoleur.14 Many associations can be intuitively familiar 
for a modern mind, for example, Forsius says that thickness has its origin in cold and 
consists on dense parts. This quality can be found in every metal, in glass and in 
strong wood. Lightness instead, belongs to heat and can be found in smoke and 
feathers. Apart from the primary and secondary qualities, Forsius describe secret 
qualities.15 An example of a secret quality is the magnetism of a stone. The magnetic 
stone has the same primary and secondary qualities of any other stone, but it has in 
addition, the secret quality of magnetism. Another secret quality permits a piece of 
                                               
13 Forsius, Sigfridus Aronus. Physica. Utgiven av Johan Nordström. Uppsala Universitets årskrift 
1952:10. 
14 Claude Lévi-Strauss. The Savage Mind, London 1962; p.22. 
15 Op. cit., p.61-62. 
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glass set on fire a piece of paper, with the help of the light of the sun. The secret 
qualities are organized in two groups depending on some natural friendship Sympa-
thia or having some kind of hostility towards each other Antipathia.  Sympathia exists 
between the magnetic stone and iron or between the magnetic stone and the North 
Star. Antipathia exists between humans and the snake, between the wolf and the 
sheep, and less obviously between the bear and the hedgehog.  
The technologies of magic transport the human mind to an original state in 
which the relation with world was purely mythical. Their brokenness is unavoidable 
and definitive. Archaic thought and archaic technology are not indifferent to effec-
tive technological achievement. Their brokenness connect to effectiveness in a 
complex way, as the technologies of poverty manage to solve practical problems re-
defining the ontological world, the technologies of magic redefine the onticality of 
the world subordinating the knowledge of the world to cultural conditions.  
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Entry 3: Tentative 
technologies 
 
Specific for the process of producing tentative technologies is that the problem of 
docking is postponed. A sketch, a drawing, a skis show the shadows of pragma and 
noema.  They are only a trace, something to be, they are part of a very primitive 
process during which thought is pure intentionality, pure unconsciousness and work 
almost automatically. Tentative technologies show some standard forms, some of 
them are easy to list. The sketch (from the Greek meaning “to do a thing without 
preparation”) is a freehand drawing that is not intended to be a finished work. The 
sketch consist of some rapidly thought ideas meant to be used later. Some sketch-
books have become art objects as Leonardo’s sketches. Another known technique is 
the croquis, (meaning the same as “sketch” in French) which is a sketch involving a 
live model. The model changes its position constantly and the artist has not time to 
draw details. The croquis is a good method to draw moving models as animals and 
children. Another related term is the doodle:  
This is a type of unfocused drawing made while a person's attention is other-
wise occupied. Doodling can also be made while talking by telephone for a 
long period if a pen and paper are available. Popular kinds of doodles include 
cartoon versions of teachers or companions in a school, famous TV or comic 
characters, invented fictional beings, landscapes, textures, banners with leg-
ends, and animations made by drawing a scene sequence in various pages of a 
book or notebook.16 
The word doodle first appeared in the early seventeenth century to mean a fool 
                                               
16 http://piasdoodling.blogspot.com/ 
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broken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tentative technology 
 
 
Pragma is the usability or pragmaticity of a noema reveled through the acting of using 
the artefact.  Noema is the “perceived as perceived”, a pure phenomenological 
“form”. 
 
  
44 
or simpleton, and is thought to derive from the Low German dudeltopf, meaning 
"fool" or "simpleton". This is the meaning appearing in the song "Yankee Doodle", 
originally sung by British colonial troops prior to the American Revolutionary War. 
“This is also the origin of the early eighteenth century verb to doodle, meaning "to 
swindle or to make a fool of". The modern meaning emerged in the 1930s either 
from this meaning or from the verb "to dawdle", which since the seventeenth cen-
tury has had the meaning of “wasting time or being lazy”.17  
Another typical tentative technology is that of the prototype. It is an original 
sketch but understood as a standard idea of a class of artefacts. The term derives 
from the Greek and meant “archetype” or primitive model.  The term “proto” 
means “original”. Some kind of prototypes as Leonardo’s machines can be under-
stood as fruitless technologies also.  
Tentative technologies are vague and ambiguous in almost every aspect.  
According to Svante Lindqvist, five factors are decisive to the establishment of a new 
technology. These five factors are technical, geographical, economic, social and cultural. He 
arrived to this conclusion after his study of the introduction of the Newcomen engine 
in the Dannemora Mines in Sweden in 1726-1736.18 The Newcomen engine “was the 
first practical working engine capable of converting thermal energy (heat) into 
mechanical energy (work).” This engine developed by Thomas Newcomen (1663/4-
1729) was the first “prime mover” which could substitute traditional engines that 
used the energy of wind, water or animal muscle.  
The engine consisted basically of a boiler surmounted by a large cylinder con-
taining a piston. When the cylinder had been heated up and filled with steam 
from the boiler, cold water was injected into the cylinder. The condensed 
steam left a partial vacuum, which caused atmospheric pressure to force the 
piston down the cylinder. Thus, power was produced by the pressure of the 
atmosphere and not by the pressure of the steam.19  
Annette Henning studied the establishment of new technologies in our time.20 
She studied the reception in Sweden of the technology of solar collectors between the 
years of 1992-1995. We notice that the ambiguity connected to the reception of a 
solar engine producing a new kind of energy met problems that can be compared to 
those described by Lindqvist.  The ambiguity of new technologies depends on their 
“tentative” character. In the case of solar collectors the culturally ambiguity depended 
on “representations of sunshine, energy and technology, and the effect of combining 
these with one artefact – the solar collector.”21  
 
                                               
17 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doodle. 
18 Svante Lindqvist. Technology on Trial. The Introduction of Steam Power Technology into Sweden 1715-1736. 
Uppsala Studies in History of Science I. Uppsala; 1984.  
19 Svante Lindqvist. Op. cit.; p.111. 
20 Annette Henning. Ambiguous Artefacts Solar Collectors in Swedish Contexts. A Processes of Cultural Modifi-
cation. Stockholm studies in Social Anthropology; 2000.  
21 Op. cit.; p. 27. 
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Figure 10: Leonardo da Vinci, design for a parabolic compass 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Leonardo_parabolic_compass.JPG 
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25) 
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Entry 4: Technologies of 
poverty 
 
We notice that the technologies of poverty fulfil the condition of managing to 
re–dimension and dock materials, muscles, tools and machines in some referential 
dimensional space that is pragmatic but not ontical. If that which converts a noema 
to a pragma is the “coagulated” intentionality flowing during the acting of working, 
“acting brokenly” in this case, means that the pragma and the noema are not con-
gruent with each other. The “use” of the pragma exceeds its onticality. An immediate 
consequence of this is that the docking–process becomes equivocate. Using e.g. a 
bed as a shelf is acting to re–dimension and dock materials in some referential di-
mensional space, but the pragmatic aspects of the intentional act are subordinated 
to the prefixed properties of a reduced number of available artefacts. Consequently, 
congruency has to be reached with a number of reduced artefacts often belonging 
to different historical periods. Technologies of poverty are those that manage to 
dock any materials unused and rejected as worthless or unwanted by society reusing 
them as materials serving other purposes. Discarded metal suitable for reprocessing 
in houses or in furniture, boxes, wood, textiles, in fact anything that has been de-
stroyed or broken and cannot work as originally intended but which can be reused 
in some other redirected way.  
Specific for the process behind the technologies of poverty or distress is that both 
pragma and noema exist, but they are not related with each other in full corre-
spondence. The ontology created in this incongruent relationship is technological 
but incomplete. The technologies of poverty “work” properly, but in some unnatu-
ral manner, producing “poor” consequences.  That which we have to use is all that 
is necessary to the process of work, however the problem is that this world is lim-
ited and therefore the solutions are limited. We say that these technologies are 
ontical–broken because the ontical results are not congruent with the ontological 
standards. They are not fantastic because they work, and they are not magic because 
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they are not mere rituals, but they are not whole technologies because of their onti-
cal limitations.  
Urban acupuncture 
The process of reusing materials and artefacts has many levels depending on 
the economical possibilities and the intentions involved. Many architects have com-
prehended that the broken character of the technologies of poverty can be 
understood as a new and “postmodern” way to understand the technologies of 
dwelling. Seen from this perspective, technologies of poverty are converted into 
new technological solutions and are no longer typical cases of broken technologies. 
However, the limits lines are quite fine between broken technologies of dwelling 
and postmodern technologies of dwelling. In some cases, dwelling is solved with 
very primitive and circumstantial materials and artefacts but in some other cases, the 
bricolage admits more elaborated forms of congruence. The extraordinary way in 
which artefacts became pragma in a situation of extreme poverty has inspired to-
day’s architects to new urban solutions. To describe this process, the Guatemalan 
born architect Teddy Cruz, when working on the borders of two very different but 
deep interwoven societies – San Diego and Tijuana –introduced the term “urban 
acupuncture”.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Broken use of space, as 
in Tijuana (image Teddy Cruz for 
the New York Times) 
 
 
 
 
 
A Tijuana speculator travels to San Diego to buy a little bungalow that have 
                                               
22 Teddy Cruz writes on “Urban acupuncture.” Residential Architect Magazine (2005). 
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been slated for demolition to make space for new condominium projects. The little 
houses are loaded onto trailers and prepared for the travel to Tijuana, where they 
will have to clear customs before making the journey south. For days, one can see 
houses, just like cars and pedestrians, waiting in line to cross the border. Finally the 
houses enter into Tijuana and are mounted on one-story metal frames that leave an 
empty space at the street level to accommodate future uses. One city profits from 
the material that the other one wastes. Tijuana recycles the leftover buildings of San 
Diego, recombining them in fresh scenarios, creating countless new opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Project at Iquique, Chile showing to the left the delivered houses and at the right its ex-
panding possibilities 
 
 
The introduced term “acupuncture” is useful because it shows the piecemeal 
change in the ontology – the “being–in–the–world” – of the urban space. The reusing 
and remaking of artefacts provoking the collapse of the obvious congruence between 
noema and pragma, and suppose a technique of inserting and manipulating artefacts 
into specific points of the urban body with the aim of solving dwelling problems.  
Another group of architects working with dwelling solutions associated to shanty-
towns and poverty is the group Elemental of Chile.  In Iquique a city of the Chilean 
desert, the group developed an integral solution to a hundred families in a shanty 
town placed at the centre of the city. The solution was to simply follow the natural 
laws of the development of shantytowns, creating a structure that contemplated the 
“porosity” of the broken space of a shantytown and making possible the spontane-
ous developing of new spaces. 
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The broken character of the use of spaces in shantytowns has inspired artists 
as the Spaniard Dionisio Gonzáles to piecing together photos of the shantytowns 
themselves with photos of modern architecture blending the organized and geomet-
ric of the modern with the fuzzy and scattered of the spaces of poverty. 
 
The art of Gonzales, as the architectural solutions of Cruz or these of the Elemental 
group in Iquique, reminds us of the case of the ready-mades. If the readymade be-
comes art because of the re–dimension of artefacts, the acupuncture of shantytowns 
became a readymade of the city giving the shantytowns an artistic content. The syn-
apse of the broken technologies of poverty became the synapse of modern art. The 
spontaneous transcription of ontological properties from a communicative dimension 
to another that is typical for shantytowns dwelling solutions became the artistic syn-
apse of some postmodern architecture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Dionisio Gonzáles: Situ-Acciones Cubo Cristal III, 2001 
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Entry 5: Fruitless 
technologies 
 
To imitate an existing animal is a typical way to create new pragma. The tech-
nologian23  (or “humanistic technologist”) as the artist, are influenced by nature and 
easily imagine new noemata as variations of natural themes.  Leonardo’s artefacts 
are broken because they manage to re–dimension and dock materials, muscles, tools 
and machines but in a “naive–ontological” way. Specific for the process involved in 
fruitless technology is that it produces an onticality but without ontology. In Leonardo’s 
technological solutions, the artefacts are linked in a cognitive model that is wrong 
about the laws of physics. The cognitive sphere is present, but produces a broken 
ontology.  
Leonardo’s example is very clear to show the necessary connection between 
ontology and knowledge. In this case, both pragma and noema exists and they are 
congruent with each other too. The brokenness depends on the strong phenome-
nalization of the laws of nature they are built on. The imitative character of 
Leonardo’s solutions shows the primacy of the everyday world in his understanding 
of experience and that conduce his solutions to a broken pragmatism as well as to a 
broken science. The technologies of poverty e.g. may use a table “as a chair”, the 
acting of sitting is fulfilled with sufficiency in spite of the using of a not full congru-
                                               
23 I found on the Internet that the term was coined in 1990 by Donna J. Fisher from the University 
of Pittsburgh. The term describes “one who studies the psychological, sociological, spiritual, philo-
sophical and artistic ramifications of technology in human life.” 
http://technologian.com/introduction.html (2008-05-18).  
 
Ontological–
broken 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fruitless technologies 
 
 
 
Ontologic is the sphere of intentionality and acting.  The directness of artefacts when they are used.  
 
  
52 
ent artefact; acting fruitlessly in some comparative situation should be to design a 
chair that only can be used as a table. Through imitating animals, Leonardo pro-
duced broken ontologies that obstruct the pragmatically of the technical solutions. 
When Leonardo designed a machine that flow as a bird, he identified the natural 
World with the human World. 
There was very little understanding of the laws of flight in Leonardo’s designs 
such as how lift is created or how one controls the stability of a flying ma-
chine. There are designs for wings, but one cannot say Leonardo had a 
systematic design for a glider, say, though modern enthusiasts have recon-
structed such a wing and completed the design for such as craft. There is a 
parachute for controlled decent and one design of a vertical airscrew or Ar-
chimedes screw for controlled ascent into the air that led many to claim that 
Leonardo had invented the helicopter. Gibbs-Smith points out that even had 
these machines been built, these flapping mechanisms would not have gener-
ated sufficient lift to support the weight of gravity of a human even using 
modern materials.24 
To develop a flying machine it was necessary to hold back the archaic tempta-
tion to imitate nature. It was first when the human mind understood that nature 
couldn’t be copied in every detail, developing analogies became possible.  
Leonardo did not understand the laws of scaling that permits creatures of a 
certain size to attain lift by flapping such as birds and insects and restricts 
humans to flight by gliding. What is clear from the sketches of these machines 
is the playfulness of using different combinations of kinematic machine ele-
ments in seeking a solution to the problem of flight; a kind of Renaissance 
‘brain storming’. 25 
The importance of scaling in the study of mechanics was first noted and sys-
tematically studied by Galileo Galilei hundred years after Leonardo’s time. Galileo 
was interested in knowing how proportions affected the form of the living beings. 
The study of the changes in size of the living beings lead him to the study of the 
variations of forms as such. Galileo wrote: 
It is perfectly clear that if it is desired to conserve the same corporal propor-
tions for a giant that prevail for the average man, it is necessary to find a 
material as hard to construct the bones of the giant. Otherwise, it will be nec-
essary to accept that the body of the giant will be relatively weak. Because if 
one increases the length of the giant over a certain limit, this one will collapse 
and squash because of its own weight. If on the contrary the size of the body 
                                               
24 Moon, Francis C. The Machines of Leonardo da Vinci and Franz Reuleaux. Kinematics of Ma-
chines from the Renaissance to the 20th Century. Springer, 2007; p. 256. 
25 Moon, Francis C. 2007; Ibid. 
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is reduced, its strength in the same proportion will not be reduced; it shows 
that smaller the body is, the harder it turns out to be.26 
The Galilean method consists of the systematic and quantitative study of the 
proportions of the parts of the body of living beings, to the effects to deduce physi-
cal laws from conclusions of morphologic character. Although this method does 
not allow knowing why a certain form has been the chosen one before others, it al-
lows excluding impossible forms. The study of Galileo followed some steps; first 
two of the dimensions of the living tissue are compared as dignities (like Euclidean’s 
exponents). For example, the length of a bone is compared with the flat section or 
the volume of the same bone. Secondly showed how this relation is influenced by 
the changes in size of the living organism. It is stated that the changes in its size 
motivate changes in the morphology and vice versa. This Galilean methodology is 
known today by the name allometry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Leonardo’s flying machine           
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Leonardo_Design_for_a_Flying_Machine,_c._1488.jpg     
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25) 
 
Leonardo’s visions about flying27 cannot be identified with the fantastic vi-
sions of flying angels appropriated to the mythology of the Christian culture. The 
ideas of Leonardo were technological in a strict sense in spite of being incomplete. 
                                               
26 Galilei, Galileo.  Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Dover Publications Inc, New York, 1954. p. 
131. 
27 http://www.museoscienza.org/english/leonardo/img/navicellavolante.jpg 
(2006-02-15). 
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The lack of functionality depended specifically in the misunderstanding of the con-
nection between scaling and the laws of gravity. This can be illustrated with 
Leonardo’s own words: 
The bird in its flight without the help of the wind drops half the wing down-
wards, and thrusts the other half toward the tip backwards; and the part which 
is moved down prevents the descent of the bird, and that which goes back-
wards drives the bird forwards. When the bird-raises its wings it brings its 
extremities near together; and while lowering them it spreads them further 
apart during the first half of the movement, but after this middle stage, as 
they continue to descend it brings them together again.28 
Worldly humanism 
During a time in which Western Europe began to work intensively with the 
spatial representation of the New World, Leonardo da Vinci worked with the new 
spatial representation in general. He drew maps and developed cartography, worked 
with anatomical studies and used the acquired knowledge in painting and sculptur-
ing. Simultaneously, Leonardo studied the human body in movement and the 
appropriateness of bodily movement with different human tasks developing ma-
chines that worked analogically to the human body. Without doubt, he represents a 
new kind of humanism, a humanism that is materialistic and engaged in worldly 
matters. This redirection of the humanist’s studies revealed the importance of the 
usefulness of humanistic knowledge. Renaissance humanism was otherwise charac-
terized by the revival of classical studies and by the accurate recreation of the 
classical environment. To the mainstream of humanists, Leonardo’s redirection of 
the tasks of humanism was clearly perceived as a threat to the humanistic project in 
general.  
“The deplorable deviation from the sources of early humanism was blamed at 
least in part on Leonardo: on his interest in knowing, his experimentalism, his 
religious scepticism, his lack of interest in the ancient.29 
The differences between the two kinds of humanism, are discernible in the 
confrontation between Michelangelo and Leonardo: 
Much earlier his discussion with Botticelli had been one of the motives for 
which Leonardo left the learned Florence for the more technological Milan: 
this polemic was at the origin of Michelangelo’s anti–Leonardism. Aiming 
toward the direct and unprejudiced experience of the real, Leonardo denied 
the authority of history as a teacher. Michelangelo idealized history, prioriting 
                                               
28 Hart, I. B. The Mechanical Investigations of Leonardo Da Vinci. Chicago, 1925.  
29 Argan, G. C. “Michelangelo 1492” i Levenson, J.A. (Editor) 1991 Circa 1492, s. 114 
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it as the necessary reference for realizing his own modernity but excluding any 
form of imitation.30 
     To the worldly humanism of Leonardo, the study of the classics was more 
a source of inspiration than the purpose of its recreation. The study of the classics 
was an excuse to break with Aristotelianism and the Scholasticism of the Universi-
ties and an opportunity to follow a secular and bourgeois path of investigation. 
Behind Leonardo –as well as behind Machiavelli – the impulses of the Modern en-
trepreneur were growing on the shoulders of humanism. Consequently, humanism 
has in fact been the intellectual source of science, technology, capitalism and Mo-
dernity. How can it be possible, then, that today both science and technology are so 
rarely associated with humanism? 
  
                                               
30 Ibid. 
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Entry 6: Art as broken 
technology 
 
  
Specific for the process involved in artistic technologies is that of the brokenness 
of ontology. It being the contrary to fruitless technologies, here it is the everyday 
world that which is questioned. The underlying process is that of using experienced 
artefacts building new noematic contents. Directly or indirectly, consciously or un-
consciously, the artist uses the available materials of the everyday world to create 
new intellectual contents.  This process gives art the character of being unusable, 
inoperative and non-productive for society. That is why Plato preferred the artisans 
to the artist. Plato’s ideas of “art” were built upon the idea of “craft”. Plato distin-
guished the practical capacity of creating things as some kind of “imitation” of 
God’s acting. The carpenter, creates a table, imitating God, the painter on the other 
hand, paints a table imitating the carpenter. Therefore, what the artist does is an im-
itation of an imitation, a subproduct of something that never was original.  
According to Greenberg, the effect of modernism on art consists in the ex-
ploring process of the limits of the medium of each art form. Art as mimetic art or as 
abstract construction is always an exploration of the limits of media. Self–awareness in 
making art does not mean that the task of exploring the limits of media became art’s 
definitive goal. But it is true that before modernism, the artist was not aware of the 
task that he/she was performing. In the same sense, Danto has observed that refer-
ring to modernism as the “end of art”, means the end of a kind or “art narratives” 
and nothing else. History cannot come to an end, only some historical narratives, 
according to Danto.  
Regardless of Greenberg’s dimensional considerations, his art theory insists in 
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seeing only a few aspects of the dimensionality of art, for instance, the “flatness” of 
painting and the three–dimensionalities of sculpture and architecture. This theory 
fails to notice the presence of the artefact or media behind the work of art. Being a 
contemporary to McLuhan, who saw media everywhere, Greenberg represents the oppo-
site approach, seeing media only in a few art forms. In his book Kant after Duchamp31 
Thierry de Duve has recorded the question of the complexity of dimensionality in 
modernist painting. He refers to the problematic standpoint which the new painting 
created, when the limits between flat representations and three–dimensional art-
works disappeared. De Duve cited Greenberg’s words: 
Each art, it turned out, had to go effect this demonstration on its own ac-
count. What had to be exhibited and made explicit was that which was unique 
and irreducible not only in art in general but also in each particular art. It 
quickly emerged that the unique and proper area of competence of each art 
coincided with all that was unique to the nature of its medium.32 
It is well known that Greenberg understands that “the unique and proper area 
of competence of painting” was flatness while three–dimensionality was the province 
of sculpture: 
Three–dimensionality is the province of sculpture, and for the sake of its own 
autonomy painting has had above all to divest itself of everything it might 
share with sculpture.33 
We see that Greenberg defended a theory according to which each art form 
has to preserve the limits of the medium in which the art–form was embedded, 
against other art forms and their specific medium. This was according to Greenberg 
the principal goal of modernism, especially in painting. Of course this theory could 
not survive the sixties.  
From Manet to Stella, modernist painting has progressively surrendered to the 
resistance of its medium, to the point where very little was left beside 
its flatness itself. Accompanying a portion of this history, from Pollock to 
Morris Louis, the critic’s taste has equally surrendered. Yet it stopped short of 
acknowledging Stella’s black and aluminium paintings, judging perhaps that 
they had turned into arbitrary objects. Battling Greenberg on his own turf, the 
early minimalists pushed their paintings into the third dimension, where they 
became objects indeed.34 
Frank Stella emphasized the picture–as–object, rather than the picture as a 
                                               
31 Thierry de Duve. Kant after Duchamp. MIT press, 1996. 
32 Op. Cit. p. 207. 
33 Op. Cit.  p. 208. 
34 Op. Cit.  p. 217. 
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representation. He produced a series of paintings in which regular bands of black 
paint were separated by very thin white pinstripes of unpainted canvas. Starting 
1960, Stella began to produce paintings in aluminium and copper. The limits be-
tween painting and sculpture disappear during the sixties because of the works of 
the minimalists as Stella and especially of Donald Judd.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Untitled (1988-1991) by Donald Judd. Concreta at the Israel museum Art Garden 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Donald_Judd_IMJ2.JPG 
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25) 
 
The work of Donald Clarence Judd counts as one of the most significant min-
imalist artists; he wanted autonomy for the artwork against the space in which it was 
embedded creating a composition without hierarchies in which synapsing became 
the centre of the composition.  
Art after Duchamp 
After Duchamp, it became obvious that art could no longer be associated to aes-
thetics. Aesthetics has by tradition, been the study of the essence of beauty in both 
nature and manufactured things. So was it for Plato and Aristotle. Plato relegated 
art to pure imitation, and understood it as the lowest form of knowledge. In The Re-
public Plato, distinguish between three reality modes, the idea or form, the 
technological knowledge of making things by an artisan and last the imitating work 
of the artist. At the beginning of the century Marcel Duchamp and the ready–made 
art, started a process that put the usability of the platonic categories of knowledge 
to an end. After Andy Warhol and the outbreak of pop–art during the sixties, it be-
came more problematic to distinguish non–art from art. Plato’s intention in The 
Republic was that of the study of the modes of knowledge that would be allowed in 
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the republic to be constructed. Plato identified art–making with “imitation”, a de-
ceiving practice built on the appearances of the secondary qualities of phenomena. 
In a conversation between with Adeimantus Socrates said: 
 In saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding 
about the mimetic art, –whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be 
allowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the lat-
ter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?35 
The question about reality and simulation, about reproduction and truth, the 
opposition between artworks and commodities, all these issues are among the pre-
occupations of Plato defining his aesthetics; in a dialog between Socrates and 
Glaucon we can read:   
– Now, let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed 
to be–an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear–of appearance or 
of reality?  
– Of appearance. 
–Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things 
because he lightly touches on a small part of them and that part an image. For 
example: A painter will paint a cobbler, a carpenter, or any other artist, 
though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may de-
ceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a 
carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real 
carpenter. 36  
We could say that for Plato, art is broken in truthfulness. Plato is interested in 
clarifying the differences between representations and reality and in fact, the prob-
lematic of dimensionality in representation. The importance of ideas in Plato’s work, 
was to make the faculty of thinking or reasoning the principal form of representa-
tion and convert “intellectual” knowledge to the most important and useful form. 
In the 18th century, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten redefined this traditional 
inquiry about beauty as the science of “emotional or sensitive knowledge” and 
adopted the Greek word αισθητική for perception to denote this new discipline. Baum-
garten wanted to describe the “criticism of taste” but it is also used as “that which 
appeals to the senses”. Philosophical studies follow hereafter, two paths, the study 
of things known and the study of things perceived –aesthetic entities. Baumgarten 
then gathered the study of the arts under the aegis of aesthetics. The two were 
quickly identified and aesthetics became “the philosophy of art” in much the same 
                                               
35 Plato. The Republic, Book III..Translated by Benjamin Jowett 
 (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.4.iii.html/  (2006-07-30). 
36 Plato. The Republic, ibid. 
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way “ethics” is the philosophy of morality.37 In our days, philosophers distinguish 
the philosophy or Art from Aesthetics and accept that if all things in the world can 
be seen aesthetically, because all things embrace or lack some kind of beauty, not all 
art needs to be beautiful –and therefore does not need to be object of an aesthetical 
inquiry. During the sixties, Ian and Elaine Baxter (whom worked behind the com-
mon name The N. E. Thing Company, 1966–1978 in Vancouver) solve the problem 
dividing their practice in two categories, ACT–works (Aesthetic Claimed things) and 
ART–works (Aesthetics Rejected things). Thierry de Duve used this nomenclature 
to analyse some of the artworks of the fifties and the sixties.38  
 
 
                                               
37 Timothy Binkley. “Piece: Contra Aesthetics” in Margolis, Joseph. (Editor) Philosophy Looks at The 
Arts. Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics. 1987. Sid. 83. 
38 Thierry de Duve. Kant after Duchamp. MIT press, 1996; p. 296. 
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An outline of second-level 
brokenness 
Second-level technologies are broken technologies that are dimensionally broken. 
Their brokenness relies on the fact that they stretch over different dimensions each 
in some particular way. Second-level technologies are technologies that present a 
noema-pragma puzzled constitution always stretching in between dimensions. The 
most obvious forms of puzzled noemata-pragmata are stretching in time and space 
or both. One of these groups consists of old technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: "The Rocket" steam locomotive  
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Steam_locomotive_rocket.png 
 (Wikimedia Commons: 2008-11-25) 
 
  
 
To this group belong the technologies that worked in the past and fit in a 
context that has disappeared; we name these enigmatic or outdated technologies and 
we can find them in museums, e.g. steam locomotives39. Enigmatic technologies are 
time-broken. 
Another group of second-level technologies are virtual technologies that puzzle 
with space in an empirical and/or phenomenological manner. Virtual technologies 
                                               
39 http://www.steamlocomotive.info/vlocomotive.cfm?display=1132 (2006-08-02). 
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are not simple visual representations of artefacts but representations, which are free 
from the laws of the dimensional world and can therefore, be pure constructions. 
They are not only fantastic constructions as the representations of fantasy, because 
they have an inter-dimensional existence. Nevertheless, virtual technologies can be 
understood as a subgroup of fantastic technologies or of art technologies.  
A ninth group is the group of media—broken technologies that consists on tech-
nologies of transcription and synapse between media forms. This group can be 
understood in some cases as a subgroup of art technologies and in other cases also 
as a subgroup of virtual technologies. However, there are cases in which the bro-
kenness of the representation is not reducible to other cases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 17: A “virtual” calculator    
http://www.anvari.org/cols/Back_to_the_Old_Technologies.html (2008-11-25) 
 
A tenth group is the family of game technologies and toys. It is miniature 
worlds inhabited by reproductions of whole technologies that are not intended to 
work. The size-broken dimensions characterize this family of brokenness. 
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Figure 18: Scale model of the Mercedes-Benz W163 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Toy_car_735
3_ubt.JPG   
(Wikimedia common 2008-11-25) 
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Entry 7: Enigmatic 
technologies 
 
 
Specific for the process involved in enigmatic (outdate) technologies is that they be-
long to an older-everyday world, an historical reality that has vanished. Nevertheless 
knowledge and purpose are congruent in docking. That means that this technolo-
gies are successful in producing the adjustment in–between pragmata and noemata 
originated in different dimensionalities and in managing the adaptation process that 
the body goes through when it tries to match tools, machines and the raw material 
during some process of work. The ontical level and the ontological are complemen-
tary in the sense that the production of new noemata is followed by the 
development of new pragmata, new ideas generate new praxis. However, the whole 
process is enigmatic; it demands that the chain of events should be recreated in an up-
date scenario. The materials, the tools, the environment, the artisans and workers who 
knew these techniques have disappeared. If the reconstruction is possible, it can 
never be anything else but a “possible world”, a conjecture.  
Working with the history of technology implies working from the first per-
son’s perspective with events that demand interpretation. History is intentional 
never descriptive and the historian is a believer not a sceptic. The word we choose 
to describe this reality with is the Latin word aenigma, from the Greek ainigma, “to 
speak obscurely or speak in riddles”. In this sense “outdate technologies” for us are 
enigmatic. Martin Heidegger discovered the epistemological importance of outdate 
technologies when he in Sein und Zeit wrote: 
The “antiquities” preserved in museums (for example, household things) be-
long to a “time past,” and are yet still objectively present in the “present.” 
How these useful things are historical when they are, alter all, not yet past? 
 
Time broken 
 
 
 
Enigmatic  
(outdate technology) 
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Only because they became an object of historiographical interest, of the culti-
vation of antiquity and national lore? But such useful things can only, after all, 
be historiographical objects because they are somehow in themselves histori-
cal. We repeat the question: With what justification do we call these beings 
historical when they are not yet past? Or do these “things” “in themselves” 
yet have “something past” about them although they are still objectively pre-
sent today? Are these objectively present things then still what they were? 
Evidently, these “things” have changed. The tools have become fragile and 
worm–eaten “in the course of time.” But yet the specific character of the past 
that makes them something historical does not lie in this transience that con-
tinues even during the objective presence in the museum. But then what is 
past about the useful thing? What were the “things” that they no longer are 
today? They are still definite useful things, but out of use. However, if they 
were still in use, like many heirlooms in the household, would they then not 
be historical? Whether in use or out of use, they are no longer what they were. 
What is “past”? Nothing other than the world within which they were en-
countered as things at hand belonging to a context of useful things and used 
by heedful Da–sein existing–in–the– world. That world is no longer. But what 
was previously innerworldly in that world is still objectively present. As useful 
things belonging to that world, what is now still objectively present can never-
theless belong to the “past.” 40 
Heidegger makes a difference between “belonging to the past” and “having–
been–there” because the “Da–sein can never be past”: 
The historical character of extant antiquities is thus grounded in the “past” of 
Da–sein to whose world that past belongs. According to this, only “past” 
Da–sein would be historical, but not “present” Da–sein. However, can Da–
sein be past at all, if we define “past” as “now no longer objectively present 
or at hand”? Evidently, Da–sein can never be past, not because it is imperish-
able, but because it can essentially never be objectively present. Rather, if it is, 
it exists. But a Da–sein that no longer exists is not past in the ontologically 
strict sense; it is rather having–been–there. The antiquities still objectively 
present have a “past” and a character of history because they belong to useful 
things and originate from a world that has–been the world of a Da–sein that 
has–been–there.41  
That is why outdate technologies of in general every historical event is never 
objectively lost but recoverable through the hermeneutical interpretation. We can 
say that a technology is always in some sense “fragile” because it is subordinated to 
the perpetual change of the World. The improvement of the modern world shows 
                                               
40 Heidegger, Martin. Being and time. State University of New York, 1996; p. 348. 
41. Ibid. 
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that the utility of pragmata is increasingly shorter and therefore, their “lifespan” as 
“technologies” is even shorter. Comparing the life span of the Stone Age axe to the 
lifespan of a Steam machine and then to the lifespan of a computer program or fur-
ther, to the lifespan as ephemera as the label or the ticket. History is “running 
faster” would Paul Virilio say.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Hindenburg at Naval Lakehurst (1936) 
 
Wikimedia common: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Hindenburg_at_lakehurst.jpg 
 
 
 
During the last years of the 20th Century, the fragility of the World has be-
come palpable and that has increased the importance of institutions as libraries, 
archives and museums. To the large amount of pragmata, which these institutions 
try to save, there are some new worth to mention. One is the group of abandonware, 
the other is the group of ephemera. “Abandonware” stands for the computer soft-
ware that is no longer sold or supported at the market. It is the case of older 
computer games but could be the case of other products.42 ´The name “ephemera” 
is given to everything that has been made to last only for a short time, such as “la-
bels” or “tickets”. However, the term is used to refer especially to printed pragmata.  
 
                                               
42 Wikipedia (2008-04-17). 
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These artefacts are saved in museums and private collections and they differ 
from other museum items because they were intended to be technologically usable 
during a very short period. Their brokenness is palpable in their utility and it could 
be said that their pragmaticity is very fragile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
advertisements 
bank checks 
baseball cards 
billheads 
bonds 
bookmarks 
bookplates 
broadsides 
brochures 
business cards 
calendars 
cameo stamps 
chromos 
cigar box labels & bands 
clipper ship cards 
 
die-cuts 
greeting cards 
indentures 
invitations 
labels 
letters 
magazines 
maps 
newspapers 
packaging 
pamphlets 
paper dolls 
passes 
photographs 
postcards 
 
poster stamps 
posters 
programs 
rewards of merit 
seed company ads 
Shakers 
sheet music 
songsters 
stocks 
tickets 
timetables 
trade cards 
trade catalogs 
valentines 
watch papers  
 
 
Figure 20: The Ephemera Society of America includes the following list of categories of ephemera 
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Entry 8: Virtual Technologies  
  
 
No every broken technology can easily be placed in a category of pragma-
ta/noemata respectively ontical/ontological. That is because not every category of 
artefacts is in an obvious way constituted out of inner-consciousness aspects. On 
the contrary, some of the artefacts that populated the everyday world make a claim 
of being “objective”. These artefacts of the second-level brokenness are built on the 
first level and their “objectivity” is in fact a re-elaboration of the subjectivity of the 
first level inner-consciousness. 
One of the emerging groups could be named virtual technologies or also impossi-
ble technologies. They can be grasped as artistic artefacts, as ready-mades that 
present the docking process as a bricolage, playing with time and space, mixing 
noema and pragma to produce “hybrid” technologies.43 As “hybrid” technology, we 
classify any broken technology that combines with the character of other broken 
technologies. In the following examples, the genres of broken technologies became 
humoristic when they combine different properties to produce impossible technol-
ogies. In our icon of this entry, the presented virtual tool, a synapse that combines 
different periods of the history of the drill, the modern   “cordless” drill with an old 
“brace” drill. 
What is it that we call virtual? Without doubt, virtual realities covers with re-
newed intensity the classic problem of the relationship between the soul and the 
body, that of the relationship between the immateriality of the soul and the materi-
ality of the body, the lack of extension of the first and the vast character of the 
second.  
                                               
43 All the pictures in this chapter are from: Anvari.Org;  
http://www.anvari.org/cols/Back_to_the_Old_Technologies.html 
 
 
Space-broken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
Virtual technologies 
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To understand what we mean with “virtual” today we believe that it is neces-
sary to introduce further categories of analysis. We need to distinguish spatial 
dimensions as the dignity and the size of a representation, without specifying if this 
representation is considered an idea, an image, a concept, a word, etc. The dignity of a 
representation decides if it is punctual, linear, plane or three-dimensional. Pure thought 
(and the soul) for example, is punctual we say, because it lacks extension. We say that 
symbolic communication generally (linguistic expressions) is one-dimensional. The flat 
image can then be understood as two-dimensional and a real object as three-dimensional. 
Very different from the dignity of a representation is its size. The size of a thing can 
make it part of other things.  
The dignity and size of a representation decides if it is a thing (a real object) or 
if the object is virtual.  A test permits us to distinguish between a virtual object and a 
thing. We verify that things have always at least one face hidden from sight. In other 
words, artefacts which are “things” cannot be encompassed thoroughly only by the 
act of sight. Another form of expressing this idea is that an exhaustive examination of 
the thing always demands the resource of the sense of touch. With these categories 
of analysis, we can conclude that the images and ideas communicated through com-
puters are not things but representations without the dimension of touch. We can also 
conclude that the dimension of touch is built on more primitive dimensions as 
those of dignity and size. We say that every-thing that we can touch is three-
dimensional and has a size. To “be touched” should be understood directly or indi-
rectly; e.g. atoms cannot be touched “directly”, but they can be touched “indirectly” 
by the mediation of other small particles. Consequently, virtual realities are less than 
three-dimensional realities, and that means a reality that does not belong to the di-
mension of the real––presential and cannot be touched. Any study of virtuality is 
then a study of “non– presential” worlds, worlds in which the human body and the 
sense of touch is not available.  
Of course, we can consider pure thought as “virtual”, or the scenario of 
dreams as “virtual”, nevertheless, for these expressions there are better terms than 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: A synapse between a flashlight and a candle 
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“virtual”. Let us here restring the meaning of “virtual” to “digital worlds produced 
by technological means”. In this sense, the image on a mirror, which does not be-
long to the dimension of the real–presential, is not virtual, because it is not “digital”. 
Virtual realities as we understand them are first, a consequence of science and tech-
nology, and especially today, they are “digital”, exist in the domain of the electronic 
communication. Yet, the image on a mirror is the consequence of the technology of 
mirror construction but we do not consider them as “virtual”. We need to introduce 
one more criteria to differentiate the digital image from that of a mirror.  Both the 
images of the mirror and those of the computer’s screen are emergent phenomena, 
consequence of the presence of other producing realities that are material. Howev-
er, we notice that the digital image and the medium (the computer) that produce it, 
are the consequence of the human purpose (intentional act) while the image of the 
mirror is not intentional but transcendental and only the medium –the mirror itself– is 
intentional.  
Further, we notice that a virtual representation has a variable degree of fusion 
with the thing that acts as its support or medium. A book, for example, and in gen-
eral all printed representations, can be understood as the result of what in Spanish 
would be called cosificación; this is the processes which makes something thing–like. 
Cosificación makes the virtual representation an intermediate product between 
“pure thing” and a “pure thought”. These printed representations, produced in a 
computer, show a much smaller degree of cosificación and can be considered a prod-
uct much closer to pure thought. For instance a version of the Windows Operative 
System can be referred as “virtual” because this computer system is both a technol-
ogy and it works digitally. In other words, “digital” or “virtual” technologies work 
in a “virtual world” because these worlds belong to the dimensionality of the un-
touchable and have been embodied in a computer program. In this sense, virtual 
technologies are koto as Rafael Capurro would call them referring to a Japanese term 
for “event”. According to Capurro the contents of the Internet is never a “thing” 
(Japanese: mono) but an informational event. 44 
Because virtual reality does not reach to the level of everyday materiality, it 
could be considered as a form of objectifying thought–representation, in the same way as 
the world created by the written word first and the world created by the printer later 
were new ways to objectify thought contents, reproducing, and saving ideas, images, 
and intellectual developments. This new level of objectivity is achieved by means of 
new technologies, which are built on old ones. However, what are the differences? 
We noticed that virtual representations have a variable degree of fusion with the arte-
fact that acts as its support. This evolution, from the first inscription of symbols on 
a rock to the apparition of the virtual word, is the process of the vanishing of the 
frontiers between thought–as–internal–phenomena and thought–as–public–phenomena.  
                                               
44 See Tadashi Takenouchi, International Journal of Information Ethics, Vol. 1 (06–2004).  
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Once upon a time, humanity was moving from a collective mind to an indi-
vidual mind, reaching the higher individual development with the development of 
the printer. This process of individualization was the necessary consequence of the 
identification between communication and transport because to write symbols on a 
rock was functional if the intention was to communicate with people in another 
time but in the same place. If the idea was to communicate with people far away, the 
written rock had to be moved with the message to the place of the receiver (in this time or in 
some another time). The solution to this practical problem was to associate com-
munication to one specific human body, the body of the sender or of the 
messenger. The idea was that the messenger would reconstruct the message in a 
new place and time. The immediate consequence of this is that the message be-
comes extremely personal, and also language developed extremely ambiguously 
because the influence of personalized variations in syntax and semantics. Because of 
this the achievement of standardization became a necessity, which was solved with 
the development of the print. The print, which was the first step into the standardi-
zation of communication, was also the first step directed to the limitation of 
individualism and to the separation between communication and transport. Nowa-
days, human communication continues to move away from individualism, favouring 
the development on new standards of communication in a clear development of a 
modern collective mind. “Modernity” in the McLuhan sense of the term, supposes the 
end of the identification between communication and transport. As McLuhan no-
ticed, “electrical” communication made individualism obsolete as it made 
communication independent from the human body. Since McLuhan’s time, the 
process has developed further and the early electrical world has become digital.  
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Figure 22: From thought as internal-phenomena to thought as public-phenomena 
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Texts as machines 
We could say that since the computer revolution and the rise of a digital 
world, the nature of the text and its place in communication has remarkably change. 
According to Espen J. Aarseth this new situation, has clarified the existence of a 
kind of text that does not work “linearly” but as “machines”. These ideas were pre-
sented in Aarseth book from 1997; Cybertext. Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. In his 
study, Aarseth explain that “mechanical” texts have always existed and they are not 
a consequence of a digitalised world. However, they became an identifiable group of 
texts because of the rise of Internet and the video games culture. According to 
Aarseth “the best-known example of cybertext in antiquity is the Chinese text of 
oracular wisdom the I Ching. Also known as the Book of Changes, the existing text is 
from around the time of the Western Chou dynasty (1122-770 BC).”45  The essential 
characteristic of these types of texts –which Aarseth define as “Ergodic literature” is 
that it is not possible to clearly separate the different dimensions involved in the 
phenomena. The cybertext’s “mechanical” nature makes it work as an indissoluble 
part of the medium in which the text is embedded. There are many distinct proper-
ties of these kinds of texts, each of the characteristics is difficult to define, yet 
together they contribute to a better comprehension of the cybertext. One of those 
characteristics is the “non-linearity”, that means, that the words in the text are not 
aligned in space or in time in a linear way. We have said that the written text is ob-
viously one-dimensional. Nevertheless, this is not true for the Cybertext, which as 
Aarseth shows, is multidimensional. Other important characteristic of these texts 
are their “interactivity” which is depending on their multidimensional character.  
According to Aarseth the classification of text expands to cover any kind of 
produced script in any form, from a poem to a database: 
Instead of defining text as a chain of signifiers, as linguists and semioticians 
do, I use the word for a whole range of phenomena, from short poems to 
complex computer programs and databases. As the cyber prefix indicates, the 
text is seen as a machine not metaphorically but as a mechanical device for 
the production and consumption of verbal signs. Just as a film is useless 
without a projector and a screen, so a text must consist of a material medium 
as well as a collection of words. The machine, of course, is not complete 
without a third party, the (human) operator, and it is within this triad that the 
text takes place.46 
 
 
                                               
45 Aarseth, Espen J. Cybertext. Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. London 1997, p. 9. 
46 Op. Cit. p. 21. 
 
  
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: The figure is from Aarseth, Espen J. 
Cybertext. Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. Lon-
don 1997, p. 21 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Aarseth, the principal characteristic of a cybertext is that it is 
complex. Complexity makes a traditional reading of the text impossible, because it is 
impossible to predict its limits, and therefore the amount of acting involved increas-
es in the act of reading. 
When a system is sufficiently complex, it will, by intention, fault, or coinci-
dence, inevitably produce results that could not be predicted even by the 
system designer. A typical example is a chess program that plays better than 
its programmer. Even if there is no reason to suspect that anything but mean-
ingless operations of shifting zeroes and ones go on inside the programmed 
machine, it nevertheless displays a significant behaviour that is not –and in 
fact could not–be anticipated by its programmer, even if it could be claimed 
that it was “intended”.47 
To analyse and classify the different types of texts Aarseth introduce some 
theoretical principles and produce some new analytical terms. Aarseth distinguish 
between scriptons and textons. Scriptons and textons are strings of signs and bearer of 
information and they differ from each other depending on how they appear to readers 
and how they exist in the text: 
 (1) A text cannot operate independently of some material medium, and this 
influences its behaviour, and (2) a text is not equal to the information it 
transmits. Information is here understood as a string of signs, which may (but 
does not have to) make sense to a given observer. It is useful to distinguish 
between strings as they appear to readers and strings, as they exist in the text, 
since these may not always be the same or want of better terms, I call the 
                                               
47 Aarseth, Espen J. Cybertext. Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. London 1997, p. 27. 
  
78 
former scriptons and the latter textons. Their names are not important, but the 
difference between them is.48 
To produce a typology that manages the differences between traditional texts 
computer programmes, video games and databases, Aarseth created the following 
categories49: 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48  Aarseth, Espen J. Op.cit. p. 62. 
49 Aarseth, Espen J. Op.cit., p. 64–65. 
 
Variable Possible Value Scriptons Textons 
Dynamics Static Constant Constant 
 Dynamic IDT (intratextonic 
dynamics) 
Change Constant 
 
TDT (textonic dy-
namics) 
 
Change Change 
Determinability Determinable Constant adjacent scripton of every scripton 
Indeterminable Variable adjacent scripton of any scripton 
Transiency Transient (intransient) The passing of the subjective time of the refer-
ring reader makes the scriptons appear. (As in 
some video games) 
Perspective Personal (impersonal) Necessary interactivity between the reader and 
the text 
Access Random (controlled) When all scriptons of the text are readily available 
to the user at any time 
Linking Explicit, conditional, none For hypertexts some links are more or less condi-
tional 
User function Explorative, configurative, in-
terpretative, textonic. 
Functions added to the user of a text  
 
Table 2: Aarseth’s classification of texts 
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With the results of the typology, Aarseth conclude that the ergodic and the linear 
texts can be arranged as follow: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 24: The figure is from Espen J. Aarseth. Op. cit., p. 64. 
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Entry 9: Media-broken 
technologies 
 
 
Intentionality is pure acting and it is grasped as praxis. It is pure difference, 
something to be, never consolidate. Therefore, it is not correct to speak about the 
“medium” or “media” but instead about intermediality. To study intermediality in this 
sense is the same as the study of the process of directing mental acts, the praxis of 
linking dimensions. These linked dimensions are often connected as ekphrasis, under-
standing this term as the extension of discourse from one communicative medium 
into another medium. The dimensionality of e.g. “thought” is not the same as that 
of the “written word”, or that of the “image”, or that of the “artefact”. In spite of 
this, synapse violates these frontiers in each intentional act. The world’s dimensions 
show a very large variety of kinds, some can be of empirical character as those we 
use in geometry. Others are of phenomenological character, for example, the fron-
tiers between inside and outside or the borderlines between static and dynamic. 
Dimensionalities can also be understood as those cognitive structures, which pro-
duce literary genres or painting schools. In this case, they work as underlines to 
genre–theory and to interartial studies. However, how are intentionality and 
knowledge related to the dimensionality of the world? We call the process of mutual 
dimensional influence a synapse, as the transcription of meaning from one dimen-
sionality to another. The aptitude of the mind to transcribe ontical and ontological 
contents, from one dimensionality to any other, makes the development of 
knowledge and praxis possible. An example of media-broken technology is a ek-
phrasis, that is, a literary description or a commentary on a visual work of art. 
 Hans Lund has developed a typology of interartial relations, which we will 
 
Media-broken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intermediatic 
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study closer.50 We will notice that for Lund, art–relations and media–relations are 
connected relations. Following Lund’s typology, and using it to illustrate the ideas 
of synapse, it is possible to deduce four fundamental forms of synapse. The first 
two involve synapse as combination (inter–reference and coexistence), a third form of syn-
apse involve it as integration, and finally the fourth synapse as transformation. The 
differences between these four groups can be explained by the presence of different 
dimensionalities. We think that in many cases one media is clearly the primary and 
the other the secondary. The name we give the medium often reveals this aspect of 
that hierarchy, as in the case of the “illustration” in which the primary media is the 
image. The Lund–classification leads us to a classification of synapse as follow: 
 
 
 
The study of the synapse in-between media can be studied decomposing with 
regard to their dimensionality. It is for example, possible to use the differences be-
tween painting, film or TV depending upon the relation between the messenger and 
the receiver during communication. The method consists in assigning both the mes-
senger and the receiver some social dimensionalities as follows: public–to–public 
(TV, radio, newspapers); private–to–private (telephone communication); or mixed 
(mailing lists or blogs). The language of communication is sometimes natural (tele-
phone, radio) but often artificial (Morse). Each language supposes some standards 
of communication, e.g. “hello” and “good bye”. The time of the act of communica-
tion can be “real” as in telephone communication or “virtual” as in e–mail 
communication. The same is valid for the “scenario” or “space” of the act of com-
munication. It can be in physical presence as in “face to face” communication or 
                                               
50 Lund, Hans. (Editor). Interart poetics : essays on the interrelations of the arts and media / edited by Ulla-
Britta Lagerroth, Hans Lund, Erik Hedling, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997. 
. 
 
Inter–reference syn-
apse 
Coexistence  
synapse 
Integrative 
synapse 
Transformative 
synapse  
The mental act A 
directed to the object 
E, is the mental act 
E’ directed to the 
object A’ 
The mental act A di-
rected to the object B 
presents together with 
the mental act E  di-
rected to the object D 
 
The mental act A di-
rected to the object B 
is the same as the 
mental act E directed 
to the object D 
The mental act A directed 
to the object B stands for 
the mental act E directed 
to the object D 
 
Table 3: Synapse typology following Hans Lund’s model 
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“virtual” over distance as in radio or TV. Different discourses uses different physi-
cal means to produce the act of communication. Some are sound waves, other 
video waves, other electric or electronic signals.  
The list of media and art–forms gives us a table with many interesting devel-
opments. Many of them are not real objects –not even possible objects– in spite of 
this, even as pure possibilities, they teach us more about real artefacts. 
 
 
The kind of congruence/incongruence between media and art–forms also re-
flects the congruence/incongruence between dimensions. The task of creating 
congruent communicative genres as that existing between theatre and TV, is sup-
posed to match their respective dimensions. We can deduce that some media are 
“homozygote” and others are “heterozygote” in respect to each alternative dimen-
sion. According to our conventions, TV–genre is a public–public genre, and then it 
is a homozygote in respect to the social dimension of plurality. The genre e–mail, 
can be described as private–private media, also a homozygote in respect to the so-
Dimensions related to the relation emissary/receiver                                                                                                          
Social 
spheres 
 
Plurality   Type of language 
used during the 
communication 
 
Type of Time 
of the commu-
nication 
(Real/differed) 
Space of the 
communication 
(Presential 
/virtual) 
Physical 
grounds of  the  
communication 
 
theatre 
public to 
public 
natural real Presential  visual/oral 
 
television 
public  to 
public  
technical  and 
natural 
real/differed virtual visual, audio 
 
 
e–mail 
private to 
private 
technical  and 
natural  
differed virtual visual 
 
Internet 
public  to 
public 
natural real/ differed virtual visual, audio 
 
radio 
public to 
private 
natural real virtual audio 
 
newspaper 
public to 
private 
natural written differed virtual visual 
 
mobile 
telephone 
 
private to 
private 
technical  and 
natural 
real virtual audio 
 
telegraph 
private to 
private 
technical/natural 
(Morse) 
real virtual audio 
 
Table 4: Representations of communication with regard to the dimensions of media. 
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cial dimension of plurality. Radio and newspapers on the other hand, should be het-
erozygote because they are public–private genres. Because TV, film, and theatre are 
homozygote in respect to plurality, they can substitute each other in just this dimen-
sion of communication.  Which kind of synthesis could be possible between e.g. 
painting and TV? Because painting is a homozygote private–private media, and TV 
is a homozygote, public–public media, the synthesis adopt the form of a Russian 
matryoshka.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Media painting music literature theatre film  sculpture architecture 
newspaper 
       
Television 
 
   
TV–
theatre 
TV–
film 
  
e–mail 
 
       
Internet 
 
       
film        
chat 
 
       
mobile 
telephone 
 
       
telegraph 
 
       
 
Table 5– homozygote and heterozygote artefacts 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25– Russian matryoshka 
Wikimedia Commons: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Russian-
Matroshka_no_bg.jpg 
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The synapse adopts the form of a TV–production contenting a painting or a 
painting contenting a TV–show. This matryoshka–synapse differs from the synapse be-
tween TV and theatre or film and the synapse between radio and theatre, which is a 
kind of grafting–synapse.  
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Entry 10: Game technologies 
 
 
A tenth group is the family of play technologies and toys. It consists of minia-
ture worlds inhabited by reproductions of full technologies that are not intended to 
dock with the world of full technologies. To be a toy is to be something without 
importance, an amusement artefact, or a pastime. It also means to treat something 
carelessly, without seriousness. Toys are artefacts that “pretend to be” real things 
and technologies that “pretend” to work properly. The connection to the full arte-
fact can be only of some resemblance, but it can also be a perfect copy of the real 
thing. In any case, the idea is to create a belief of authenticity; it is a technology that 
works as a belief-factory. In some sense they are similar to fantastic technologies, 
but with a more developed sense of pragmaticity. We understand these technologies 
as reality-broken, understanding “reality” as the level of completeness that the eve-
ryday world demands in space and time dimensionality.  
We need to distinguish between the artefact (the toy) and the process of play-
ing. “A toy is an artefact made by adults to be used by children to play with. They 
have a very specific meaning and the form of the toy, their colour, and function is 
determined according to aesthetical, ethical, functional, or pedagogical principles. 
The modern toy is a typical European creation which is developed during the 18th 
Century.” 51    
Roger Caillois is considered a major contributor to the field of ludology, to 
which he devoted his book Les Jeux et les Hommes. Roger Caillois’ work brought to-
gether the fields of literary criticism, sociology, and philosophy by focusing on 
subjects as diverse as ‘play’ and ‘the sacred’. He studied with thinkers such as Alex-
andre Kojève, and Marcel Mauss. With Georges Bataille he founded the College of 
Sociology, a group of intellectuals who lectured regularly to one another. Partly 
                                               
51 Lönnqvist, Bo and Silvander, Johan. Ting för lek och tanke. Leksaker i historien. Historiska Media, 1999; p. 
17. 
 
Reality 
broken 
 
 
Game technology – Toy 
technology 
 
Playing with artefacts, espe-
cially with “toys” 
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formed as a reacting to the Surrealist movement, the College moved away from sur-
realism’s focus on the fantasy life of an individual’s unconscious and instead 
focused more on the power of ritual and other aspects of communal life. Caillois 
made a distinction between paidia and ludus, which describes the difference between 
“play” and “game”. Paidia refers to the form of play present in early children (con-
struction kits, games of make-believe, kinetic play) while ludus represents games with 
social rules (chess, soccer, poker). Caillois describes these categories through exam-
ples but he does not provide a strict definition. It is common to think that paidia has 
no rules, but this is not the case: a child who pretends to be a soldier is following 
the rule of behaving like a soldier and not as a doctor. 
According to Gonzalo Frasca52 the difference between paidia and ludus is that 
the latter incorporates rules that define a winner and a loser, whereas the former does 
not. Structurally, ludus follows the same three-act rule behind Aristotelian stories: 
First, ludus sessions go through a first act in which the rules are acknowledged; sec-
ond act in which players perform, and, finally, a third act that concludes the game 
and draws the line between victors and losers. In both paidia and ludus, simulation 
provides an environment to express the way we see the world. In trying to explain 
the reach of the concept it is common to contrast narrative, as the form of the past 
of that which cannot be changed. On the other hand, drama would be the form that 
best expresses present time. According to Frasca, to take the analogy further, simula-
tion can be seen as the form of the future. Simulation does not deal with what 
happened or is happening, but with what might happen. Unlike narrative and drama, 
its essence lies on a basic assumption: change is possible. Traditional media (literature, 
drama, film, TV) are representational, not simulational; they produce both descrip-
tions of traits and sequences of events (narrative).  
Further Caillois introduced a typology of playing and gaming structures in 
which he called the games of competition Agon; Alea was the name for games of 
chance; Mimicry, the name for the games of simulation and Ilinx for games of ex-
citement. Caillois considered the cases in which these games structures were 
informal or institutional and when they were the manifestation of decadence and 
corruption. 
 
 
                                               
52 Gonzalo Frasca, Ludology meets Narratology: Similitude and differences between (video) games and narrative. 
http://www.ludology.org/articles/ludology.htm (2007-11-19). 
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Figure 26: Paidia and Ludus 
Games and the Pleasure Principle 
Johan Huizinga was one of the founders of modern cultural history and who 
had an aesthetic approach to it. He believed that art and spectacle played an important 
part in history. In the book Homo Ludens from 1938 he discusses the influence of 
playing on the European cultural history. According to Huizinga playing as social 
activity is as old as humanity itself and has always been a natural activity for children 
in every culture. He says that this special activity can differentiate from everyday 
life’s activities because to play supposes an activity that is delimited in both space and 
time. The meaning of the act of playing lies in itself, in its own rules. Another im-
portant property of playing is that the acting of playing supposes the repetition of the 
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steps of the played activity. In almost every form of play, there are repetitions, re-
frains, inverted words, and levels. Each play-act has its space and its duration, which 
are delimited in advance. Excitement according to Huizinga is also a very important 
part of the activity of playing and is related to the unknown, to chance and “luck”. 
Nevertheless, to play also supposes organisation. Order comes to this activity through 
the rules of each play that in each case are compelling and of an unquestionable so-
cial character.  
The play was also important for Sigmund Freud who in his book Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle from 1920 presented the archetype of the child game known as 
“Fort-Da”. His interpretation of the game was related to the child’s instinctual re-
nunciation to satisficing allowing his mother to go away. The child compensated 
himself for this loss, staging the disappearance and return of different objects within 
his reach. This is the structure of the pleasure principle; there are procedures that con-
vert that which is unpleasant into pleasant experiences.  
 
For millenniums, we have relied on “representation” for both understanding 
and explaining our realities. This is especially true with a particular form of structur-
ing representation: narrative. “Representation” is such a powerful formal mode of 
communication that it has become evident to our civilization. However, “simula-
tion” is not a new form of narrative. It has always been present through 
such common things as toys and games but also through scientific models 
or cybertexts like the I-Ching. In the late 1990’s, Espen Aarseth revolutionized elec-
tronic text studies with the following observation: electronic texts can be better 
understood if they are analysed as cybernetic systems.53 
 
                                               
53 See more about this in “Virtual technologies”. 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Together with Dorothy Burlingham Anna Freud opens the 
"Jackson Nursery" on the Rudolfsplatz, a kindergarten in which she can 
begin her study of aspects of infant behaviour. 
 
 
Sigmund Freud Museum Vienna 
http://www.freud-museum.at/freud/chronolg/1937-e.htm 
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An outline of the third-level 
of brokenness 
Technologies of the third-level brokenness are those that are socio-cultural-
broken. This can be the case of value-brokenness in an economic sense or in any 
other sense of “value”. Every form of amateurism belongs to this level of broken-
ness. This is also the case of the second language and artificial languages, which are 
broken in e.g. idiomatic aspects. An idiom is a phrase which meaning cannot be 
learned from definitions, but instead refers to a metaphorical meaning determined 
by common use. Because an idiom generally is a colloquial collection of metaphors 
built on knowledge and experience of a particular culture the second languages of-
ten show more or less brokenness concerning idiomatic aspects.  
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Figure 28: Jan Vermeer. The Kitchen Maid. c. 1658; Oil on canvas, 45.5 x 41 cm;  
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Jan_Vermeer.The_kitchen_maid.jpg 
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25) 
 
 
A third case of third level brokenness is that of the hobbyists and their activities, 
which are typical of the postmodern era. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Modern Electrics and Mechanics April 1914 Volume 28, Number 4 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Modern_Electrics_and_Mechanics_Apr_1914.jpg 
(Wikimedia common: 2008-11-25). 
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 Entry 11: Value-broken 
technologies and broken labour 
The substance of value in Marx 
It is important to make some specifications about Marx idea of value. In Das 
Kapital, Marx wrote: 
A commodity is, in the first place, an object outside of us, a thing that by its 
properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another. The nature of such 
wants, whether, for instance, they spring from the stomach or from fancy, 
makes no difference. Neither are we here concerned to know how the object 
satisfies these wants, whether directly as means of subsistence, or indirectly as 
means of production.54 
The idea of value of Marx is closer to the idea of the satisficing of wants than 
to the idea of the satisficing of needs. Marx uses the term “menschliche Bedürfnisse” 
which can be translated as both “wants” and “needs” however, there is an im-
portant difference in meaning between those two terms. After this sentence, Marx 
quoted Nicholas Barbon’s words to make his idea of value clearer: 
                                               
54 Section 1, The two Factors of a Commodity: Use-value and value. (The substance of value and the magni-
tude of value). Capital Volume I. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S1 
From the German original: “Die Waare ist zunächst ein äusserer Gegenstand, ein Ding, das durch 
seine Eigenschaften menschliche Bedürfnisse irgend einer Art befriedigt. Die Natur dieser Bedürf-
nisse, ob sie z. B. dem Magen oder der Phantasie entspringen, ändert nichts an der Sache. Es handelt 
sich hier auch nicht darum, wie die Sache das menschliche Bedürfniss befriedigt, ob unmittelbar als 
Lebensmittel, d. h. als Gegenstand des Genusses, oder auf einem Umweg, als Produktionsmittel.” 
Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. Karl Marx. Erster Band. 
Buch I: Der Produktionsprocess des Kapitals. 
http://pagesperso-orange.fr/dumauvaiscote/Das%20Kapital_Kap1_1867.htm#_ftnref2 
 
 
Value-broken 
 
 
 
Family technology 
 
Family-work in 
any form 
  
96 
Desire implies want; it is the appetite of the mind, and as natural as hunger to the 
body.... the greatest numbers (of objects) have their value from supplying the 
wants of the mind. Nicholas Barbon : A Discourse on coining the new money lighter, in 
answer to Mr. Locke’s Considerations etc. London 1696, p. 2-3.55 
This is important to remark because we need to put some order in the different uses 
of the underlying idea of “intentionality.” Marx belongs to a post–Kantian time and 
we assume here that even Marx is working within a field already influenced by 
Kant’s phenomenalism. What is new in the work of Marx is the idea of acting as 
phenomenal, the acting of labour that realises the “intentions” of the worker when 
the worker is trying to realise his “wants”. There is an explicit need in the philoso-
phy of Marxism to make “productive” labour –that is the wage-earning labour the 
essential form of labour. That was certainly the central form of economic produc-
tion of the capitalism of that time and maybe still is very important. However, this 
form of labour is not the same as “labour” in general; labour in all its forms cannot 
be reduced to a particular form or period. The same is valid for value, if value is on-
ly connected with “productive” labour, there is no value in non–productive acting 
and that is not the case. In general, productive labour is labour that can produce 
more than is necessary to maintain the producer, but in our own way to see this, 
some form of surplus value, originates in each “labour–circumstance”. Let see some 
examples of non–productive labour: 
Tendai is a young girl in the Lowveld, Zimbabwe. Her day starts at 4 A.M. 
when she carries a thirty–litter tin to a borehole about eleven kilometres from 
her home to fetch water. When she returns about five hours later, she eats a 
little and then gathers firewood until midday. She does the breakfast dishes 
and then prepares lunch for the family. After lunch, she again does the dishes, 
and then wanders in the hot sun until early evening, gathering wild vegetables 
for supper before making the evening trip for water. Her day ends at 9 P.M., 
after she has prepared supper and put her younger brothers and sisters to 
sleep. According to the international economic system, Tendai is considered 
"non–productive," unoccupied, and economically inactive.56 
Michelle Yaiser identifies “productive labour” with “active labour” and in this 
sense, the working day of the young girl from Zimbabwe is indeed very active and 
therefore “productive”. However, Marx definition of “productive” has nothing to 
do with “activity” but with receiving wages, salaries, or (monetary) benefits for ones 
activities because in this case this activity generates surplus–value to the capitalist. 
What we need to do here is to not try to force non–productive labour into the 
                                               
55 Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Oekonomie. 
 http://pagesperso-orange.fr/dumauvaiscote/Das%20Kapital_Kap1_1867.htm#_ftnref2 
56 Yaiser, Michelle. Improving Development: Incorporating "Nonproductive" Labour into Economic Analysis. 
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/soc/SocialMoments/yaiser8.htm 
  
97 
sphere of productive labour but to leave Marx definition of labour and value behind 
considering it a specific case of labour and value. In another example of Yaiser we 
find more of the same problematic: 
Cathy, a young, middle–class North American housewife spends her days 
preparing food, setting the table, serving meals, washing dishes, dressing and 
diapering her children, disciplining the children, taking the children to school, 
dusting, doing the laundry, going to the gas station and the supermarket, re-
pairing household items, ironing, keeping an eye on or playing with the 
children, making beds, paying bills, putting away toys, books, and clothes, 
sewing or mending or knitting, answering the telephone, vacuuming, sweep-
ing, washing floors, cutting the grass, weeding, shovelling snow, cleaning the 
bathroom and the kitchen, and putting the children to bed. Just like Tendai, 
Cathy is considered "non–productive," unoccupied, and economically inac-
tive.  
We have to remember that for Marx, exchange-value is not originated in in-
tentionality as such but in intentionality that is not paid. The following text confirms 
this expressly, if nothing extra happens, labour itself does not produce value: 
Let us now consider the total value of the product, the 10 lbs. of yarn. Two 
and a half days’ labour has been embodied in it, of which two days were con-
tained in the cotton and in the substance of the spindle worn away, and half a 
day was absorbed during the process of spinning. This two and a half days’ 
labour is also represented by a piece of gold of the value of fifteen shillings. 
Hence, fifteen shillings is an adequate price for the 10 lbs. of yarn, or the 
price of one pound is eighteen pence. Our capitalist stares in astonishment. The 
value of the product is exactly equal to the value of the capital advanced. The value so 
advanced has not expanded, no surplus–value has been created, and conse-
quently money has not been converted into capital.57 
However, the astonishment of the capitalist disappears when he discovers 
that the exchange–value of the labour–power does not coincide with its use–value: 
Let us examine the matter more closely. The value of a day’s labour–power 
amounts to 3 shillings, because on our assumption half a day’s labour is em-
bodied in that quantity of labour–power, i.e., because the means of 
subsistence that are daily required for the production of labour–power, cost 
half a day’s labour. But the past labour that is embodied in the labour–power, 
and the living labour that it can call into acting; the daily cost of maintaining 
it, and its daily expenditure in labour, are two totally different objects. The for-
                                               
57 Marx, K. Capital I; Section 2;  The Production of Surplus-value. 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch07.htm#S1 
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mer determines the exchange–value of the labour–power, the latter is its use–value. The 
fact that half a day’s labour is necessary to keep the labourer alive during 24 
hours, does not in any way prevent him from working a whole day. There-
fore, the value of labour–power, and the value which that labour–power 
creates in the labour–process, is two entirely different magnitudes; and this 
difference of the two values was what the capitalist had in view, when he was 
purchasing the labour–power.58  
The labour of Tendai and Cathy according to a Marxian perspective has use–
value but no exchange–value. As we see this, the Marxian definition of value is of 
no use in general studies of labour and Marx was not interested in studying value in 
general but only in connection to political economy. However the narrowness of 
the Marxian understanding of value affects political economics as well because it do 
not comprehends the study of value in a non–productive situation. In other words, 
to develop and study a general theory of labour generated value, supposes to leave 
the Marxian idea of exchange–value behind and concentrate our study on what 
Marx called use–value. 
Use–value and archaic labour 
The question of the so called “non–productive” labour, which more appro-
priately should be named “none–paid labour” or “archaic” labour, is a key problem 
for the future of the philosophy of praxis. This has been observed by many femi-
nists who have studied the situation of women’s labour at home and in relation to 
the whole economy of society. Margaret Benston quoted Ernst Mandel when he 
wrote: 
In capitalist society, commodity production, the production of exchange val-
ues, has reached its greatest development. It is the first society in human 
history where the major part of production consists of commodities. It is not 
true, however that all production under capitalism is commodity production. 
Two classes of products still remain simple use–value. The first group of all 
objects produced by the peasantry for its own consumption […]. The second 
group of products in capitalist society which are not commodities but remain 
simple use–value consists of all objects produced in the home. Despite the 
fact that considerable human labour goes into this type of household produc-
tion, it still remains a production of use–values and not of commodities. 
Every time a soup is made or a button sewn on a garment, it constitutes pro-
duction, but is not production for the market.59 
                                               
58 Marx, K. Ibid. 
59 Mandel, Ernst. An introdution to Marxist economic theory; 1967. Quoted by Margaret Benston, “The 
Political Economy of Women’s Liberation”, 1969. (Materialist Feminism. A Reader in Class, Difference 
______ 
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In a study of the socialist economy Alec Nove wrote that one of the most serious 
problems of Marx’ theory of value is that Marx did not see use–values as compara-
ble realities. According to Marx, a use–value is a “particular”, a concrete artefact in 
some sense unique and with a qualitative essence, which is not quantitative compa-
rable.  This becomes an important problem for the economy of socialism because 
two very similar use–values can differ in their usability. That difference can only be 
established in an open market in which the consumer could decide the use–value of 
the qualities of the products to use.60 The “market” is nothing else than the place 
and time in which the products of labour shows their correlative congruence; the 
market is a docking-place. Consequently, the use–value, which is qualitatively better, 
shall be more valued and the production of the less utilizable shall be stopped. The 
demand of this use–value is going to be stronger and the results of this competition 
will make possible the improvement of the technologies and the productive meth-
ods involved in the production of those use–values. In the early days of humanity, 
before the development of class societies, the economics of society was built on 
“non–productive” or “archaic” labour, that is, people worked to satisfy their and 
their families wants without being “paid” for it.  That does not mean that this la-
bour was not “remunerated”. This type of labour exists today almost as then but it 
is an invisible part of the economics of Modern society because it is not rewarded 
with a salary. At that time, tribes and clans exchanged products with other tribes 
and clans and the mechanisms of these exchanges were the same as those we see in 
the modern market. They tested their products, docking them with each other and 
with their wants choosing those they believed were better. These mechanisms 
granted the improvement of labour, motivating to the development of talent and of 
skilfulness.  
Either Use–value or Change–value 
Alfred Sohn–Rethel wrote in 1978 that the use of commodities and the ex-
change of commodities are in time mutually exclusive processes.61 That happens 
because during the exchange process, the establishment of exchange value demands 
that the material status of the commodity remains unchanged. About this dichoto-
my, Alfred Sohn–Rethel wrote:  
The point is that use and exchange are not only different and contrasting by 
description, but are mutually exclusive in time. They must take place separate-
                                                                                                                               
 
and Women’s Life. edited by Rosemary Hennesy and Chrys Ingraham, 1997). 
60 Nove, Alec. Teori om en möjlig socialism. (The Economics of Feasible Socialism. 1983). Röda Bokförlaget 
AB, 1985.  
61 Sohn-Rethel, Alfred. Intellectual and Manual Labour. A Critique of Epistemology; 1978. 
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ly at different times. This is because exchange serves only a change of owner-
ship, a change, that is, in terms of a purely social status of the commodities an 
owned property. In order to make this change possible on a basis of negotiat-
ed agreement, the physical condition of the commodities, their material status, 
must remain unchanged, or at any rate must be assumed to remain un-
changed. Commodity exchange cannot take place as a recognised social in-
institution unless this separation of exchange from use is stringently observed. 
This is a truth, which need only be uttered to be convincing, and I regard it as 
a firm basis on which to build far–reaching conclusions.62 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: The consumer and the vendor 
 
In our visualization–model, Judith Weller’s Garment Worker from 1984 give 
form to “use–acting” while Baca Rossi’s, Fish vendor from 1976 shapes “exchange–
acting”. According to Sohn–Rethel the separation in time of use and exchange is a 
fundamental law of civilization, because it is the law which makes society work as a 
regulated unconscious mechanism. This separation is built on the concept of proper-
ty, which works socially as a law: 
The concept of property is it self only a conceptualisation of the factual ne-
cessity of keeping use and exchange separated. The need to exempt from use 
objects entered for exchange is a simple fact of experience; if it is ignored ex-
change must cease.63 
The use–value of labour power is specific in industry but different in com-
merce. A teacher’s labour-specificity makes his/her labour power different from the 
                                               
62 Op.cit. p. 24. 
63 Op.cit. p. 40. 
 Vendor         Consumer 
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labour power of a housekeeper. However, each of these labour powers have use–
value. What is then that process which gives them the property of being “valuable”? 
That they are a part of the chain of congruence-testing and docking of artefacts dur-
ing which communication is constructed in society. The differences between the 
different forms of labour are rather ontical than ontological. They may differ in the 
ontical aspects of labour (their cognitive aspects) but not in their intentional nature 
and therefore not in the ontology of labour. The product of homework, that is, the 
fulfilled day work of a “housewife”, is the consequence of realized purpose. It can 
happen that this homework contributes to the reproduction of labour power and in 
this way comes into cycle of capitalism, but this is irrelevant for our study. In re-
spect to the ontology of intentionality, there are no differences between working in 
a factory and working at home as a housekeeper. The differences are not ontologi-
cal but of a lower level e.g. economic or sociological. In this sense, the theoretical 
problem we are confronted with is that historically, the sociology and political 
economy of Marx once invaded the sphere of ontology and eclipsed the ontological 
levels of labour and value. This is especially problematic because Marx is the first 
and beside Heidegger, the most important philosopher of praxis. 
We assume here that the labour performed in the home of Cathy, the middle–
class North American housewife of Michelle Yaiser’s example is economically pos-
sible because her husband works somewhere and receives a salary.  This salary paid 
the reproduction of the power of labour of Cathy’s husband including the family 
needs. Otherwise should he do not work at all: 
The owner of labour-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the market is 
to be continuous, and the continuous conversion of money into capital as-
sumes this, the seller of labour-power must perpetuate himself, “in the way 
that every living individual perpetuates himself, by procreation.” The labour-
power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear and death, must be con-
tinually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-power. 
Hence the sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of 
labour-power must include the means necessary for the labourer’s substitutes, 
i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-owners may 
perpetuate its appearance in the market. 64 
However, the fact that Cathy’s family supplies its family needs by selling 
Cathy’s husband’s work at the market, is irrelevant here in connection to the work 
that Cathy delivers to the family and indirectly to society. Her work is in any case 
pure surplus value gained by the family and by society and it does not disappear into 
the pockets of any capitalist as the work of her husband does. The connections of 
family–work and wage earner–work in modern life is obvious and it is well known 
                                               
64 Karl Marx. Capital, Volume One. Chapter Six: The Buying and Selling of Labour-Power. 
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that long time unemployment adventures the quality and even the existence of fami-
ly work. Nevertheless, the reproduction of labour–power assure on one hand that 
the capitalist obtain a renewed labour–power but on the other hand, that society 
becomes a congruent society, a “working whole” that makes sense because of the fami-
ly-labour. The grade in which individuals work for common values is not given by 
capitalism and vary from society to society; is not the same e.g. in Japan than in 
Spain. Is this surplus value of the same type that the surplus value created by wage 
earner–work? Of course, the total amount of value of the family (and society) has 
been increased on the basis that some have been working for “nothing”. Because 
women working at home cannot compare their amount of work with any salary, 
they have to compare their daily work with goods of the kind that they have been 
produced within the family.  
Head and Hand in Labour  
In the second part of his work, Sohn–Rethel tries to find some simple princi-
ples to understand the involvement of intellectual and manual work in the process 
of production. He recognizes that “no human labour can take place without a de-
gree of unity of head and hand”. However, Sohn–Rethel says, this is not the end of 
the analysis;  
But for us the essential question is: in whose head is the intended result of the 
labour process anticipated?65 
Here Sohn–Rethel is asking who is controlling the whole working process.  
Being a child of his time (the book is from 1978), the analysis of Sohn–Rethel is 
carrying some predisposition against intellectual work and the mystification of the 
work done “by hand”. For our own account, the question is important because we 
do not distinguish between any kind of praxis and the matter of whether praxis has 
an intellectual character or if it is of a “manual” kind is not important for us. Let us 
see one of his examples: 
It is important for us to differentiate between personal and social unity, or di-
vision, of head and hand. Personal unity attaches only to the labour of the 
one–man producer. This does not mean that, conversely, all individual one–
man production presupposes such a personal unity; for example, the slaves 
who produced the pottery or textiles by their individual labour were far from 
being masters of its purpose or form.66  
As we see it, the slaves who produced the pottery or textiles by their individu-
al labour, made these commodities as any other worker of any time has done and 
                                               
65 Op.cit.; p. 84-85. 
66 Ibid. 
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are going to do, namely, converting knowledge to intentionality and intentionality 
into materialized work and value. As we said above, the mind materializes through 
the intentional act and becomes materialized work in an artefact. That what Sohn–
Rethel has in mind when he tries to find a materialist epistemology is the always–
cited opposition between “mental and manual labour – present throughout the 
whole history of exploitation and assuming the most varied forms.” This opposition 
is in fact a misunderstanding, which identifies exploited–work with manual–work, 
and exploiting–work with intellectual–work. The correct equation would be that to 
identify exploited–work with the lack of control of the whole working process. 
However, this has nothing to do with the involvement of the exploited worker’s in-
tentional activity during the working process. Without the workers mental and 
emotional engagement in the working process, no productive work could be done 
and then no value could be created.  
 
Family labour and broken value 
An immediate consequence of the idea of “broken technologies”, is that of 
the determination of the existence of a different kind of labour that use these bro-
ken technologies to produce “broken artefacts”. Is it possible that broken work 
creates “broken values”? We can expect that the use-value of the produced artefacts 
is also broken. In general, the use-value of broken artefacts is less valuable than the 
use-value of whole-artefacts. The use-value of e.g. a sketch is less valued than that 
of the accomplished artefact. Magical cure procedures are less valued than scientific 
medicine procedures, the solutions of the technologies of poverty are less valued or 
not valued at all because of their limitations, etc. According to Plato, the carpenters, 
who create a table, imitate God by doing so, but the artist that paints a table, imitate 
the carpenter. Therefore, the artist should be understood as an imitator of an imitator 
or in other words, a very poor designer. Outdate technologies are less valued than 
up-to-date technologies and fantastic artefacts are not understood as real artefacts 
but rather as daydreams. In other words, we can assert that the use-value of broken 
artefacts is also “broken”. 
 We can now ask ourselves how much does this reduced use-value in the ex-
change-value influence on the produced artefacts. Is it possible to conceive broken 
artefacts as commodities? If Marx was right and the origin of value is the amount of 
abstract time of labour dedicated to the production of the artefact (commodity), 
broken artefacts shall have exchange value and shall behave themselves as any other 
commodity does at the market. The laws of offer and demand should also work 
too, because the scarcity respectively abundance of broken artefacts should affect 
their exchange value too. In the submarket of poverty, broken artefacts have ex-
change value as any whole commodity has and are apparently exchangeable in 
relation to both the amount of work demanded to be produced and upon their ac-
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cessibility at the market. However, the artefacts of poverty have not exchange value 
on the whole market. In the same way, the work of art, which has a place in the 
global market, appear to be indifferent to the amount of labour-time dedicated to 
their production. We must remember here that the majority of all the amount of art 
works, never achieve the standard of a whole market artefact. That is the case for 
any definition of art and especially for the conventionalist definition, according to 
which to be a work of art is to be an artefact of a kind created, by an artist, to be 
presented to an art world public.67 The fact that these artefacts are of  reduced use-
value make them less valuable or not valuable at all as exchange values at the whole 
market.   
That is certainly the case of some of the groups of broken artefacts, those be-
longing to the group of tentative or fruitless technologies. Belonging to these 
groups are the family technologies as a subgroup. Every artefact has its beginning at 
someone “backyard”. As an example here could name the case of John Stith Pem-
berton 1831-1888, an American druggist inventor of Coca-Cola. He began his work 
with tentative technologies experimenting with an old family recipe belonging to the 
family of his African American house cleaner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: John Stith Pemberton inventor of the Coca-
Cola 
 
During his time, there was a large demand for home remedies and tonics in 
the United States. Coca-Cola which included kola (a tree from Africa of the same 
family as the cacao, rich in caffeine) and the coca leaves was originally used as a 
brain tonic that cures headaches and calm nerves. The receipt of the new product 
was still tentative until it began to be produced. Even after the receipt leaved the 
experimental board and got a patent and a social status, it was still a tentative prod-
                                               
67 Dickie, Geroge. Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Cornell University Press, 1974. 
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uct. It was first when it was confronted with the whole market and became ex-
changed for other commodities, that the Coca-Cola also became a commodity. To 
become a commodity the tentative artefact has to fulfil two conditions: first it has to 
be produced outside the family level of needs in an amount of units that can satisfy 
a larger group of persons; secondly it has to achieve a level of quality which can be 
acceptable even by persons that are not members or friends of the own family; 
these are the conditions demanded to a tentative (familiar) artefact to achieve the 
commodity status. Before becoming a commodity the artefact need to exist as a 
broken one, as a tentative and more or less fruitless project. In this sense to culti-
vate potatoes at the family backyard is family labour as long as the production is 
consumed by the family and their friends. Nevertheless, if the amount of produced 
potatoes surpasses the needs of the family and the surplus is sold at the market, the 
family backyard’s production becomes business and the potatoes become com-
modities. Of course the quality of the potatoes and their quantity is relevant in this 
process. Another example could be the fallowing: a family member can take care of 
a sick member of the family without being a health professional. At home it is pos-
sible to be a practitioner of folk medicine or magic even if you are a licensed 
medical doctor. But if this praxis shall be applied at the whole market and it is in-
tended to be sold as a way to earn money, you need a social license according to the 
standards of up-to-date technologies to practice medicine. In other words, you have 
to dock to the social corpus and to manage this your performance has to achieve some 
level of social quality standards.  
However transcribing home labour to the social level is not as easy as we first 
think. In fact, these employments have a lesser rang in society and have the lowest 
salary standard. This situation has an explanation its the fact that to work as e.g. a 
“house keeper” does not differ so much from a work at home with the same tasks 
of knowledge and experience. These jobs fit in the category of non-qualified jobs and 
are usually announced, with the label of “no previous experience is needed”. As an 
example we can use the case of the scullery maid who was the lowest-ranking of the 
female servants in the big houses of the 19th Century and acted as assistants to a 
kitchen maid. It is not difficult to trace these jobs in history; they have almost been 
the same situation throughout time, from the slaves of Antiquity to the modern 
house keeper of the 20th Century.  
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Figure 32: Oil painting of a scullery maid by Jean-
Simèon Chardin. 
 
Wikimedia common: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_Scullery_Maid_
(L%27Ecureuse).jpg 
 
 
“Her duties included the most physical and demanding tasks in the kitchen, 
such as cleaning the floor, stoves, sinks, pots and dishes. Before the advent of cen-
tral heating systems, scullery maids were required to light the fires and supply hot 
water.”68 
 
 
                                               
68 See Wikipedia, “scullery maid”. 
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Entry 12: Second language 
technologies  
 
Is it possible to understand language as technology? Understood as performatives 
or speech acts, language utterances, can be understood as tools, and its structures and 
rules can be seen as technologies. There is no doubt that artificial languages are 
technological devices. All the modern development of computer languages are very 
good examples of technological languages. We could also say that when these lan-
guages exceed their time and nobody uses them anymore they will develop into 
broken technologies.  
A second language is language learned after the mother tongue, a learning pro-
cess achieved some time after puberty when the learning is necessarily more 
conscious than intuitive. To learn a second language is to be seen as a socio-cultural 
necessity of the global society. The dominant international second language of the 
world today is the English language. To learn the first language demands only a few 
years of our early life but to learn a second language is a lifelong learning process. 
Of course, the learning process of a second language also depends on the similitude 
and differences between the first and the second languages. Second language learn-
ers produce errors of syntax and pronunciation because the influence of the first 
language. These errors can be listed as “typical” for each original relationship be-
tween these two languages.  
The user of a second language shows a diminished grammatical competence 
manifested in the lack of knowledge of lexical matters, of rules of morphology and 
syntax. The deficiency stretches to some inaccuracy in the ability to connect sen-
tences in discourses to form a meaningful whole. But the principal differences 
between the first and second language users is idiomatic. Idiomatic are semantic con-
tents that cannot be learned from definitions, but refers instead to a metaphorical 
meaning determined by common use. 
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Modelling Languages 
We have seen that it is specific for tentative technologies to postpone the 
process of docking. A sketch or a drawing shows the shadows of pragma and noe-
ma.  We have said that they are only a trace, something to be. However, some 
methodologies have been developed to work with these “shadows” and some of 
them have been conceived as languages.  Of course there are typical cases of bro-
kenness because of their goals and because of their means. I will introduce these 
languages with the generic name “modelling languages”; we notice that a common 
characteristic for them is that they work heuristically.  
Heuristics from Greek heuriskein; to discover, can also be understood as a di-
dactic method to systematically approach to the solution of a problem. What is 
characteristic for heuristics is that anything is allowed, encouraging the implementa-
tion of the most creative means possible. However heuristics emerged as the self-
reflecting process during which the mind tries to understand how problems are 
solved and how these solutions can contribute to the solutions of other problems. 
Creating models is then an important and natural part of this heuristic approach, 
which cannot be developed as a phenomenological methodology without develop-
ing rules for depiction and rules of interpretation that can be used to communicate 
within the community of researchers. These rules and depicting standards convert 
the modelling activity into a structured semantic field with grammatical rules which 
make them “languages” used as technologies of communication.  
Whenever you solve a real-world problem, you have to create a model of 
that problem first. It is critical to make the distinction that the model that you 
work with isn't the same as the problem. Every model leaves something out. 
It has to otherwise it would be as complicated and unwieldy as the real-world 
itself. We always work with simplifications of how things really are. We have 
to accept that. Every solution we create is, to be precise, a solution only to the 
model that we postulate as being a useful representation of some real-world 
setting that we want to capture. The trouble with models is that every one of 
them has an associated set of assumptions.69 
The complexity of the task of solving problems of any kind has to do with 
the fact that any solution belongs to the “future”, that is the solution of an actual 
problem exists in some future dimension that does not yet exists. The vagueness of 
the model as the vagueness of any tentative technology depends on this particulari-
ty. That is why the development of depicting languages can be helpful. Models and 
modelling languages are simplifications of the phenomenological field. They work 
only as “interpretations” of the future and are attached to the concrete conditions 
                                               
69 How to Solve It: Modern Heuristics. Zbigniew Michalewicz, David B. Fogel. Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, 2000; p. 30. 
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valid under the development of the depiction act.  
Every time we solve a problem we must realize that we are in reality only 
finding the solution to a model of the problem. All models are a simplifica-
tion of the real world; otherwise they would be as complex and unwieldy as 
the natural setting itself. The process of problem solving consists of two sepa-
rate general steps: (1) creating a model of the problem, and (2) using that 
model to generate a solution: Problem –Model –Solution.70 
An example of these languages is the Unified Modelling Language an artificial 
language that provides engineers with standardized mechanisms for visualizing, 
specifying, constructing, and documenting software systems. The standards are col-
lected from the everyday praxis of the field and developed by professionals as it was 
a computer program available at the market.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
70 How to Solve It: Modern Heuristics. Zbigniew Michalewicz, David B. Fogel. Springer-Verlag Berlin Hei-
delberg, 2000; p. 15-16. 
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Entry 13: Amateur-technologies  
 
 
 
Quality-broken technologies 
A hobbyist is a person who engages in any activity as a pastime and not as a 
“professional”. As a “professional”, we understand a person who earns a living with 
these activities. The hobbyist is a social and cultural character of the highest im-
portance for the development of technology during the 20th Century. We can find 
this social character connected with the development of technologies of low costs, 
often used at home. The examples of the development of radio and other electric 
devices can illustrate this situation. Closer in time we can find the development of 
the first steps of computer technology. The ingress of the hobbyist into the field of 
computation can be related to the development of the BASIC language because the 
structure of this programming language is closer to that of natural language.  The 
first version of BASIC was presented in 1964 provoking a revolution radically in-
creasing the number of users of computers and making it possible for a group of 
hobbyists to participate. With the incorporation of the hobbyists the necessary mar-
ket for the PC was born and the science of programming entered the postmodern 
age of popular science and popular technique. In January of 1975 the front page of “Popu-
lar Electronics”, announced a microprocessor named ALTAIR 8800 to the price of 
397 dollars, constructed by a small company of New Mexico named “Micro In-
strumentation Telemetry Systems”. MITS was founded and directed by the hobbyist 
Ed Roberts. This was the first processor with a price and a technology accessible to 
the hobbyists and it became the starting point of the PC. Bill Gates and Paul Allen 
created a primitive operating system using BASIC to this processor. It is important 
to recall here that neither Gates nor Allen were engineers but young hobbyists with 
an extraordinary talent for businesses and a very clear vision of the way that the de-
velopment of the sector would follow in the near future. In the following years, they 
founded MICROSOFT . Later they made the agreement with IBM for the devel-
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opment of an operative system - known as DOS – for their first PC and the agree-
ment with Apple Computers according to which, Apple Computers relinquished the 
rights of their GUI system to MICROSOFT, making possible the development of 
the operative system WINDOWS.  Other hobbyists of importance were Stephen 
Wozniak and Steve Jobs developers of Apple Computers and of the first computer 
with the GUI system. Jobs maintained an open relationship to the “Computer Lib-
eration” movement, which today is still outstanding and which since then, 
propagate for social release through the use and popularisation of computers. An 
ideologist of this group is Ted Nelson the creator of the term “hypertext” and the 
head leader of the group of the hobbyists who worked for a new social order. This 
ideology then moved over to other individuals of new generations and is today still 
the political ideology of the “hackers”. A very interesting late product of this ideol-
ogy is the system known as LINUX, a free of charge variant of UNIX, which was 
distributed through the Internet to anyone who wants to get a copy, one of the first 
“open source code” initiatives of the age of popular science and popular technolo-
gy.  
 
Amateurism and professionalism in computer technology 
Around the seventies, two groups of users of computers could be distin-
guished, the professionals and the hobbyists. The professionals of the branch and the 
large companies saw this development with hostility; especially when it became ob-
vious that the group of hobbyists would be economically powerful. Since then there 
are two easily identifiable ideological schemes. The first is that which consider 
methods and devices that are technical obscure and inaccessible for the majorities as 
“high qualitative” – and another group that works to simplify the use of devices and 
see usefulness and pragmaticity as the authentic “high quality”. We shall consider 
here, following the judgment of the professionals, that the technology of the ama-
teurs is “quality-broken”. It is important to notice that the technology of the 
amateurs is broken only with respect to skilfulness in relation to professional tech-
nologies.  Their brokenness is then, social. The development of the computer shows 
the following developing steps generally valid for the processes from the creation of 
technology to broken technology: a) A first step in which the social group which is 
involved is small and highly competent. The product is complex and its results are 
poor. The discoveries can be maintained secretly with facility.  This technology is 
broken because it is noema-broken or pragmata-broken. b) A growing simplifica-
tion and a process of amplification of the wrapped social circles happened at the 
same time that the practical value of the developed technology increase. This is the 
actual step of the full developed technology. c) The third phase begins when tech-
nology reaches new and informal spheres of application. This process is a 
“democratisation” process of the accesses to technology. Besides that, the entrepre-
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neurial culture varies in relationship to this process. The companies that do not 
achieve to be adapted disappear or lose importance, being substituted by new.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Byte from July 1977 
 
DigiBarn Computer Museum: 
http://www.digibarn.com/notice/notice.cc.html 
 
 
Amateurism in technology can exists if the “knowing how” within popular 
culture is well developed and if it is connected to professionalism creating new 
standards between home-labour and exchange-labour. The so-called “new econo-
my” born to the light of the data processing revolution, is bound to the wheel of 
the “knowing how” of the consumers. Today more than ever, industries are devel-
oped where there is “knowing how”, both within the producer and in the 
consumer, since the limits between these two sides are very flexible today.  
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Entry 14:  Artificiality as 
broken technology 
 
 
Any automata or robot that works “properly” is a full technology, but in spite 
of this it is also always broken in nature. As a copy or imitation of life and life’s 
movement, it will be considered as life-broken. These technologies of the third level 
are neither “broken in reality” as game technologies, nor “broken in quality” as the 
technologies of the amateur. Artificiality depends on the culturalization of natural 
processes. Franz Reuleaux’s (1829–1905) classical work Kinematics of Machinery from 
1876 introduced a typology and technological “elements” which combined in dif-
ferent ways could turn out to be kinematic chains and machines. According to 
Franz Reuleaux all machines consist of basic ‘constructive elements’ and in turn they 
build basic ‘kinematic chains’. In the typology of Reuleaux, mechanical parts could be 
organized in levels of complexity. Some of these have been listed out by Francis C. 
Moon in his work, completing them with a present-day perspective71: 
Level 1: Kinematic pairs  
Franz Reuleaux called the “unnatural” movement between two neighbouring 
parts in a machine, a kinematic pair. He mentioned four: Revolute, Prismatic, Cylindri-
cal and Circular. A kinematic chain is what Reuleaux called a number of linked 
kinematic pairs form a higher level in a machine.  
Level 2: Kinematic chain  
As a kinematic chain, (Moon presented the example of a bicycle chain), con-
sists of a connected series of kinematic pairs that form a closed loop or circuit. 
                                               
71 Moon, Francis C. The Machines of Leonardo da Vinci and Franz Reuleaux. Kinematics of Machines from the 
Renaissance to the 20th Century. Springer, 2007. 
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Level 3: Mechanisms  
Mechanisms are kinematic chains, which are designed to transform one kind 
of motion to another. For example, the slider crank kinematic chain in an internal 
combustion engine, changes the translation motion of the pistons into rotary motion 
of the crankshaft. 
Level 4: Complex machines   
Several mechanisms coupled together, along with a source of motion or en-
ergy, form complex machines.  
Level five: Prime Movers or Engines   
Prime mover machines are machines that produce energy as in gas turbine 
engines or internal combustion engines. As an example the 14th century’s water-
power engine can be mentioned or the 13th century wind power engine. 
Level six: Automata 
The automated machine has a connotation of performing its tasks without 
human intervention according to an embedded set of instructions. Traditionally au-
tomata devices were identified with clock-like mechanisms for telling time or driving 
mechanical musical devices as well as doll or robotic-like devices for entertainment.  
The player piano was a popular mechanical form of automata. In the Renais-
sance, engineers such as Leonardo da Vinci often designed fountains with 
time changing ﬂows or moving props for stage productions and pageants as 
part of their duties for their patron. In the late 18th century, Jacquard de-
signed punched cards to control textile machines. James Watt also invented a 
rotating ball speed controller for his steam engines. In the early 19th century 
Charles Babbage tried to build a machine with 15000 parts to automatically 
generate mathematical tables for astronomy and navigation. By the 20th cen-
tury, the idea of the controlled-machine and robotics reached maturity with the 
development of electronics.72 
Level seven: Machines Mechatronics 
According to Moon machines that combine computers and mechanics to 
produce “intelligent” machines can be considered “mechatronical”. These seven 
levels of machine constructions are organized following the traditional simple–to–
complex correlation. However, the disposition of the types also follows a historical 
development, from antiquity to our own time. The question we will ask ourselves is 
if these levels of development correspond to a genetic process in the mind of the 
inventor. The existence of ideas of automata as early as in Antiquity can be consid-
                                               
72 Moon, Francis C. 2007; p. 32. 
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ered a positive answer to our question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34: Revolute, Prismatic, Cylindrical and Circular.  These are the “unnatural” elementary parts of 
machines. (From  Moon, Francis C. 2007) 
 
In this sense it is important to distinguish the events that can be mechanical 
from other events that cannot be mechanical. It must be noticed that – in spite of 
the recurrent comparison that the history of thought shows between life’s forms 
and machines– no living form can develop mechanisms as those that characterises 
machines. For instance, no living form can produce a wheel or a propeller, because life 
cannot develop gear wheels. The reason behind this is transcendental: live tissues de-
velop linking continuous parts. The circular movement of a wheel corresponds to the 
torsion movement of the living tissues. We can use this radical transcendental differ-
ence to develop a definition of technology that can be distinguished from the 
simpler idea of “mechanism”. We can call “technology” a process that connects dis-
continuous parts of the world in a practical way. At the other side, we understand 
the process of change or movement that is reversible, as “mechanical”. That means, 
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processes in which the system can be returned to its original state. A condition for 
the changes of the resulting artefact is that it can be obliterated. To move e.g. a chair 
from a place to another is e.g. a “mechanical event”. These mechanical acts can be 
described step by step. That means that we can understand the movement of the chair 
as the summa of many small movements. We notice that living beings are not me-
chanical systems but they can produce mechanical processes. That means that the 
living body being not “mechanical” can be connected to mechanical processes con-
necting the body to the World mechanically.  
Artificial Life or the Vitalism of Postmodernity  
When philosophers in different times tried to define “life”, they confronted 
some archetypical problems. One of the first problems was that of deciding if living 
and non-living matter showed the same properties. If not, which of the matters was 
that which was the most primitive? The second problem was that of developing an 
epistemological model of life. Philosophers worked on two families of models, one 
model, which we can call a substance-like model, and a second that we can call a scene-
like model. The first model understands life as a substance with all the properties that 
characterizes substances. This is the point of view of a chemical metaphysics. On the 
other hand, a scene-like metaphysics understands life as a “projectile” that is a parti-
cle that moves in space and time. The second model reflects the point of view of 
physics. A third problem was to find a good method to organize the living process 
in a causal model. Is life a mechanism? Alternatively, shall we understand life as a 
goal-oriented process (teleological)? 
Considering the first problem and acknowledging that non-living matter is 
not the same matter as the living matter, conduces us to the conclusion that living 
matter lacks physical and chemical properties, (because non-living matter shows 
physical and chemical properties). Such a conclusion conduced to the requirement 
of a non-material substance. In this sense, life became animated matter (anima as spirit or 
soul that expresses the idea of “breath.”) The hypothesis, at the other hand, that 
non-living matter is the same matter as the living matter, conduced to a new level of 
problems. It could be possible that the differences between living and non-living 
matter were the same between organic and inorganic matter. However, in the year 
1828, this possibility showed to be an illusion when Friedrich Wöhler (1800-1882) 
managed to produce urea (NH2CONH2) from inorganic matter. Today, the prob-
lem of the differences between living and non-living matter, is still actual and there 
is not any convincing answer to this question. To the history of this study, some 
other important results should be named, for example the discovery of viruses as 
large molecules. This discovery was made by Wendell Meredith Stanley (1904-1971) 
whom received a Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1946 for his work on the tobacco 
mosaic virus, which he crystallized in 1935. Stanley demonstrated that a virus has 
molecular properties and grounded a new approach that studies viruses as large 
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molecules. However, if it is not possible to decide what the limits between living 
and non-living matter are, could it be possible to decide which of the two is the 
more primitive? During Antiquity the dominant Ideas were that life dominated in 
the universe. With Descartes philosophy, this idea changed to the opposite. Today 
scientific view coincides with that of Descartes and we understand life as a special 
state of matter.  
Two competing epistemological models 
During Antiquity, the dominating idea of the living was the substance-like epis-
temological model. Greek philosophy understood life as the presence of soul in 
matter (psyche). For Plato, this substance was the underlying cause of the self-
motion of the living. Death occurred when the life-giving substance disappeared 
from matter. However even in Antiquity there are exceptions to this tendency, At-
omists understood life as moving particles. The metaphysics that understands life as 
independent from any other form of matter has been called “Vitalism”. This meta-
physics often appears associated to substance-like models. In a corresponding way, 
Mechanism is easily associated to scene-like models. The confrontation between vital-
ists and mechanists reach the highest point during the last years of the 19th century. 
To the vitalists life is not reducible to any mechanism. “Life” is a category itself, as 
space, time, substance and movement. With this in mind the metaphysics of Vital-
ism worked with two different forms of matter. The mechanists, on the other hand, 
believed that life is nothing but a special combination of physical and chemical 
properties. That means that life could be produced in the laboratory. While vitalists 
could explain “what life was”, mechanists chose to explain “what life was made of”.  
Once, in the beginnings of science, the need of systematic classification of life 
forms was unavoidable. Aristotle and many others after him until Linnaeus worked 
in this direction. The characteristics of primitive science determined that those sys-
tematic studies should be done “in vivo”. At that time, life forms where understood 
as wholes, as they appeared to everybody in the world of common sense. This di-
rection has been followed by evolutionists as Charles Darwin and geneticians as 
Gregor Mendel and in our days by the ecologists. With the development of scien-
tific technology, with apparatus as the microscope, another form of study of life 
became possible. Life forms were desiccated and studied “in vitro”. The scientific 
strategy worked with living beings as mechanisms and decomposed them as a jigsaw 
puzzle. The first step consisted in finding a minimal particle, the minimal piece of 
the machine. Following the inheritance of atomism, the scientists found the cell and 
studied how it worked.  
The foundations of Postmodern philosophy of Life 
During the 18th century, a group of scientists that later would be called “vital-
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ists” flourished in Europe. Among those vitalists, was Georg Ernst Stahl (1660-
1734), the creator of the theory of phlogiston. After Stahl and Bichat, the debate be-
tween vitalists and mechanists reached its climax during the last years of the 19th 
century. Among the vitalists we will name Max Verworn (1863-1921) who had the 
idea that chemical particles with special chemical acting were “living” and Hans 
Driesch (1867-1941) an anti-Darwinist that defended the autonomy of life. Driesch 
believed that there existed a special power, which he called “monads” – a concept 
he borrowed from the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-
1716). Driesch had demonstrated by experiment in 1895 that it was possible to re-
move large pieces from eggs, such as shuffling the blastomeres at will or taking 
some away and thus interfering in many ways, yet not affect the resulting embryo. 
This was taken as proof that any single monad in the original egg cell was capable of 
forming any part of the completed embryo. The 19th century debate was the last de-
bate between vitalists and mechanists that was centred in trying to find proof about 
the nature of life in biology and chemistry. The next generation of vitalists, worked 
in a digital environment and would be one of the typical expressions of the Post-
modern era.  
What we call Postmodern Vitalism is the position that defended the possibil-
ity of creating life forms from the application of intelligent programs in 
computational environments. The new variants of Leibnitz’s monads were robots 
and androids. The differences from traditional Vitalism are remarkable, when the 
traditional Vitalism saw in the machines the opposite of life, Postmodern Vitalism 
see in machines the platform of life forms. The point of departure for Postmodern 
Vitalism was Alan Mathison Turing’s (1912-54) work and his reflexions on the ca-
pacity of constructing a thinking machine. Another important contributor to this 
new branch was Norbert Wiener’s (1894-1964) program on Cybernetics. After the 
Second World War the needs of a new ground for a philosophy of life grew in di-
rect proportion to the astonishing scientific discoveries and outstanding 
technological achievements. There were many different disciplines which contribut-
ed to this development and many of them changed decisively in combinations with 
others to create new interdisciplinary results. Some of those decisive sciences were 
mathematics, electronics, and neuronal physiology. Some very important results in 
the field of Cognition were the works of Humberto Maturana (1928) and Francisco 
Varela (1946-2001). 
Maturana’s main ideas were introduced in his most important works Autopoie-
sis and Cognition (1980), The Tree of Knowledge (1987) and Science and Daily Life: the 
Ontology of Scientific Explanations (1991). Among the works of Varela should be men-
tioned The Embodied Mind (1991–Varela, Rosch and Thompson) which anticipated 
the ideas of intelligence as “evolutional intelligence”. Maturana first worked with 
studying vision and its phenomenological aspects. 
According to Varela, knowledge can only be reached through the body’s par-
ticipation in the process of cognition. He worked with his own ideas, as that of 
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“neuronal phenomenology” which tried to combine neuronal physiology with Hus-
serl’s phenomenology. Varela suffered hepatitis–C and died after a liver–
transplantation. During his convalescence, Varela wrote, “Intimate Distances - Frag-
ments for a Phenomenology of Organ Transplantation.” The central question these authors 
asked was “in which way are living creatures organized?” Already here, their orienta-
tion was clear. Life is not to be explained extracting the properties which living 
things have in common. The class of living things is not defined by common and 
essential properties, but by a particular form of organization. An explanation of life 
would be accomplished if it could prescribe a “generative mechanism” which if “re-
alized”, would lead to experiencing the phenomena wanted to be explained. So if 
there could be specified an organization, which, if realized would behave in a man-
ner indistinguishable from the other phenomena we would call “life”, then, we 
would have an explanation of life. Some questions now surface. If one succeeds to 
specify a generative mechanism, for example a computer program or a conceptual 
system, would this, apart from being an explanation of life, also be an example of 
life, as the phenomenology of the generative mechanism would be indistinguishable 
from real life? If so, artificial life would also be real life.  
Maturana and Varela could be said, be following a tradition started by von 
Neumann and formed by cybernetic research; an early version of what now is 
known as cognitive science. The field of cybernetics is now experiencing a revival 
(Varela, Rosch and Thompson), partly because of the influence of Maturana and 
Varela. A blossoming underground movement in cognitive science known as Artifi-
cial Life (also known as AL) is drawing heavily on the cybernetic tradition. A-life 
researchers seem to be in accordance with the theoretical stance of Maturana and 
Varela.  
Christopher Langton defines life similarly to them: “a property of the organi-
zation of matter, rather than a property of the matter that is so organized”. So the 
phenomena of life, can emerge from simple physical matter and complexity. The 
important point is that life, though it has to be carried out by a physical structure, is 
not a property of the matter. It is not a form, not a colour or some kind of life force 
connected to living tissue. If this way of thinking is right, then to know the organi-
zation of the living is to know what life is. A first objection might be raised at this 
point: what is complexity and how is complexity distinguished from simplicity?  
The notion of complexity is a very central one for the Modern theories of au-
tomata and artificial life. It is normally used pragmatically. The notion of complexity 
is accepted without analysis as belonging to some ontological reality. To be able to 
work with it in spite of this, it is defined in operative terms. An example of this can 
be found in the book of Håkan J. Holm Complexity in Economic Theory “An automata 
theoretical approach”. He defines “complexity” indirectly, through defining a “meas-
urement” of complexity. A measurement of the complexity of any problem could 
be precise as follows; 1) a description of the computer that can handle it, 2) a de-
scription of the algorithm (computer program) which can handle that problem, 3) 
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the kind of input data, 4) the demands of time and space of data.  
Asking about the organization of an entity, is asking how this entity is struc-
tured and even how this entity works. Now, one may object that a question about 
the organization of an entity, would tell us what the entity is, because I cannot ex-
plain what life is through a description of its structure or through a description of 
how life works (or both). The reason for this is the same as the reason of why we 
are not able to explain what a car is through a description of its structure or an ac-
count of how it works. If this explanation is given to a man who never has seen a 
car, he would not understand what we are talking about. I cannot say for example 
that a car is “some particular relationship of four wheels with an engine”. We can-
not answer a question of the type “what is A?” with an answer of the type “the 
organization of A is so and so”. That is why, in spite of the progress of the philo-
sophical Mechanism, it has not been possible to answer the question of what life is.  
We must not forget that Mechanism raises upon the development of Nomi-
nalism and the question of what life is, is a question about essentials. The 
organization of matter is not what life is but rather the conditions for life to be. 
Now, some of the arguments of Maturana and Varela make us think that they are 
not mechanists. For example, they think that life has a unique place in the world of 
nature. At this point, they are more close to Vitalism than to Mechanism. As we are 
going to see, they are not physicalists either. This means that the use of the word 
“organization” in their ‘language’ must mean something else. It is rather more ap-
propriate to understand that with “organization”, they are referring to life’s essential 
organization. What is essential to the organization of the living is for example, the 
existence of neighbourhood’s relations. This idea seems to provide us with a solution of 
the problem of teleology. The different parts of a living organism act independently. 
Each part is working with some immediate acting and does not influence the others 
directly. The results are the combination of each particular, not globally but inde-
pendently (see also Langton, 1993).  
When a materialist model is used to represent life, or some connected process 
of cognition, usually an identification is made between “a world of matter” (life in-
clusive) and “the physical world”. We may ask ourselves if this is the intended 
interpretation of Maturana and Varela. That is, are they physicalists? Well, the an-
swer is no. It seems that they are trying to develop an epistemological state that is of 
a new kind. It is neither a reductive physicalism nor any other kind of physicalism. 
Living systems may be then the consequence of a state of matter that is emergent as 
well as it is not physical (the biological state). Thus if you ask Maturana and Varela, 
they would say that they believe that life can be produced by complexity from sim-
ple physical objects and in support of this would show you how emergent 
proprieties can be produced in a computer. The intended interpretation then is that 
life is a complication of the physical world that is by definition “simple”. As a con-
sequence of this, and because complexity is itself the bearing factor of life, a 
computer program as a “virus” for example, has to be in some way living (or at least 
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living in the same way as a non-artificial (“real”) virus). What is new in all of this is 
that the reduction of the living to the non-living, which was the central issue of 
Mechanism has changed to the opposite. It is not the case that Maturana and Varela 
try to avoid materialism as the classical vitalists wanted to do, but their strategy as 
we saw, is not that of Mechanism either. Their project was the continuation of that 
of the alchemists as well as that of the computer scientists of Artificial Life. 
Maturana and Varela are neither mechanists nor physicalists; we might call their in-
terpretation as organizationism.  
Life is complex and circular but we learn that an organization might be com-
plex and circular at the same time without being living. What distinguishes life from 
other non-living things that might be circular? Maturana and Varela say that life is 
self-producing and self-organizing. Complexity and circularity without structural 
coupling and self-production is not life. The idea that the complexity of its organi-
zation is the bearing property of life has a very strong intuitive appeal and deserves 
therefore to be studied in more detail. We may not forget that this idea with more 
or less influence from physicalism and Mechanism is shared by Maturana and 
Varela and the researchers of AL. I know that life is embedded in physical and 
chemical processes and even if I do not believe in a complete reduction of life to 
physical and chemical processes, I have to accept that somewhere, sometimes, 
something happens that make non-living matter to a living being. Therefore I may 
say that life is an emergent quality arising from the complexity of some physical and 
chemical processes. If the complexity of the organization is the bearing property of 
life, then nothing more is necessary and we can presume that to introduce complex-
ity into non-living matter may transform it into life.  
Getting over to the consequences of those assumptions, we shall assume that 
nothing could be more practical than to use computational devices to check our 
ideas. The reason to this choice is that with the help of computers it is very easy to 
provoke complex behaviour from the mere repetition of simple initial patterns. 
Computers and computer-technology have provided a new and precise idea of 
complexity.  
The history of AL shows us a very large list of experiments. These experi-
ments depart from the application of some algorithm (computer’s program) without 
knowing the consequences of that acting. We will emphasize that the key of the un-
derstanding of those programs, is simply that we cannot know a priori, what the 
machine is going to do. Instead, we know step by step, what the program will make 
the machine do, then the acting of the machine will not be considered complex at 
all. Complexity then, is the name of some degree of ignorance as well as the name 
of some degree of uncontrolled behaviour. These conclusions seem to be in some 
sense, paradoxical. Take for example the idea of algorithm. An algorithm is usually 
understood as a procedure to know and control a process step by step. If this is 
right, it is in some sense paradoxical to create algorithms that violate this strong 
claim. Another paradoxical consequence arises from the original assumptions: If we 
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have sustained that life is a complex organization, and we have gone further and 
carried out some experiments to show that our assumptions are demonstrable, we 
have assumed that the secret of life is revealed in the secret of its organization. It is 
natural then, to demand an account of how all this has gone on. Now, even if we 
succeed in creating  life-similar phenomena with the recourse of a computer, we still 
do not know if complexity is the bearing factor, as long as we do not show, step by 
step, how all this has occurred. As we already said, to know about the organization 
of something is to know how it works. To know how it works is in its turn, to de-
scribe systematically the whole process; but this is, by principle, impossible.  
We will now draw some general conclusions about the use of computers and 
other automates to study life and life-depended qualities: 1) computer’s programs 
might succeed in producing life, if life is understood as uncontrolled and unpredict-
ed machine behaviour. At best, it would be a copy of life and at worst it would be 
an imitation of life. 2) In both cases, it might be a matter of uncertainty if the arising 
life-similar qualities, are the consequence of the applied algorithm - who knows? 3) 
Arising complexity cannot explain what life is.  
To visualise our conclusions we will present an example: let us say that some 
researches might find that the combination of some chemicals under some physical 
conditions produce living beings. They have shown then, that life can be produced 
if we systematically follow some chemical and physical methods. Now if this is pos-
sible, we still do not know what life is. The epistemological situation is the same as 
that of the computational life-similar device.  
Let us now analyze in more detail the roll of uncontrolled acting. The acting 
of some underlying program has to be demanded if a computer’s virus will be un-
derstood as having followed the power of rules. Unfortunately the relation between 
rules and behaviour is not an easy one. There is in fact a kind of distance between 
rules and behaviour, which may not be the same for computer’s and living viruses. 
To be able to decide if the distance between the rules and the behaviour of a com-
puter virus is the same as the same distance in a real virus, we should need not to 
copy or imitate life, but to know what life is. We want to emphasize again that if life 
has to be created in some artificial way, it would be unpredicted and uncontrolled 
even in the way it would reproduce. The idea of artificial life cannot be associated to 
the idea of controlled conditions. If we succeed in producing life through artificial 
devices, it would reveal to us its mysteries a posteriori. 
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Entry 15: Cloning as Broken 
Technology  
 
 
Is a cloned organism the same case as of a robot? Like the robot, a cloned or-
ganism is an example of the brokenness of nature but not exactly the same 
brokenness, because it is not the whole nature that which is broken here but only 
the process of natural reproduction of living organisms. It is only a part of the copying 
process that is mechanical. In this sense the technology of cloning shows some kin-
ship with other reproduction processes that are also “artificial”. The first "test tube 
baby" is 30 years old today and was conceived using a technique known as “in Vitro 
Fertilization”.  Since then, also other techniques have been used successfully: e.g. 
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) y la Ooplasmic Transference. In each of these cases 
it is the natural reproduction that broke but in different degrees and with different 
phenomenological consequences. However the phenomena of cloning has large and 
unique consequences for the everyday world because the making of copies is 
achieved through “universalizing” an already specialized (particularized) cell which 
had been transformed to a primitive stadium of undifferentiated properties: life 
shows to be a reversible process. We say that cloning cause brokenness in identity. 
The current discussion about the promises and the risks of genetic manipula-
tion recalls us of previous situations as those in which the freedom of the human 
being has been questioned by some form of “necessity”. This necessity has been 
expressed frequently as the presence of an omnipresent and all mighty God but also 
and above all, from the 17th century, as the inexorable mandate of nature. The prob-
lem of genetic manipulation is related to other philosophical problems not less 
important, for example to the problem of the existence of universals – a problem 
that in its moment gave place to the development of two mayor philosophical 
schools; the realists and the nominalists - and to the existence of the soul as a dif-
ferent and independent substance. A study of the problems treated in relationship 
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to genetic manipulation shows us that such manipulation supposes the freedom of 
modifying the genetic inheritance. At the same time, this manipulation is made pos-
sible thanks to the character purportedly mechanical of the genes, or with other 
words, to the necessary interrelationship between properties and genes. In fact, it is 
not the process of cloning in itself (multiplication of exact copies of a certain genet-
ic code) the revolutionary phenomenon by excellence, but the fact that it has been 
achieved through “universalizing” an already specialized (particularized) cell which 
had been transformed to a primitive stadium of undifferentiated properties (even 
called totipotent). The group of scientists that cloned Dolly, achieved to develop an 
undifferentiated cell from the point of departure of a perfectly differentiated one. 
Life is revealed to us now as reversible, as able to be changed through the axle of 
time, then, as in some sense mechanic. However, far from being a great victory of 
Mechanism, cloning reaffirms exactly the opposite, that is, the non-mechanical 
properties of life, which become revealed when the mechanical step “backwards” 
surprised everyone. Cloning is not the case of a simple step backwards as in the 
wheels of a mechanism; it is the jump from the particular to the universal, a jump 
without sharp-edged limits.  
What exactly do we mean by cloning? There are two possible types of clon-
ing, the first of which is really a misnomer. The first type is creating two, four, 
or eight embryos out of one original very early embryo. When the embryo is 
composed of only two to eight cells (called blastomeres), before it has begun to 
differentiate into the inner cell mass (which will become the embryo) and 
support cells (which will become the placenta), all the cells are totipotent 
which is to say that each of them has the ability to become an entire 
new organism.73 
Davis understands this as kvasi-cloning. Cloning is understood by Davis as fol-
lows: 
The second type of cloning, and the one on which I will concentrate here, is 
somatic cell nuclear transfer. A somatic cell is any cell in your body other than 
sperm or eggs. Somatic cells have the full complement of chromosomes, half 
from your mother, and half from your father. But germ cells (sperm and eggs) 
have only half that number (otherwise, when they came together in fertiliza-
tion, there would be twice the correct number). In somatic cell nuclear 
transfer, the genetic material is scooped out of an egg cell and replaced with 
the genetic material of a "regular" or somatic cell, taken from anywhere in the 
donor's body.74 
 
                                               
73 Dena S. Davis. Genetic Dilemmas. Routledge, 2001; p.109. 
74 Dena S. Davis. Op cit; p.111. 
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Cloning also, is the process by which it is made possible to copy a genetic 
code independently of the course of the historical time. The properties of life ap-
pear now as reversible functions, which can be multiplied and be transmitted to 
other particulars, in other times. That is why it is possible to imagine the recovering 
of extinguished animals as dinosaurs or the recreation of dead persons as Hitler, Je-
sus or Einstein, now in a very different historical situation. All indicates that within 
few years it will be possible to recreate an exact copy of a dead human being from 
the genes of his hair or from his nails. But will those particulars be the same particu-
lars as they were in the past? We can be sure that they would be in such a case, and 
without any doubt, the exact copies of a genetic code, with what this entire means, 
but never the same particulars. History manages to introduce historical time 
through the interstices of cloning through the unavoidable variations of circum-
stances. In a few words, we can say that the plasticity of life will not affect the 
course of history, course in which the genetic code is only a part of an enormously 
complex reality.  
We have here once again, the great topic of the existence of universals and 
particulars. Consequently, in connection with cloning it will be necessary to distin-
guish between vital time and historical time. The fabric of life demonstrates that the 
relationship between what is particular and what is universal is reversible. In the vital 
process, the passage of what is universal to what is particular coincides with the di-
rection of time, while the passage of what is particular to what is universal reverses 
the course of time, modifying the chain of the events through the repetition of a 
certain genetic code emerged in a disappeared historical time. The concept of clon-
ing supposes furthermore a redefinition of the topic of death. In some way the 
genetic code is appeared to us as a-temporal, free of all kind of decadence and from 
death. Life, seen now under a mechanical light, seems to enjoy two parallel capaci-
ties, that of evolution and that of involution.  
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Part II: The Humanist as 
Engineer 
Introduction  
The category of “humanistic engineer” or “engineer of brokenness” includes 
two fundamental groups. First, there are those, which produce ideal societies and 
paradigmatic human relationships – I will call this group the “utopians” respectively 
“dystopian”; the society and world of Plato, More and Campanella, are examples of 
the first group, George Orwell's 1984 is the best example of the second group. A 
second group of humanistic engineers is that which works principally with artefacts 
designed and produced by humans; this group could be called “humanistic techno-
logians”. Broken technology is the name we give a kind of praxis which have a 
broken connection to the everyday world and through which we can reach fore-
knowledge, intuition or presentiment of realities that do not have an obvious place 
in this Everyday world. The humanistic engineer does not imagine, design or recon-
struct machines but “artefacts”. These artefacts are built according to different 
principles than those of machines, they are routines rather than mechanism. The techno-
logian differs from both the technician and the technologist: 
A technologian is neither a technician nor a technologist.  Although she or he 
is one who understands technology, she focuses her investigation on the role 
it plays in creating meaning in human life.  The fields of study pertaining both 
to the practical and technical aspects of information as a commodity (librari-
anship) and information technology as a tool or system to capture, 
manipulate, store and deliver information (information science, computer sci-
ence, systems engineering) are well developed.  Each has a history and 
tradition of research and scholarship of its own which focuses on the tech-
nical aspects of each while considering human beings only as consumers of 
information or users of information systems.   While much attention has been 
paid to human needs, with regard to the ways information is packaged and 
displayed and to the ways technology is used to manipulate and deliver it, little 
research has been done on the lived human experience of technology itself.75 
The technologian is a phenomenologist working to make conscious the uncon-
scious world of everydayness. This work will be done by focusing the analysis in the 
artefact itself and not in the noema-noesis relationship which reduces the artefact to 
                                               
75 What is a technologian? http://technologian.com/introduction.html 
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a mental content.  
 
 
Bringing attention to the “thing itself” for us does not mean to focus on the 
“perceived as perceived” but on the “perceived as praxis”. The perceived is then for 
us, always a product of acting and therefore the consequence of technologies im-
plemented throughout effective procedures. We understand this approach as 
phenomenological. Some of the procedures are technological adequate and some 
are not. From the point of view of phenomenology the cases of brokenness are 
more interesting because in their negativity they expose the hidden structures of the 
everyday world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
The technologian  
 
produce “possible” places, realities which have ei-
ther ontological or ontical references but never both 
 
The technician  
 
produces “genuine” places, realities which are  both 
ontological and ontical references 
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Caring for first-level 
brokenness 
From pure thought and language to praxis 
If we hastily resume the panorama of classic 20th philosophy of meaning we 
can establish that the common reference of these philosophies is judgement, logic and 
the development of a universal language as the only certain reference for intentionality 
and knowledge. This situation leads to the reductionism of consciousness to “lin-
guisticism” a matter of fact that is obvious in the analytical tradition and less 
remarkable but present in classical phenomenology and its ramifications. We have 
to point out here, the philosophical “distance” existing between the debates over 
“knowledge”, “intentionality” and  “belief”, developed during the first years of the 
20th Century and the ideas about the same issues in Postmodern (Post–Analytic, 
Post–Structuralist, Post–Marxist) philosophy. What is new after these new ap-
proaches is that the achieved idealized representation is devalued in respect of truth. 
With the entrance of Derrida in the scene of philosophy in the early sixties, the dis-
cussion presented above, moved to the history of philosophy. The critic that 
Derrida directed to the modern classics of linguisticism, to Husserl and Ferdinand 
de Saussure but also to Austin and with him, to all the analytical tradition, was pos-
sible through the introduction of a deep instability in the philosophy of language. 
Derrida’s critique awakened a new consciousness and a more fruitful understanding 
of the heritage of Greek metaphysics in the thought of the West. Derrida concen-
trated his criticism against what he called logocentrism, manifested especially at the 
centre of philosophy of language and was the centre of Husserl’s work. His critique 
was directed to all form of positivism, also in its structuralist, Marxian and psycho-
analytical alternatives. In addition, even the possibility of a phenomenological 
scientific program became impossible. 
However, Derrida’s philosophy becomes a victim of its own criticism because 
it is impossible to conceive his methodology (we will call it deconstructionism) without 
the ideological “ism” that it implies. Further, it is not possible to see Derrida’s phil-
osophical project different than a method in spite of the fact that Derrida himself 
specifically rejected both consequences. As an “ism” deconstruction becomes a 
metanarrative and a part of the logos. In addition, the worst scenario is that as a meth-
od, deconstructionism has a clear positivistic value. Because of Derrida’s work, it is 
impossible today to speak about meaning in any sense and therefore it is impossible 
to understand the real content of Derrida’s own work and of any other work. 
Therefore, it is necessary to put Derrida in between brackets and try to see his work’s 
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consequences instead of focusing our attention to the traces of his thought. The con-
sequences of his work on the other hand are much clearer; there is the awareness of 
the end of logocentrism, ethnocentrism and phallus-centrism in any of its expres-
sions, and the end of the dominance and simplicity of linguisticism in philosophy 
and in science.  To think philosophically after Derrida demands that we incorporate 
his conclusions in more traditional philosophical models, those that in some sense 
had anticipated his work, I am referring to Marx and Marxism, to Husserl and Phe-
nomenology and to Freud and Psychoanalysis. Against linguisticism we are going to 
work with ontology; against logocentrism, we have to differentiate intentionality from 
knowledge. The reason for that is that logocentrism is the consequence of just this 
identification. Western thought cannot escape the destiny of logocentrism, if 
knowledge should be the goal of acting. After Derrida, we know that culture in such way it 
is produced, should be constantly deconstructed. However, this goes for Derrida’s 
philosophy as well, otherwise the différance and deconstruction becomes the new 
metanarrative. On the other hand, a deconstruction of deconstruction requires that 
we stop deconstructing. Otherwise, we should deconstruct and construct simulta-
neously. The result must be a construction, made free from that naive attitude 
which characterizes the positive sciences before the 1980’s. The new science should 
therefore be humble towards itself and its products, like a careful positivism or 
post-positivism. It must withhold a healthy distance to itself, show less dogmatism 
and promote the variety of ideas. It must become ‘fröhliche’ in Nietzsche’s sense76. 
 
The two states of mind 
Franz Brentano said that the acts of consciousness are directed toward an ob-
ject and he called this directness the intentional relation. He thought that to think is to 
think something. With Husserl, the intentional act creates the noema (the perceived as 
perceived) and the noesis (the consciousness of the perceived) while their relation is 
noetic (as pertaining to the mind). For us an act is an “act” when it is directed through-
out an object and we call this the act of incursion. For us to think pragmatically is to act 
right through something making the noema a pragma. The idea of “acting” is intuitively 
understood as the cause of an “act” both mental and physical. To “act” is the oppo-
site of the idea of “rest” passivity –stillness, apathy, immobility– to which we have a 
special term acedia –from Latin and from the Greek akedeia, meaning “indifference”. 
To simplify we say that the mind is either acting or is not, and then it is in a state of 
acedia. As an example, intending is acting; knowing at the other hand, is to be in acedia. 
We shall not differentiate either the communicative act from other acts, because we 
believe that every act is directly or indirectly communicative in its purpose. There is 
                                               
76 Look at Nietzsche’s   Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. 
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an analytical philosophical study of acting, which is relevant to our reflection; Ar-
thur Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of Acting from 1973, which includes Marx’ 
starting–points in the problem that he chooses to study.   
Exemplarily, we are knower of a fixed reality; our essence is fulfilled through 
the acquisition of ideas whose clarity is their guarantee of truth. This theory 
of man generates accordingly a theory of reality and of our relation to it. 
Marx, in opposition, perceives us as agents, reality is something we help 
shape, it has an essentially historical dimension, it is not something fixed and 
given, of which we might have some hope to achieve a final representation in 
thought. So his injunction to change the world is underwritten by an implicit 
metaphysics of world and men, if men are to be effective as agents.77 
Arthur Danto makes a parallel between the cognitive process and the pro-
cesses of acting. Danto’s intention is to understand how knowledge and acting is 
treated within Cartesianism and Marxism. He speaks of Descartes as a typical mod-
ern intellectual theorist of knowledge who takes interest in the question of the 
possibility of apodictic knowledge based on a modern dualistic subject–object rela-
tion. Danto writes, “It is in part to map these complexities, to get a better 
philosophical picture of man as related to the world through knowledge and acting, 
that I shall employ the concepts of knowledge and acting as mirror–images of one 
another, having parallel but inverse structures.”78 Danto’s conclusion is that there 
are parallel structures that connected the process of knowledge and the process of 
acting. About this opposition, Sigmund Freud wrote: 
I have noticed in the course of my psycho-analytical work that the psycholog-
ical state of a man in an attitude of reflection is entirely different from that of 
a man who is observing his psychic processes. In reflection there is a greater 
play of psychic activity than in the most attentive self-observation; this is 
shown even by the tense attitude and the wrinkled brow of the man in a state 
of reflection, as opposed to the mimic tranquillity of the man observing him-
self. In both cases, there must be concentrated attention, but the reflective 
man makes use of his critical faculties, with the result that he rejects some of 
the thoughts which rise into consciousness after he has become aware of 
them, and abruptly interrupts others, so that he does not follow the lines of 
thought which they would otherwise open up for him; while in respect of yet 
other thoughts he is able to behave in such a manner that they do not become 
conscious at all - that is to say, they are suppressed before they are perceived. 
In self-observation, on the other hand, he has but one task - that of suppress-
ing criticism; if he succeeds in doing this, an unlimited number of thoughts 
                                               
77 Arthur Danto. Analytical Philosophy of Action¸1973. Sid. 1-2.  
78 Danto. Op. cit. Sid. 1-2. 
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enter his consciousness which would otherwise have eluded his grasp.79 
This parallelism builds on an epistemological perspective that has its roots in the 
philosophy of Descartes and that imagines the problem of knowledge as a subject–
object relation. Danto’s comparison could in that case be applied to a concept of 
acting that is congruent with philosophy before Kant and Hegel, and an example of 
a concept of phenomena that Heidegger in Sein und Zeit describes as “vulgar”. From 
this perspective, Danto’s comparison is misleading since the ”acting” that Marx 
talks about is not comparable to the experiment–like situations that are the kinds of 
acting that Danto thinks about. An experiment–like situation differs from an inten-
tional act in that the cognitive subject in the first case has been isolated from the 
immediate world. This isolation is a necessary condition to the success of the exper-
iment. The artificially created world is already a product of knowledge, destined to 
“produce” the empirical object. The process of isolation in an experiment is meant 
to break all the intentional ties that bind the object of study to the “living world” 
and by these means create an artificial ontology. An experiment–like acting is hence 
fully compatible with the Cartesian view of life but incompatible with a Marxist one.      
Let us now take a closer look on the connection between the two states of 
mind, the one that starts from the disposition to be an observer and one that starts 
from the disposition to be engaged. We will now present an analogy that builds on a 
reference that Danto makes to art in the 16th century. In the year 1520, the pope 
Leo X (Giovanni di Lorenzo de' Medici 1513–23) consulted Michelangelo to build a 
chapel for the Medici family. The pope also wanted Michelangelo to place in the 
chapel the tomb of his younger brother Giuliano and his nephew Lorenzo. The genius 
of Michelangelo captured the opposition between acting and thought in the tombs 
of these two men. On one hand, the athletic Giuliano, a man of acting and on the 
other hand Lorenzo – Il Pensieroso who seems to be lost in deep thoughts, unaware 
of his surroundings. The point of the analogy is to show the relation between 
thought and acting, or also, between pure information and intentionality. Let us pic-
ture a situation (the analogy that follows is our own invention) that could take place 
in a detective anecdote:  “a desert landscape during the war, in which two individu-
als, who know each other well, are confronted after a long period of thinking that 
the other no longer was alive.” The individual whom we call Lorenzo is the first to 
come to the scenery of the meeting – let it be a house on the countryside, sur-
rounded by a forest – and when Giuliano arrives and discovers that someone already 
is in the house, he hides in the forest waiting to reveal the others identity. Could it 
be an enemy? Soon Giuliano sees a man through one of the windows; he is smok-
                                               
79 The Interpretation of Dreams- Sigmund Freud (1900). Chapter 2: The Method of dream interpre-
tation 
http://www.psywww.com/books/interp/toc.htm 
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ing. Something reminds him of Lorenzo, “who died in the war”. Alternatively, did 
he not? Time passes and Giuliano thinks to himself that if the man in the window 
was Lorenzo, he surely would have visited the childhood–place in the valley. He 
hurries over there and finds fresh traces from a visitor. Then, Giuliano thinks and 
realizes that if the man from the hiding place is Lorenzo, something amongst his 
belongings will reveal his identity. As soon as he can, he examines the man’s prop-
erties. Amongst the belongings of the man, he finds an old family portrait that 
strengthens the theory of the man’s identity. Giuliano reasons that the probability of 
his chain of hypotheses and proofs is so strong that he should reject the thought 
that Lorenzo is dead; he then, makes the decision to meet this man. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Giuliano and Lorenzo. Praxis and knowledge 
 
 
Let us now view the same situation from Lorenzo’s perspective. During the 
same period, Lorenzo feels shadowed. During one of his daily visits to the child-
hood place in the valley, he finds proof that someone else has been there. This is 
worrying, since it could be enemies. Gradually he calms himself down with the 
thought that it could very well be wild animals. When Lorenzo discovers that 
someone has been in his room, going through his belongings, he understands that 
the situation is serious. The visitor has to be someone who wishes to reveal his 
identity but who already knows about him. However, “it could not be Giuliano 
since he is dead”. He then decides to leave the house, hide in the forest, and wait to 
see what happens. What is the difference between the situations of Giuliano and 
Lorenzo? What makes them apply different strategies? In Giuliano’s case, the initial 
information (as fragmented intentionality) that he got during his observations has 
been transformed into intention. As we understand this dialectics, the two states of 
mind implies the movement from intentional state as order to a cognitive state as pure 
data (information or also, fragmented intentionality). This dialectic can be expressed 
relating order to certainty and information as disorder and uncertainty. 
Lorenzo –  
il Pensieroso.  
 
The dimension 
of information  
and knowledge 
- Passive rationali-
ty 
Giuliano – The 
dimension of 
intentionality, 
acting or praxis 
- Active rationali-
ty 
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Information becomes an intentional act when it diminishes to be almost identi-
cal with order and conversely, information is the measure of disorder when acting 
is impossible. 
 
 
Giuliano’s alternative has such a safe outcome that it automatically leads to acting. Giu-
liano has a world populated by phenomena in front of him – “familiar” objects – 
that make Lorenzo’s presence an understandable whole. For Giuliano the artefacts be-
come pragmata while the world of things is still noemata for Lorenzo. Giuliano’s relation to 
the situation is of an active nature. Lorenzo, on the other hand, has only pure infor-
mation (fragmented intentionality) to his disposal, which presents a chain of events 
that make it highly unlikely that he is connected to the “being”. The subjective 
probability here stands in relation to the completeness of the conception. The inten-
tional orientation of the conception is only compatible with conviction and therefore 
with “very probable” outcomes. Lorenzo on the other hand, has a not oriented con-
struction of thought, since it is based on empirical facts, a conceptive model that 
cannot be compatible with the living world. Lorenzo cannot act because all he has 
to his disposal are hypotheses. As in all experimental situations, Lorenzo can act 
first when the empirical situation has been transformed into a rational active whole. 
In Giuliano’s case, the observation of the “man in the window” has made the 
other person’s existence a part of the everyday conception. That observation makes 
it possible to apply the hypothetical deductive method, which after every confirma-
tion strengthens the original assumption. Giuliano digs deeper into active rationality 
and simultaneously the feeling of conviction grows stronger. Even though, nothing 
says that the figure in the window is the man he expects it to be, the certainty of the 
presentation is given. As soon as a situation is experienced as very probable, it is a 
certainty to act from. Observe that Giuliano becomes a “dogmatic” and Lorenzo a 
“sceptic” from the point of view of theory of knowledge. The conception of the 
world that is immediate is the one that gives us the conditions to act. We could say 
that while Giuliano is engaged in a situation, Lorenzo is only in suspense in front of it. 
Whereas the first can act immediately in complete agreement with his surroundings, 
the other must wait until the immediate world would be created. The difference be-
tween Giuliano and Lorenzo is to be found in their relations to the order of the 
world that each of them has got. Danto has studied the incongruence between look-
ing and acting: “So knowledge and acting, with regard to the same representation, 
are logically inimical: where there is room for acting, there is none for knowledge; and where 
there is room for knowledge, there is none for acting. In this respect, the man of acting and 
the man of thought are logical antagonists.”80 
                                               
80 Danto (1973). Sid. 26. 
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As my analogy shows, acting is caused by beliefs and those are the base of 
praxis. Nevertheless, beliefs depend on the order accessible. Conviction becomes an 
ideology when beliefs are combined with larger and more complex unities. 
Knowledge, on the other hand, is a consequence of acedia. Knowledge connects 
aimlessly to the chain of transcendental events and the mind is randomly connected 
to the world. This condition makes methodical scepticism possible allowing conclu-
sions of empirical nature. However, when it is time to act, the subject must transport 
itself from the knowing–state into the acting–state and transcribe the meaning of the 
known information (fragmented intentionality) into beliefs. It is interesting to ob-
serve that you cannot engage yourself in one or the other situation in any manner. To 
engage yourself, you have to be a part of the chain of events. High probabilities are 
the sign you have to wait for, the sign that will tell you that you have become “one” 
with reality in an ordered world. It is only after this that the conditions for acting 
have been produced; you believe instead of expect. On the other hand, to transport 
yourself from the engagement–condition you must become neutral to the chain of 
events. This is typical for the experimental–condition in natural sciences, but first 
after not being able to realize the expected predictions of the experiment. As a form 
of acting, the experiment–condition supposes to produce certain outcome and 
therefore involves beliefs. It is first when the experiment does not give the expected 
result that it can be seen as neutral to the chain of events. As we see it, there is then 
a connection between the nature of conceptions and our appreciation of order and 
expected results. This connection turns the “very likely statement” into the rational-
ity of praxis and the “less likely” into empiricism. The shifting in–between the 
rational dimensions of praxis and knowledge suppose then the comprehension of 
the fundaments of rationality in general, that is the understandings of the rules that 
control the dimensionality of the world, the human body included. Observe that in 
our analogy, the development did not stop with Giuliano’s resolution to act, in fact 
when Giuliano had decided to confront the “man in the house”, Lorenzo had al-
ready decided to hide in the woods and they never met each other. This is allegory of the 
incommensurability existing between empiricism and phenomenology.  
 
Order and Information 
The concept “information” is not so easy to define because it is used in dif-
ferent contexts. It is used in connection with natural sciences and technology with a 
specific signification and in social and human sciences meaning something differ-
ent.81 The term comes from Latin and originally meant “to form” something.  It can 
                                               
81 A complete study of the history and the definitions of the term can be found in: Capurro, Rafael 
and Hjørland, Birger: The concept of Information. Annual Review of Information’s Science and Technol-
ogy. Ed. Cronin. Vol. 37, 2003. 
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be found already in Publius Vergilius Maro and after him in Saint Augustine and 
Saint Thomas Aquinas. Later it appears again in Descartes and the new philosophy 
meaning “to form matter” and “to communicate something to someone”. In our 
times, the term became concrete after World War II associated with theoretical and 
technological developments in the fields of mathematics, communication technolo-
gies and computer science and to the names of men of science as Norbert Wiener, 
John von Neumann and Claude Elwood Shannon. Especially important is the book 
by Shannon and Weaver A Mathematical Theory of Communication from 1948. Shannon 
distinguished the meaning of the term “information” from that of the term “mean-
ing”. According to Shannon, “information” does not need not to be meaningful. 
“Information” to Shannon is the measure of a “difference” between signals.  The 
binary difference between “yes” and “no” is the simplest of all possible contents of 
information. This measure defines a binary unit or “bit”. The richer the open alter-
natives the richer the content of information in the message, therefore the 
technological meaning of information is a measurement of “organisation” and “or-
der”. 
Messages are themselves a form of pattern and organisation. Indeed, it is pos-
sible to treat sets of messages as having entropy like sets of states of the 
external world. Just as entropy is a measure of disorganisation, the infor-
mation is a measure of organisation.82 
One of the most important consequences of the modern use of the term” in-
formation” had some importance to our times materialism: 
The mechanical brain does not secrete thought “as the liver does bile”, as the 
earlier materialist claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy, as the 
muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter nor ener-
gy. No materialism, which does not admit this, can survive at the present 
day.83 
Rafael Capurro introduced a very interesting connection between the 
technological meaning of information and the phenomenological field of 
philosophy84. According to Capurro, information is fragmented intentionality. Capurro 
understands the modern age of informatics as postmodern phenomena, which can be 
found already in the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. The informative content 
can be understood according to Capurro as Postmodern knowledge because it is 
neither rational nor scientific. Another important difference is that informative 
communication leaves behind the opposition between object and subject and 
                                               
82 Wiener, Norbert. The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society. New York, 1967. 
83 Capurro, Rafael och Hjørland, Birger: The concept of Information. Anual Review of Informations Sci-
ence and Technology. Ed. Cronin. Vol. 37, 2003. 
84 Capurro, Rafael. La Hermenéutica y el Fenómeno de la Información. Cuaderno de psicoanálisis freudiano 
8, 1987. 
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substitutes it with inter-subjectivity and context; the informational content is not 
attached to a subject. Following our paradigm in which information is a kind of 
knowledge, it should be also meaningful and conscious. The fragmentation of 
intentionality in small and disconnected parts can be reconnected producing different 
and always unexpected results as new knowledge. Unexpectedness of meaning 
depends on the vanishing of intentionality. Because the mind’s closeness in the state 
of knowledge makes any acting impossible, the mind closes itself to any impute from 
the subject. Knowing as static consciousness is the opposite to acting and at the same 
time a consequence of it as its complement. The relationship between acting and 
knowledge has been very important for Alfred Schütz who studied this problem 
under the title of “Relevance”. As starting point, he referred the teachings of the 
Greek sceptic Carneades (214–129 BC) the first who criticized the dogmatic doctrines 
of the Stoics and the Epicureans. Relevance is in fact the problem of the deciding to 
act because of limited order (certainty). According to our interpretation of human 
acting, the essence of a conscious act is order. In other words, we understand “order” 
as inversely proportional to information; that means that if we know that an act 
produces x bits, it generates an order of 1/x bits. By the same reason if an artifact 
embeds x bits of informational value, it embeds 1/x bits of organizational value. In 
his writings, Schütz refers many of the examples introduced by Carneades. We will 
not repeat these examples here because each of these have the same structure that our 
own analogy about the brothers Lorenzo and Giuliano.85 According to Schütz, this 
problem had been studied by Husserl in Erfahrung und Urteil and by Bergson in Time 
and Free Will: 
He (Husserl) is especially interested in the problems of alternatives in which 
several interpretations of the same precept compete with one another. In case 
of so competing he calls them problematic possibilities; each of them stands to 
choice, as it were. Each has its own weight, and the mind oscillates from the 
one to the other weighing these possibilities before it comes to a decision –a 
decision which itself is always open to verification or falsification by even fur-
ther events. Husserl’s theory may be correlated to Bergson’s interpretation of 
choice, found in the last chapter of Time and Free Will. According to Bergson, 
it is not the case that there are two possibilities standing to choice. He speaks 
therefore not of choosing between two possible interpretations or courses of 
acting, but of two ways of possible acting or two goals to be brought about 
before any such process of choosing.86 
What Schütz is studying here is the same that concerns us: that any presenta-
                                               
85 Schutz, Alfred. The Structures of the Life-World. Northwestern University Press; 1973; p. 183. And 
Schutz, Alfred. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. Yale University Press; 1970; p. 17. 
86 Schutz, Alfred. Ibid. 
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tion has to deal with the problem of choice, that consciousness is always confronted 
with the alternative of either perform or inspect. The presence of the noema in a philos-
ophy of technology is the condition for the existence of some idea of an artefact. 
The noema can be either ideal or material but its essence is to be pure information. 
That is the case for the philosophy of Husserl which floated between monism and 
dualism. The undecided aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of knowledge de-
pended on his interest on the pair noema–noesis with the accent put on the self–
reflection of the phenomenological analysis. Husserl was interested in building a 
philosophy of ideas or mental contents. He belonged to the generation of thinkers 
who was kept by the problem of the “entertainment of thought”. However, after 
Heidegger, the idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology became obvious. Heidegger 
introduced another pair of categories, which relocked phenomenology to a new di-
chotomy. The new pair of foundational categories is pragma–noema, in which noema 
is the “perceived as perceived” and pragma is the usability or pragmaticity of a noe-
ma revealed through the acting of using the artefact. To “use things” as a way to 
understand their meaning is the essential difference between Heidegger and Hus-
serl. The idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology makes it to a cognitive philosophy 
without connection to the real world of phenomenal artefacts. Don Ihde refers to 
this as follows: 
They are clear adaptations from the Husserlian notion of intentionality which 
‘consciousness’ is always of something to which the act of consciousness re-
fers. The intentional act in Husserl is thus: Ego–cognizing–World. It should 
be noted preliminarily that the interpretation in the Husserlian context is one 
that dominantly sticks to a more traditional perceptual and cognitional charac-
terization of the act as ‘mental’. Functionally, the intentional act remains 
operative in Being and Time but it is no longer interpreted cognitionally – it is 
rather existentialized such that what turns out to be basic or primary is what I 
shall call the praxical.87  
A necessary condition, which makes a technology work, is that the dimension of 
pragma is present. That means that an intentional act is been designed to transform 
some noema through praxis. The presence of pragma makes the artefact an intend-
ed one and that it is a part of an acting, which produces something occasioning changes in 
the order of the World. The dualism of pragma–noema then controls the materiality 
of any intentional act. We say that the absence of pragma make an artefact pure 
perception or pure entertainment of thought.  
 
                                               
87 Ihde, Don, Technics and Praxis. 1979;  p. 116-117. 
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Figure 36: Technology as intentional act respective technology as knowledge 
 
 
This is what Don Ihde refers to as Heidegger’s inversion of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology introducing the notions of ‘ready–to–hand’ and ‘present–at–hand’: 
Heidegger argues that to take “things” interpreted as bare entities with prop-
erties, is already to have presupposed ontology prior to the concrete 
investigation of human engagement with the environment. It is from this ar-
gument that Heidegger constructs two different ways of relating to entities 
with the environment. These two ways of relating are well known as the dis-
tinction between the ‘ready–to–hand’ (Zuhandenheit) and the ‘present–at–hand’ 
(Vorhandenheit). It must be noted that both are qualitatively different relations 
to entities within the environment. Heidegger’s inversion of Husserl is one 
which makes a strong contrast between the ‘present–at–hand’ relation and the 
‘ready–to–hand’ relation. The first is one in which entities (beings) appear as 
‘just there’ and as having certain qualities or predicates. They are ‘theoretically 
determined’. Contrarily, the ‘ready–to–hand’ belongs to the stratum of pro-
ductive use or other forms of active engagement, which characterize praxis. 
And Heidegger’s strategy in Being and Time is to show that these are not mere-
ly two alternate modes of relation, but that one is founded upon the other, in 
this case the ‘present–at– hand’ upon the ‘ready–to–hand’. This is, in effect, 
and acting theory of ontology.88 
The relationship between noema and pragma have two aspects, the first is 
that we call “absolute congruency” meaning by that the direct relationship between 
pragma and noema. Another aspect is that of “relative congruence” in which the 
important issue is the weight of pragma respective noema to decide the emerging 
                                               
88 Ihde, Don, Techniques and Praxis. 1979; p. 118. 
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World. Husserl philosophy for instance, does not study ontologicity but onticality; 
the relationship between ideal artefacts and the perception of these as meanings. In 
a Heideggerian perspective, the presence of pragma connected to noema supposes 
ontology. When the mind works with these dichotomies the absence of one of the 
alternatives, suppose the invasion of one of the underling possibilities. Being not 
ontological suppose being ontical and conversely, being not ontical suppose being 
ontological. The disoperation of e.g. pragma makes noema stronger and the ontical 
emerges; conversely, the disoperation of noema makes pragma stronger and the 
World becomes ontological. The ontological and the ontical together “make” the 
everyday world. Some technologies are broken because they fail to produce pragma. 
That is the case of fantastic technologies. They delimited a field and a possible 
world with artefacts as noemata, which are only pure entertainment of thought. 
Conversely, other technologies are broken because they do not manage to connect a 
pragma to a noema. That is the case of magical technologies. They have reduced 
technology to pure pragma (rituals) without connection to knowledge. One kind of 
technology goes on faithfully on Husserl’s side: that is the case of tentative technolo-
gies, which are trapped into the world of noema–noesis and of the pure 
phenomenological analysis. The technologies of poverty do not match onticaly but 
their flexible relationship between pragma and noema makes them working well, re-
vealing new aspects of an underlying unknown ontology. The pragmatics of these 
technologies is built on the range of the docking possibilities of the pragma. Con-
versely, fruitless technologies are ontological–broken because their connection 
between pragma and noema do not match the everyday world. They work in an ide-
al world, a world that is half way from praxis. The pragma–noema and the 
ontological–ontical relationships even if they exist and work properly, have to dock 
with Time. Some broken technologies are enigmas. An enigma, is a historical riddle 
and it supposes the study of all the information available and the interpreter’s own 
phenomenal experience. This “phenomenal experience” is generational and non-
transferable. We said above an enigma is not an abstract cognitive problem, but a 
concrete one, it is a cognitive problem converted into a cognitive concrete situation. 
An enigma supposes acting, the acting of solving it in our own time. An enigma is 
never empirical but phenomenal, suppose intentionality and not knowledge. Solving 
an enigma supposes working out some “missing” part of the reported events.” The 
functionality of an artefact depends on the quality of docking with the tangible 
world. However, this docking is enigmatic or time–connected and so is the world, 
which is constantly changing. In this sense, the capability of docking of an artefact 
is praxis–sensitive and historical determined. We say that the pragmatic aspects of 
any technology “grow old” with the humans that are using these technologies. That 
is the situation of outdated technologies, which work as self–referring parts of a 
whole ´that does not exists anymore. Their pragmatic properties are damaged but 
they “are still there”, as a ghost or as a trace of another world–time.  
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Caring for second-level 
brokenness 
The World 
We will name the problem of the being in general “ontical” and “ontological” the 
problem of belief. We will use the following structure of ideas: 
 
 
Ontological:  intentionality – belief– certainty – acting – doxa –
technological act 
 
 
Ontic: knowledge – information – being – being in acedia – in-
spective attitude – probability - technology 
 
 
The grounds of this structure are the same as in Husserl’s Ideen. Husserl wrote about 
this global dichotomy in section 103 of Ideen, with the title “Characters Distinctive 
of Being and of Belief” and then in the section 105 with the title “The Modality of 
Belief, as Belief; the Modality of Being, as Being”: 
Looking around now for new characters, our attention is first drawn to the 
fact that interlinked with the groups of characters previously treated, we have 
characters which are clearly of a wholly different type, namely, the characters of 
Being. As noetic characters, correlatively related to modes of Being –as “dox-
ic” or “belief characters” we may cite as closely linked with intuitable 
presentations the perceptual belief present as a real (reell) factor in normal 
perception, and functioning therein as a “sense of reality,” and, more closely 
still, perceptual assurance or its equivalent; to it corresponds in the appearing 
“object” as noematic correlate the ontical character “real’ (wirklich). The same 
noetic or noematic character is shown in the “certainty” which may accom-
pany all repeated representation, in “sure” recollection of every kind, whether 
in respect to what has been, to what now is, or to what will be in the future 
(as in anticipative expectation). Such are “thetic” acts, acts that “posit” Being. 
[…] The way of “certain” belief can pass over into that of suggestion or presump-
tion, or into that of question and doubt; and, according to the line taken, that 
which appears (characterized m respect of that first order of characterizations 
which takes in the “primordial,” the “reproductive,” and the like) will adopt 
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the ontical modalities of the “possible,” the “probable,” the “questionable,” and 
the “doubtful” respectively.89 
Transcribing Husserl’s ideas to our perspective can we say that our own contribu-
tion has to do with the dichotomy of the “two states of the mind” create to develop 
a comprehensible structure of the relationship between acting as intentionality and 
information as fragmented intentionality. The World as it reveals itself for us as 
pure phenomena adopt a twofold structure that we identify as the group of substanc-
es, and the group of scenarios. Substances for instance, are dense, continuous and do 
not relate to space or time. “Consciousness” for example has been understood as a 
substance, also “electricity” or “air”, “dust”, the “soul” and even God. Scenarios are 
representations in space and time in which dignities, sizes and substances can be 
projected. Each of these aspects of the structure of the world has a dynamic and a 
static state, which produce the ideas of movement, change or growth. The change of sub-
stances is understood as the changes of the identity of the noema. With the 
development of modern science, the idea of “movement” became more important 
than the idea of “change”. “Movement” consisted as the projection of the noema in 
a scene-like “place” in which the changes in identity of the noema are given in the 
scene itself. A combination of scene–like phenomena and substance–like phenome-
na gives the plastic model. The plastic model arises from the attempt to explain the 
phenomena of life. The dynamics of life includes both movement and change, pro-
ducing a kind of stretching in every direction. The Greek idea of kinesis referred to 
any kind of change and before Aristotle, nobody had distinguished movement from 
change. Aristotle was the first who tried to develop a clearly limit between scene-
like phenomena and substance-like phenomena. He works out the differences be-
tween movement-in-a-scene and movement in-place. Aristotle distinguishes also the 
changes of birth and the changes of destruction, and quantitative changes from 
qualitative changes. Before Aristotle, the study of the dimensions of the world as-
sumes the substance-like perspective. Thales of Miletus, the first of the pre-Socratic 
philosophers from Ionia, opened the scientific Western tradition with a typical sub-
stance-like interpretation of the world. The driving axiom of his philosophy was the 
discovery and explanation of the substantial ground of the world. According to Ar-
istotle, water was Thales primary substance or arche, the ground of the whole world. 
The same substance-like proposal can be found in the following philosophers from 
Ionia, Anaximander (apeiron) and Anaximenes (air). In the same line, Empedocles 
from Sicily developed the successful model of the four elements. In addition to these, 
he describe the principle of philia (Love) to explain the attracting of different forms 
of matter, and the principle of neikos (disorder) to explain their separation. Other 
pre-Socratic living in Elea, were more interested in scene-like explanations; notably 
Parmenides, and Zeno. The same is valid for the atomists who tried to reproduce 
                                               
89 Husserl, E. Ideas. London, 1972; p. 273-274. 
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and explain substances as scene-like phenomena. During the Middle Age, the inter-
ests of philosophers changed in focus to historical and religious issues. However, the 
ontological alternative between scene–like and substance–like models was still there. 
The “soul”, for Saint Augustine is a kind of rational substance separate from the body 
and meant to control it. The soul is simple, non-material, non-extensive and immor-
tal; the soul has no place. The material existence of species leads Anicius Boethius to 
the first formulation of the problem of the universals. In the Commentary on the Isagoge 
of Porphyry he wrote: 
He [Porphyry] omits the question whether general and species have a definite 
subsistence, or dwell in the mind and intellect alone; whether they are corpo-
real or incorporeal; and whether they are separate or joined to the objects that 
our senses perceive. On these matters, seeing that the disputation was a deep 
one, he promised to be silent.90  
Universals became a philosophical problem when the mind tried to re–
dimension thought and language into the dimensions of reality and on the contrary, 
reality into thought and language. Because of the difficulties of the effort of re–
dimension of thought and language into the dimensions of reality, philosophy was 
obliged to the developing of theories of the origin of knowledge, theories as Realism, 
Conceptualism and Nominalism. We shall found that these difficulties arose because 
the mind understands as zero–dimensional, and language as one–dimensional and 
they are realities that are incongruent with the plural–dimensionality of the real world. 
Euclidean geometry specifically, is a construction of some rules to transcribe real 
dimensions into mathematics, images and words. There are not any points or lines or 
triangles or circles in the “transcendent” world. All those figures are empirical 
constructions meant to work as transcriptions rules between pure thought and the 
perceived. With time and education, these rules became “reality”, a very strong 
collection of rules that we understand as intuitively truthful. With the rise of the 
scientific era, knowledge moved from commonsensical ontology to an empirical and 
transcendent following the Euclidian movement. In these early days, the limits 
between scenarios and substances were not obvious. The experimental process of 
modern science can be illustrated with the help of the development of the science of 
electricity and magnetism. In the year of 1546, Gerolamo Fracastoro develops an 
electroscope (that is an instrument for detecting the presence and the quality of 
electricity) with rotating axis that was intended to work with small pieces of paper and 
feathers.91 In 1600 William Gilbert built the same electroscope and called it 
“versorium non magneticum”92. This was the very beginning of electrology and 
Gilbert was the first to coin the term “electricity” from the Greek word for amber. 
                                               
90 Curtis M.A. 1950, s.34. 
91Hieronymi Fracastorii: De Sympathia et Antipathia rerum liber unus.Venezia 1584. Quoted by Giovanni 
Polvani: Alessandro Volta. Pisa 1942.p.26.  
92 G. Polvani p.26. 
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Gilbert wrote about the electrification of many substances in his work from the year 
1600, De magnete, magneticisique corporibus. This was the stage of the study of the 
substances. Gilbert introduces the Greek name electron to denote the stone of amber. 
The very first problem to solve was to determine whether the electrical substance was 
the same substance as the magnetic. The works of Cardano (1550), Gilbert (1600) 
and, Nicola Cabei in his Philosophia Magnetica from 1629, fixed the difference between 
the magnetic and the electric. It was done with some resistance because the ideal 
solution was to reduce both phenomena to only one substance. The experiments were 
conducted with among other substances, diamond, glass, arsenic, and resin. The 
metals were listed as non–conductors of electricity because no experimental results 
showed that they reacted on rubbing.93 Consequently, at this point, we have this 
scheme: 
 
 
In 1550, Cardano described one of the differences between electricity and 
magnetism. According to Cardano the magnetically acting, is reciprocal, it attracts 
and repels matter. On the other hand the electrical acting only attracts. In 1629, Ni-
cola Cabei discovered the phenomena of the electrical repulsion and the theory of 
Cardano broke down. From that time and up the rise of modern physics, the rela-
tion between magnetism and electricity switched systematically between the one–
substance scheme and the two–substance. In fact, the modern electromagnetic the-
ory is a kind of compromise allowed by the transcription of the whole problem into 
a scenario-representation with the incorporation of particle theory. The debate 
about the nature of electricity, worked also with other oppositions as those of at-
tracting and repulsion. This schema was not introduced clearly until 1687 when 
Newton used it for the gravitational theory. When it became clear that magnetism 
and electricity had to be held apart from each other, the problem was to make a de-
cision on the reason of the attracting and the repulsion and the alternatives were 
                                               
93 What really happens is that the electrical current goes to the earth through the body of the scien-
tist. Later in 1792, this misunderstanding played a very important role in the discussion between 
Volta and Galvani about animal electricity. 
Thesis: one substance: de atractiva                                                                                                                            
Two phenomena:  Amber stones (electricity) and Magnet stones 
The experiments associated to these stones are not supporting the same conclusions 
 --> (then) there are  being used two different substances 
 
Table 6- Number of substances involved in electrical phenomena 
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two: 
 
a) One electrical substance, that has the attracting as a quality, and another electrical substance that 
has the repulsion as a quality. We are talking about two substances, quality A and quality B. 
b) Alternatively, the magnitudes of one substance change, and explain the repulsion and the 
attracting, as consequences of the variation of magnitudes of some qualities. We are talking 
about plus or minus quantity of some unique substance. 
 
Table 7:  Number of substances and of qualities involved in electrical phenomena 
 
In 1660, Otto von Guericke built the first electrical machine. A globe of sul-
phur “magnitudine ut caput infants” was put into an axis of iron that caused the 
globe to rotate.94 Newton said of this machine: “vapor electricus frictione ma-
nus...exitatus”.95 The hand was held against the globe while it was rotating. That 
caused friction and the electrical “fluid” or “vapour” developed around its surface. 
Electricity was perceived as small lightning in a very small atmosphere and felt like a 
breeze in the palm of the hand. Here it is interesting to point out all the underlying 
associations: all have the character of simple phenomena and are very close to the 
archaic Ionian philosophy of nature. These associations were not explicit but played 
a very central role; suppose we have some material, which is a liquid, and we believe 
that this material “goes from one body into another body”. The recipient–body 
must have the fine structure that is needed to collect a liquid, which is very different 
from the structure that is needed to collect a solid or a gas. In the case of electricity, 
the situation was especially difficult because it appears as a very complicated sub-
stance, sometimes it behaves as a liquid, sometimes as a gas and sometimes as fire. 
If the moving–material is a liquid and the receiving–material is a solid, we could vis-
ualize the recipient as a vase or as a sponge. Open alternatives with four types of 
materials could be the following: 
 
                                               
94Experimenta Nova...Amsterdam 1672. 
G Polvani,p. 27. 
95Optice, Book III. G: Polvani s 27. 
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Different experiments conducted by Gilbert and von Guericke showed that 
gases do not participate in the electrical phenomena. However, in spite of those re-
sults the dominant idea by scientist was the idea of Galileo, that electricity attracted 
gases and the bodies that were embedded in them.96 As we see, the first step in the 
study of nature is that of solving the problem of the decision of the imbedding dimen-
sion, in this case the problem concerning the nature and the number of substances. 
This was also, the procedures followed by the old school of Ionian philosophers in 
Greece. Commonsensical dimensionality belongs to the archaeology of science, and 
its study can be useful for a study of the history of science, if it is possible to 
demonstrate that the mind always goes through the same formal steps. Those steps 
are: the developing of a theory that uses only one substance to explain the phenom-
ena. If that shows insufficient, the next step consists in introducing the idea of an 
amount of substance. If after this, the facts have not been explained, a second sub-
stance is introduced and the possible alternatives increased rapidly. The name and 
description of the substances that could be chosen changed from antiquity to the 
early modern time from earth, water, air and fire to solids, liquids, gases and igneous sub-
stances. During the eighteenth century, the choice of a determined “substance” was 
in fact the choice of some of these four general “states”, and the explanation had to 
use the ideas intuitively associated to them. The first electricians alternatively used 
the scheme of an electrical “fire”, that of an electrical “vapour”, or that of an elec-
                                               
     96 G. Polvani, p.28. 
Moving material= MM 
 
 
                        Receiving material= RM 
(l) Liquid 
 
(s) Solid (i) Igneous (g)   Gas 
(l) Liquid X 
 
L-->S L-->I L-->G 
(s) Solid S-->L 
 
X S-->I S-->G 
(i) Igneous I-->L 
 
I-->S X I-->G 
(g) Gas G-->L G-->S G-->I X 
 
Table 8: The ontology of electricity, alternatives with four types of materials 
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trical “fluid”. In 1720, Stephen Gray studied different materials by rubbing them. 
He came to the conclusion that all matter could be grouped into two qualities; as 
conductors and as isolators; once again the dualistic schema, but now in the form of 
secondary qualities. In 1734, Charles François de Cisternay Du Fay found that elec-
trification is a property of all the materials with the exception of metals and fluids. 
He showed that colours were not important to determine the electrical activity of 
matter. Du Fay came to believe that there are two different kinds of electricity: res-
inosa and vitrea; another pair of alternative substances that later became the modern 
theory of negative and positive electricity. Nevertheless, the scientific community did 
not attend Du Fay’s ideas. His theory was built using the schema of two substances 
while the majority of contemporary physicists preferred the competing explanation 
worked out by Benjamin Franklin, which used one substance changing in quantity. 
This confrontation between the two schemes is illuminating and it continues indi-
rectly today. The theory of Du Fay had to wait to the year of 1759 to get a successor 
in Robert Symmer. The theory of Franklin said that the electrical fluid “differs from 
common matter in that the parts of the latter mutually attract” but the parts of the 
electrical fluid “mutually repel each other”. However, though the particles of elec-
trical matter do repel each other, they are strongly attracted by all other matter.” 
“This supposed that all kinds of common matter do not attract and retain the elec-
trical, with equal strength and force”; “[…] in common matter there is (generally) as 
much of the electrical as it will contain within its substance. If more is added, it lies 
without upon the surface, and forms what we call an electrical atmosphere”.97 A re-
lated theory is the one exposed by Jean-Antoine Nollet in 1745 and shared by 
Georg Mathias Bose and William Watson according to which there is also a porous 
moving-receiving–substance and there is only one electrical fluid. In this case, the 
fluid is already in the matter and it will be provoked by rubbing. After rubbing, the 
electrical substance divides itself into a matiere effluente and a matiere affluente. The “re-
ceiving-matter” was attracted by the difference of porosity. This theory is 
electromechanical because of the importance of friction.98 The dimensionality of 
phenomenal objects reveals also in the theme of the presence of electricity in the 
“vacuum”. Drawing conclusions from some experiments with rarefying of air, the 
early science of electricity believed that the vacuum was a perfect conductor of elec-
tricity. Scientists extrapolated and deduced that, “if more rarefying meant more 
conducting, then absolute rarefying of absolute void, meant absolute conduction.” 
Air was depicted as one and uniformed substance. It could be more or less in quanti-
ty, but it was uniform. The void then, could not be anything else than the absence of 
air. To rarefying air meant then, “the diminishing of the magnitude of air”. Howev-
                                               
97 Experiments and Observations on Electricty, made at Philadelphia in America. Benjamin Franklin. 
Quoted by G. Polvani 1942. 
98 G. Polvani, p.40 
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er, other experiments showed that electricity could not be conduced in the absolute 
void of matter and that therefore rarefying air could not be the same as “less” sub-
stance. When the scientist has decided which kind of substance has to be used, he 
studies the relations between qualities and their magnitudes. The first model is the 
“going to – going from” model. The second model is the “going into–going out 
from” model. The first interpretation of change is the scenario–dimensions and it could 
be reduced to a problem of identity. The movement of the body A from the place x 
at time t, to the place x’ at time t’, could be seen as the identity of A’s qualities in 
both places and times. An example could be that of an arrow, which is represented 
as a projectile in the air. In this case, the moving–quality is the same as the arriving–
quality and it is independent of space and time. When the moving-quality and the 
arriving-quality are not the same, the movement does not consist in the identity of 
the amount of one quality that simply changes its co-ordinates in space and time; 
instead it consists in a change of amount of the same quality. It could be seen as if 
the changing quality is growing or diminishing in magnitude. This is the substance–
dimension of the commonsensical world.  An example of this could be the growing–
diminishing electricity of Franklin or as Nollet explained not in a space/time rela-
tion but in a magnitude of quality/time relation. Any explicit ontology develops in 
connection with philosophic and scientific studies. Before Galileo, the scientific 
works consisted in converting everyday implicit ontology to an everyday explicit on-
tology. The idea of an experimental science was not yet an option. Older science was 
a kind of hermeneutics in which the unconscious became conscious.  
 
Empirical versus phenomenal dimensions 
When we study the noema in the noesis-noema duality, we have to distinguish 
the dignity and size of it and the dignity (power) and size of the noesis that is the 
cognitive process or the consciousness side to duality of noesis-noema. The plasticity 
of thought, allows the mind to convert itself to different dignities and sizes, during the 
processes of intentionality and of knowing. We say that the mind adjusts itself making 
transcriptions of mental contents to be congruent with the world. During this 
process, the mind shows the capacity of reorganizing its power and resizes itself, 
adapting its values to the referring media. Talking about visual representations, this 
movement of the mind is popularly known as zooming, and has become a part of 
everyday life with the development of photography and film. In the old days, before 
the age of photography, the same process was known as “abstracting” a process that 
was essentially conceptual rather than visual. The idea of zooming is constructed upon 
the ideas of dignity and size as expressions of empirical dimensions in the case of the 
dignity of an object and of phenomenal dimensions in the case of size. It supposes 
the movement of the mind trough different dignities of dimensions and different 
sizes of representation: 
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Figure 37: Scaling and Sizing 
 
 
The noema or the pragma cannot belong to two or more dignities or to two 
or more size–levels without going through a stretching process. If the stretching pro-
cess occurs because of changes in dignity and size of the noema/pragma we say that 
the stretching is empirical.  A stretching process occurs in pure thought when e.g. the 
content of thought gets a visual dimension. Plato describes visual representations as 
the “eye of the mind”: 
And do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms 
and reason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of thee ideals 
which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute 
square and the absolute diameter, and so on the forms which they draw or 
make, and which have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are 
converted by them into images, but they are really seeking to behold the ob-
jects themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?99 
This stretching transforms the noema into a fractal and their “meaning” into a syn-
                                               
99 Plato, The Republic, book 6. 
Scaling 
Sizing 
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apse. There are two different ideas of fractal representation; both have been devel-
oped by Benoit Mandelbrot in The fractal Geometry of Nature100: the first is the idea of 
a picture or geometrical representation (but also a physical object), which stretches 
itself between different whole–realities becoming a fractingated artefact, a noema 
in-between whole-worlds. The second idea of a fractal refers to its structure; for 
Mandelbrot, a fractal constitutes through the continual iteration of the same pattern 
in different scales. As a stretched object or artefact, the media–product becomes a 
fractal reality. To illustrate how the observer decides the fractality of the representa-
tion in respect to dignity, we shall introduce a brief example. Let us picture a man or 
woman who is working as a cleaner in a butcher’s shop. Every evening after closing 
time, the cleaner is expected to clean the entire place plus the butcher’s tools in 
such a perfect way that no trace of meat or grease could possibly be detected. In 
fact the limits of the cleaning are not specified and cannot be specified either. How 
thorough should the cleaning be? Let us accept that the place is of 40 square meters 
and is expected to be cleaned up to a m–level. When the cleaner begins the work, 
the total area becomes the perceived object of the acting of cleaning. As a first step, 
the worker cleans the rests of meat and grease that are of the largest size. This is the 
phenomenal level of work; we may say that the cleaner begins with a representation of 
the space in a size–level= m + n, because this size–level is congruent to the size of 
his or hers own body. That is the level of the perceived as perceived, the noema in 
its immediate manifestation. A second step of the work, would be to clean the same 
area but departing now from a more detailed representation. Let us call this new 
size–level as m + (n–1). With other words, the cleaner changes the stick with which 
he/she measures both the room and the objects in it, for instance the pieces of 
meat and grease. The cleaner goes from a larger size of particles to a smaller size of 
particles of grease. Now the cleaner uses chemical products to penetrate in a deeper 
level of reality. The immediate consequence of this change in the scale of the acting 
is that the working area is not the same as before. Diminishing size conducted the 
cleaner’s mind, from the phenomenal sphere of thought into the empirical sphere 
of thought; a sphere, which after being empirical, becomes phenomenal again.  
 
 
If we accept that the change of the scale of observation, responds 
to ontological changes and not only in the mind of the cleaner, 
we have to accept that the working area increases in proportion 
to the carefulness of the cleaning. 
 
 
We have to consider now the fact that when the worker cleans the room in step 2 
                                               
100 New York, 1982. 
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(size–level m + n–1), his/her body is still in size–level m + n, a level that the work-
er chooses as a natural point of departure and which he/she cannot leave. Getting 
deeper in size–scaling implies that the work is stretching deeper in a new dimension 
that is a part of the world which we have not reached before. That also means that 
the dimensionality of consciousness changes from pure representation of the idea 
of the room as noema, to a level of molecules and atoms as noemata in a very dif-
ferent scale. If we accept that the body of the cleaner, is only a manifestation of 
he/her mind and vice versa, and that one is not conceivable without the other, then, 
the penetration in scale is a penetration of the body in a non-congruent world. The 
idea of a trans–dimensional relation can be studied as self–reference in mathematics 
trough implicit equations, equations that show the same variable at both sides of the 
symbol of equality, for example:  
 
i) x = (x² + 1) 
 
The equation (i) refers to itself therefore it can be denoted as implicit.  Instead, 
the equation (ii) does not “mention itself”:  
 
(ii) y = (x + 2) 
 
In the case of self–reference in (i), the symbol of equality stands for proportionality 
and incongruence, but not for identity. In spite of this, it means identity. With other 
words, equation (i) means identity but that is an illusion. In an analogous way, as a 
logical paradox, it presents this particularity, that of the reference to incongruous 
situations of false identity. In the case of (i), the incongruence does not necessarily 
occur in the level of dignity of the representation, which could be linear for both 
terms. Nevertheless, the incongruence may arise simply in the level of the size of x, 
if it assumes two different values simultaneously.  
Empirical dimensions 
Size and dignity differ however in one fundamental aspect: things have “sizes” 
in an immediate way. They are therefore “phenomenal” in the sense that “size” and 
the everyday world are inseparable in any representation. “Empirical” dimensions 
could not be thought before the phenomenal world was questioned. This process 
which began with the geometry of the Greeks, became a reality when the men of 
the Renaissance understood that, e.g. the moon and the sun have to be bigger than 
they appear to be, or e.g. that the earth is not as large and could be circumvallated in 
one single tour. The empirical arose when the absolutely given by vision, hearing, smell, 
taste and touch did not give us the answers we needed. Then, we questioned our 
common sense and made experiments, tests or engaged us in discovery travels. The 
empirical dimensions arose when humanity could think of “sizes” as if they were 
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“dignities” (expression of the “power” of a magnitude), when the mind could repre-
sent what is far away as “little” in spite of being very “large”. This empirical 
approach to analysis was Husserl’s own during the first years of his writing. He 
transported this methodology from mathematics in a new interpretation of it, which 
Husserl called a system of “variations”. Don Ihde described this in the following 
quotation from On non–foundational phenomenology: 
Actually, the model behind Husserl’s notion of variations is originally out of 
mathematics. He was doing mathematical variations and applying this model 
now to different regions of human experience than had been previously ap-
plied. Of course, like the mathematicians, he wanted to arrive at that he called 
an essence. And, of course, the Husserlian essence is very difficult, because it 
has a long history of terminological use in other parts of philosophy, and he is 
radically modifying that use.101 
What the mind does is converting the world from pure perception (sensible 
data) to essences or pure ideas; a methodology, which in many aspects reminds the 
project of both Plato and Descartes. Husserl wanted to distinguish the noema from 
the noesis but was deeply inserted into the classic philosophical problem of object–
subject. Ihde wrote about the “origins of geometry”: 
Now, how do you get geometry? Geometry is the increasing abstracting and 
idealization of certain parts of that sensory plane. So, what is basic are these 
ordinary objects: tables, chairs, and all the stuff that philosophers always talk 
about. The first thing is a practice of abstracting. (…) The first process is a 
process of abstracting. Instead of regarding all these objects simply as what 
they are –ordinary sense, material, concrete, dynamic, all these things– you 
abstract into shapes: these kinds of shapes and those kinds of shapes, but not 
just abstracting (sub) one, but abstracting (sub) two: Not just shapes, but par-
ticular shapes, because Husserl is talking about originating geometry. And 
geometry at the beginning is totally incapable of dealing with any shape what-
soever. It has to deal with certain particular shapes, and historically of course, 
you are talking about things like “measuring practices. For example, the Egyp-
tians. 102 
Husserl wrote about variations and dimensions in Ideen: 
It is clear that in respect of all the peculiar characterizations we have come 
across in the structurally diversified domain of modification through varia-
tions in the form of representation, we must distinguish, and on the grounds 
already alleged, between the noetic and the noematic. The noematic “objects” 
                                               
101 Ihde, Don. On non–foundational phenomenology. Fenografiska notiser 3. Göte-
borg, 1986; p. 15. 
102Ibid.  p. 19–20. 
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the object as copy or the copied object, the object functioning as sign and the 
significant, disregarding their own proper characterizations “copy of,” “copied,” 
“sign for”, “signified” –are unities of which we have evident awareness in ex-
perience, but which yet transcend experience. […] But of characters such as 
these that cleave to the noematic nucleus, there are still other instances of 
quite different type, and of these the modes of attachment to the nucleus vary 
widely. They come under radically different genera, under radically different di-
mensions of characterization, so to speak..103 
Generally, we considered ideas or intuitions, sensations or emotions, as men-
tal contents of dignity–0, whereas we considered the outer world, included our own 
body, as extensive materials of dignity–3. Descartes e.g. wrote in the Sixth Medita-
tion:                         
...there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by 
nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For as matter of 
fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only a 
thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in my self any parts, [...]. 104  
Nevertheless, the classification of any mental activity as representations of dignity–
0, need to be studied closely. With a closer analysis, we can see that it is not accurate 
to assign the dignity–0 to linguistic representations such as a symbol, a word or a 
sentence. Even though these representations cannot be identified as objects of the 
material world, it is evident that they more or less have some kind of “extension”, 
which means that it would be more accurate to understand its dignity as “d = 1” 
(that is as linear representations). If we think e.g. the idea of the number 4, it will be 
a representation d=0 of the number 4, but if we think the symbol “4” or think the 
word “four”, we have a case of linear dignity. Let us say that according to this crite-
rion the semantic level could be always represented as d=0, whereas the syntactic 
level could be represented as d=1. The study of the dignity of a representation can 
help us to understand the internal structure of the paradoxes of classic logics, for 
example the Liar paradox. We could understand the arising of paradoxes as the in-
congruence between the level of pure ideas and the level of its factual representations 
as a displacement between the semantic level and the syntactic level. Paradoxes are in 
general self–referring expressions that compromise in using different dimensionali-
ties for the semantic and the syntactic level. It is not paradoxical to think, “This 
sentence is not true” (d=0), but it is paradoxical to represent the sentence (d=1). 
The reason to this is the incompatibility of two or more mental contents of differ-
ent dignity. With other words, in one dimensional level alone, there cannot be 
paradoxes. The acting of thinking demands energy and so does the transcription of 
                                               
103 Husserl, E. Ideas. London, 1972; p. 272-273. 
104 Descartes, R. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Vol. 1; p.196; 1981. 
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meaning from a dimension to another. In the history of western thought, pure 
thought has always been understood as primary to vision; and this is possible to 
show following the history of geometry. According to Descartes, who considered that 
thought has no extension, the dignity of thought is cero (d=0) or even the dignity of a 
“point”, thought must be understood as compact and dense. The transcription to other 
dignities implies both a reduction of richness and an increase in accuracy. Thought 
became words through a reduction of its richness (the process supposes a primary ob-
jectification of thought.) The fluidness of thought petrifies in language producing a 
stable base for communication. This new discourse shows a 1–dimensionality in 
written language. Mental words became a fractal in between thought (d=0) and writ-
ten language (d=1). Language is of lineal extension while images and pictures belong 
to the dimension of the flat (d=2). Written language is not an image and certainly not 
an artefact. It can be written on paper, but that which is written is not the same as 
the discourse in which it is written in. Three–dimensional noemata are those we can 
touch and those we usually call “artefacts”. We cannot touch a thought or a word or 
an image, but we can touch a book or a painting. The dimension of time is the next 
in order; it is usually counted as the fourth dimension. This is the dimension of histo-
ry, of processes and of life. The four–dimension affects the other dimensions in 
different ways. In connection with thinking, time is relevant for memory. For any di-
mension, time determines the rhythm of the any communicative process and for 
music and poetry, time, as rhythm is essential. Finally the contemporary contribu-
tion to the corpus of dignities, the dignities of matter, the dignity of waves and the 
dignity of particles, two new aspects of the modern empirical research, which we 
will place in order –by pure convention– as dim=5 respective dim=6.  The dignities 
of empirical dimensionality can be ordered as follow:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
157 
 
Language for instance, is not the same as the marks of symbols in a paper; 
these are visual marks and therefore 2–dim images. However, language is not the 
same as thought. Therefore, language is something in-between pure thoughts and 
the written string of letters. We can say that language is a “linear” or one–
dimensional frame, existing in-between pure thought, which should be 0–dim and 
written symbols, which should be 2–dim. Neither language nor thought can be re-
duced to any material object. We note that what is valid for language is also valid for 
any form of symbolic communication. Within the category of language, we shall 
count every symbolic expression, from mathematics to music notation. The situa-
tion of vocal language is obviously different. It would belong to the dimension of 
waves because its discourse empirically belongs to field of sound.  
 
Phenomenal dimensions 
The plasticity of mental media is capable of bringing together and expressing 
the whole world through other families of dimensions that we call “phenomenal” 
dimensions. The archaic classification of the world according to the properties of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: The spheres of dignities 
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senses vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch belongs to this approach to reality. This 
classification belongs to the same family as the oldest scientific classification of 
substances as earth, air, fire and water. This way of organizing perceptions suits an old 
science, which created an order built on phenomenal congruencies. Congruencies in this 
sense are phenomenal dimensions that are involved in an enquiry about the nature of 
the everyday world; for example, the frontiers between inside and outside or the 
borderlines between static and dynamic105. The phenomenal nature of these dimensions 
is commonly covered, and it often appears first through the work of artists. Modern 
art has specifically worked with this approach to reality, making visible the hidden 
connections of the everyday commonsensical world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: The frontiers between the inside and the outside; 
 design by Vivien Westwood at London Fashion show  
 
 
The photography of a woman wearing suspenders on the outside is a signal for 
“sexual provocation” and a transgression of semantic rules in the grammar of Fash-
ion.106 However, in ontological terms, the picture is a transcription of the inside to the 
outside, a phenomenal fractal. This transcription between an inner–dimension and 
outer–dimension reminds of another empirical transcription, that of the Möbius 
strip107, that is, a transcription between dignities d=3 and d=2 in which the tran-
scription makes paradoxical the relation between the inside and the outside; another 
example is Max Ernst’s La Table from 1964 a synapse between the pair up-
right/invert of the discourse. 
                                               
105 Pictures from: Lloyd Jones, Peter. Taste Today. The Role of Appreciation in Consumerism and Design; 
1991. 
106 Lloyd Jones, Peter. Taste Today; p. 60. 
107 August Ferdinand Möbius (1790 – 1868). 
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Figure 41: Möbius’ Strip II, 1963. Painting of M. C. Escher 
(1898–1972) 
 
The picture showing the racing–car bed is similar but the parameters are now 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Max Ernst’s La Table from 1964. 
 
 
 
Figure 42: The frontiers between the 
static and the dynamic; the racing–car 
bed 
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static–dynamic or rest–motion. In the artworks of Christo and Jeanne–Claude for in-
stance, the dimensions of the natural and urban environments work in concordance 
with more sophisticated and less obvious transcriptions, as in the “Wrapped Reichs-
tag” in Berlin, in which the size of the wrapped object is not congruent with the 
acting of “packaging”. Christo and Jeanne–Claude use the incongruence of size to 
explore the limits of the human praxis as a “phenomenology of acting”.  
 
Technology and epistemology 
From the philosophical point of view, it can be useful to classify technologies 
depending on the epistemological frame in which they are thought. In the following 
table Lucas Introna classifies (and defines) technologies according to the epistemo-
logical frame in which they were conceived:108 The way we understand Introna’s 
typology, the first definition of technology belongs to empiricism and modern sci-
ence. This is the Cartesian model of tools and machines as mechanical devices and 
technologies as mechanisms. The relation of the artefact to the mind is that of the re-
lationship between res extensa and res cogitans. The second definition coincides with 
                                               
108 Introna, Lucas, “Phenomenological Approaches to Ethics and Information Technology.” First 
published Sat 19 Feb, 2005. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-it-phenomenology/#1.1 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Wrapped Reichtag, Berlin, 1995. Christo and Jeanne-Claude  
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Positivism and the rise of Modern Sociology and Political Economy. Svante Lind-
qvist defines technology as follows: 
Technology is defined as those activities, directed towards the satisficing of 
human wants, which produce change in the material world. This definition is 
not so vague as it may perhaps sound, and has in fact to be as broad as this in 
order to accommodate all the phenomena that we call “technology” today. 
The distinction between human “wants” and more limited human “needs” is 
crucial, for we do not use technology only to satisfy our essential material re-
quirements. Helmer Dahl has written that historically technology has had 
basically to fulfil three different functions in society: A productive function, a 
military function and a symbolic function.109   
 
Svante Lindqvist’s definition is social–historical and could be reformulated as fol-
lows: 
The body of knowledge available to a society that is of use in fashioning implements, 
practicing manual arts and skills, and extracting or collecting materials.110 
Finally, the third interpretation is proper to Heidegger and the Phenomenological 
school. In this case, technology can be understood as “the act of bringing something to 
bear and using it for a particular purpose”.111  
                                               
109 Lindqvist, Svante. Technology on Trial. The Introduction of Steam Power Technology into Sweden 1715-1736. 
Uppsala Studies in History of Science I, Uppsala 1984; p. 14. 
110 The Free dictionary: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/technologies 
111 Ibid. 
Approach or view View of technology / society relationship 
Artefact / tool  
Technologies are tools that society draws upon to do certain things it would 
not otherwise be able to do. When tools become incorporated in practices, it 
tends to have a more or less determinable impact on those practices. 
Social Constructivist  
Technology and society co-construct each other from the start. There is an 
ongoing interplay between the social practices and the technological artefacts 
(both in its design and in its use). This ongoing interplay means that techno-
logical artefacts and human practices become embedded in a multiplicity of 
ways that are mostly not determinable in any significant way. 
Phenomenological 
Technology and society co-constitute each other. They are each other's condi-
tion of possibility to be. Technology is not the artefact alone it is also the 
technological attitude or disposition that made the artefact appear as meaning-
ful and necessary in the first instance. However, once in existence artefacts 
and the disposition that made them meaningful also discloses the world beyond 
the mere presence of the artefacts. 
 
Table 9: Lucas Introna’s typology 
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In Technics and Praxis, Don Ihde wrote quoting Heidegger: 
Technology is a mode of revealing. Revealing is a coming to presence within a 
framework. Already at this level, one can detect the emergent value given to 
praxis by Heidegger. In typical fashion, he reverts to etymological expositions 
upon Greek thought which stands at the origin of our epoch of Being. Techné, 
Heidegger points out, is originally thought of as broader than ‘technique’ in 
the contemporary thought. “Techné is the name not only for the activities and 
skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. 
Techné belongs to bringing forth, to poièsis; it is something poetic.” Poièsis is 
both making and bringing forth, but bringing forth is presenting and thus is a 
praxical truth. Here is already the seed for the primacy of the praxical, which 
characterizes Heidegger’s phenomenology, but at this point is only important 
to see that techné, as with the ancients, is linked to epistemè as a mode of truth 
as bringing to presence. Techné reveals or brings to presence something 
which is possible. “What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? 
The answer: everything. For every bringing–forth is grounded in revealing.”112 
In this last case, technology is understood as an intentional act, acting that is 
directed to practical means. It is in this sense, that the “thing” of the empiricists be-
came the pragmata of phenomenology. In any case, we will support the idea that an 
act is technological when it produces docking between material objects. Our under-
standing of technology embraces the three of the definitions of Introna’s 
classification. That is because our philosophical standpoint is eclectic. We think that 
any definition of technology should consider the congruence between artefacts, and 
the human body. That is an idea embedded in modern materialist philosophy; how-
ever, the implementation of technology does not necessary lead to some utilitarian 
results.  
Technology from the point of view of post-phenomenology 
While Introna presents an epistemological typology of technology, Don Ihde fol-
lows another pattern to classify technologies.113 Following Merleau-Ponty rather 
than Heidegger, Ihde developed a typology of technologies, from the point of view 
of empiricism and pragmatism. He named this approach post-phenomenology. We no-
tice that the perspective of Ihde is to sketch the dichotomy between the initiative-
taking behavior of acting and the passivity of knowing. Ihde’s two first cases are typically 
intentional while the last two cases are typically cognitive. Further, Ihde’s perspec-
                                               
112 Ihde, Don, Techniques and Praxis. 1979;  p. 108. 
113 Ihde, D. Technology and the Lifeworld: From garden to earth. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press; 1990. 
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tive makes underlying references to the consciousness respectively unconsciousness 
of the technological artefact and of the World and indirectly to the relationship be-
tween the artefact and intentionality respective knowledge. His typology makes 
visible the goal of intentionality, when it is powered by technology. To act techno-
logically means to be intentional and therefore to be in a middle of an unconscious 
process, which we “know” after its consequences. Following Ihde, we know that 
some artefacts also became unconscious, as the eyeglasses are during the act of see-
ing. The intentionality of the act “drags” the artefact into unconsciousness. The 
same thing happens with the act of mapping the World but in this case, both the ar-
tefact and the World are dragged into unconsciousness. In the other two cases, we 
have another kind of unconsciousness, one that we should call indirect. In the case of 
alterity, the World is eclipsed by an artefact and therefore is not conscious. In the 
case of background technology, is the technological process itself that which is out-
side the range of consciousness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Don Ihde’s typology formula 
Technologies 
of embodiment  
In wearing eyeglasses, perceptions changes. The 
perceived World seen through the eyeglasses be-
come the real world. 
[I-glasses]-world 
 
Hermeneutic 
technologies 
 
Thinking the landscape through a map the 
World and the map become the same. But the 
connection between the map and the World is not 
perceptional but hermeneutical. 
I-[map-world] 
 
Technologies of 
Alterity  
 
Intelligent robots and humanoids are good ex-
amples. The real World disappears behind an 
analogical device that imitates life. The World 
becomes unconscious. 
I-technology-[world] 
  
Background 
technologies 
That is the case of technologies as electricity. We 
notice its presence first when it is absent. Technol-
ogy is working outside the conscious world. 
I-[technology]-world 
 
Table 10: Don Ihde’s typology 
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Technical solutions can be classified depending on the way they satisfy human 
wants. Some techniques are developed to do that which the human body cannot do 
at all; that is for instance the case of the wheel or the propeller. However, the ma-
jority of techniques are developed to improve the human capacities, as a hammer or 
a screwdriver do. In any case, techniques are developed to do something, they are 
pragmata, which means for us that they are things brought through praxis, and exist-
ing only in the frame of that praxis. We will classify the different types of 
technologies according to two intentional processes: technological equivalence and techno-
logical imitation.  
 
 
 
 
 
The process of technological equivalence built tools and machines according to 
analogical principles. The mechanic process tries to reproduce a movement or change 
what is typical for living processes. The wheel and the propeller are examples of that. 
There is no identification but some kind of ontical kinship. The wheels of a railway 
wagon are to the legs of a horse as the propellers are to the wings of a bird. The 
kinship demanded a gap between the living body and its pattern of movement and 
the resulting technology. Consequently, the train and the automobile can be 
understood as analogies of horses, camels and elephants and any other animals used 
as a vehicle of transport. The power of a motor for instance is still measured in 
“horses”. Equivalent technologies work as the living does, but do it through 
mechanical principles.  
Technological imitation supposes expansion of some movements from the pattern 
of the movement of the human body to develop it in a tool or a machine. There is no 
analogy of those movements; they are only a pure copy. That is the case of 
hammering which is the simple amplification of the acting of beating with hands. 
Leonardo’s wings in his flying machines are an example of the last group of 
technologies. Observe that the “wings” of Leonardo’s flying machine are working as 
an imitation of the bird’s wings.  
 
Technological 
equivalence 
Supposes the construction of tools 
and machines according to analogical 
principles. 
Examples are the wheel 
and the propeller. 
Technological 
imitation 
Supposes the expansion of some 
movements from the pattern of the 
movement of the human body to de-
velop it in a tool or a machine 
Examples are both 
tools as the hammer 
and more elaborate 
machines as the robot. 
Table 11: Technological equivalence respective technological imitation 
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Things and devices 
Albert Borgmann introduced the notion of “device paradigm” to describe 
modern society and its relation to technology. According to Borgmann, the “device” 
substituted the “thing” and provided modern society with both more control and 
efficiency and an increasing factor of social alienation. A “thing” for example is a 
stove, functioning as the central place of the home, a point to which the engagement  
of the family converge. According to Borgmann a stove is more than simple 
warmth, it is engagement too and with the introduction of the more efficient central 
heating system, the increasing control and effectiveness of the purpose of technology 
results in the splitting of the original family.  
 
THINGS 
                            
DEVICES 
 
 MERE MEANS A MERE END 
 
 machinery  commodity 
 
 variable 
 
fixed 
 unfamiliar 
 
familiar 
Gathers and illuminates 
the world 
 
Reduce the world to resources, machinery, com-
modities 
Engages us mentally, 
physically, socially 
Disburdens, disengages, distracts 
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In calling forth a manifold engagement, a thing necessarily provides more 
than one commodity. Thus a stove used to furnish more than mere warmth. 
It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a family 
and gave the house a centre. Its coldness marked the morning, and the 
spreading of its warmth the beginning of the day. It assigned to the different 
family members tasks that defined their place in the household. The mother 
built the fire, the children kept the firebox filled, and the father cut the fire-
wood. It provided for the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with 
the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together of the threat of cold and 
the solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of sawing and of 
carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks.  114   
We think that the central heating system cannot be just the “negation” of a 
stove in question of engagement. In fact, the central heating system makes the whole 
house a meeting place while the stove reduces it to the surrounding space. It is cer-
tain that the provenience of the commodity we call “warmth” is not so obvious in the 
case of the central heating system and that this is a typical case of that which Don Ih-
de defines as background-technology. Many of the philosophers of technology share 
this view of the technology of devices; one of them is David Strong115. David 
                                               
114 Borgmann, Albert. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. A Philosophical Inquiry. Chicago, 
1984. Pages 41-43. 
115 Strong, David. Crazy Mountains; 1995. 
Table 12: Things and devices 
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Strong schematizes this crucial difference as follows116: 
According to Borgmann there is a crucial difference between “things” and 
“devices”: 
The wood-burning stove yields to the coal-fired central plant with heat distri-
bution by convection, which in turn gives way to a plant fueled by natural gas 
and heating through forced air, and so on. To bring the distinctiveness of 
availability into relief we must turn to the distinction between things and de-
vices. A thing, in the sense in which I want to use the word here, is 
inseparable from its context, namely, its world, and from our commerce with 
the thing and its world, namely, engagement. The experience of a thing is al-
ways and also a bodily and social engagement with the thing's world.117 
The notion of “device” used by Borgmann is interesting because it can be 
used to distinguish between two different kinds of artefacts, those traditional and 
those that introduce “complexity” in the artefact or the tool. Traditional artefacts 
have a simple relation of congruence with the human body and its parts. Devices at the 
other hand are in a complex and never obvious relation of congruence with the 
human body and its parts. We can easily add our ontological categories to 
Borgmann’s scheme showing that the engaging connotations of Borgmann’s “thing” 
are related to intentionality and that the opposite, the disengaging connotations of de-
vices are connected to knowledge and information or “fragmented” intentionality. 
 
 
 
 
To Borgmann “engagement” means “skills” or, “the experience of the world 
through the manifold sensibility of the body”. It is not difficult to associate his ideas 
                                               
116 Ibid, p. 84. 
117 Borgmann, Albert. Ibid. 
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Figure 44: Intentionality and Information 
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about skills to the idea of acting connected to the intentional act.  
These features of physical engagement and of family relations are only first 
indications of the full dimensions of a thing’s world. Physical engagement is 
not simply physical contact but the experience of the world through the mani-
fold sensibility of the body. That sensibility is sharpened and strengthened in 
skill. 118 
When skills leads to a social engagement, technologies are connected to la-
bour: 
Skill is intensive and refined world engagement. Skill, in turn, is bound up 
with social engagement. It molds the person and gives the person character. 
Limitations of skill confine any one person's primary engagement with the 
world to a small area. With the other areas one is mediately engaged through 
one's acquaintance with the characteristic demeanor and habits of the prac-
titioners of the other skills. That acquaintance is importantly enriched through 
one's use of their products and the observation of their working. Work again 
is only one example of the social context that sustains and comes to be fo-
cused in a thing. If we broaden our focus to include other practices, we can 
see similar social contexts in entertainment, in meals, in the celebration of the 
great events of birth, marriage, and death. And in these wider horizons of so-
cial engagement we can see how the cultural and natural dimensions of the 
world open up. 119 
According to Borgmann, “the thing” needed skills to be present and these 
skills were an engaging part of human life. Knowing how to make things were in 
some sense an “intuitive” procedure. The production of things happened through 
what we should call “amateurish” methods. Resuming, with the advent of the de-
vice the world of skills were destroyed, and amateurism was replaced with 
professionalism:   
We have seen that a thing such as a fireplace provides warmth, but it inevita-
bly provides those many other elements that compose the world of the 
fireplace. We are inclined to think of these additional elements as burden-
some, and they were undoubtedly often so experienced. A device such as a 
central heating plant procures mere warmth and disburdens us of all other el-
ements. These are taken over by the machinery of the device. The machinery 
makes no demands on our skill, strength, or attention, and it is less demand-
ing the less it makes its presence felt. In the progress of technology, the 
machinery of a device has therefore a tendency to become concealed or to 
                                               
118 Borgmann, Albert. Pages 41-43. 
119 Borgmann, Albert. Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. A Philosophical Inquiry. Chicago, 
1984. Pages 41-43. 
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shrink.120   
Finally, a last important aspect of devices is that they are not “reparable”. De-
vices complexity makes them things that we use and “throw away”. To try to repair 
a broken device is the same as to try to understand the congruence with our body 
and this congruence is always beyond the skills.   
Congruence in artefacts and tools 
The intentional act developed through Martin Heidegger as a general philoso-
phy of the relationship between phenomena and the World as the Dasein.121 This 
concept (Dasein) can be understood as “everydayness” of the human “existence”. 
The Dasein manifests itself through the acts of care (Sorge) and concern with which 
the Dasein treated the phenomena and the World. World signifies the totality of ar-
tefacts (entities for Heidegger) which can be present-at-hand within the world. For 
Heidegger, everything that exists is present–at–hand and some of that which exists 
is equipment when it is part of an acting or process that he called an assignment. In the 
everyday World, many artefacts (entities) are equipment, but if any of them is famil-
iar for us it is because they are ‘something in-order-to’ achieve some results. A 
hammer is not a hammer because of its form or because of its materiality, but be-
cause its use (intentionality). The value of the hammer consists in being usable as a 
hammer. Further, this equipment belongs to an ‘equipment structure’ or greater sys-
tem of equipment often hidden or less obvious to the analysis. The equipment of 
hammering consists on the hammer, a nail, some piece of wood, etc. According to 
Heidegger, work is the ‘towards–which’ of equipment. The work produced by the 
hammer, is the same as the ‘towards-which’ of the hammer. That is why equipment 
cannot be a noema in itself. Equipment is only definable by its use, through the act-
ing of using the tools these entities of the equipment gain meaning. In other words, 
the intentionality of artefacts emerges by its use. As we see it, intentionality ‘coagulates’ 
(a Marxian metaphor for value) in the produced artefact trough the process of 
work. That which make a hammer just a “hammer”, is that coagulated intentionality 
or the purpose hidden behind the artefact. Understood as a process technology then 
is praxis and the tool or the machine is pragmata. For us, technology is not the same 
as work but cannot be separated from it. We do not coincide with Gilbert Simon-
don when he wrote that: 
C’est le paradigme du travail qui pousse à considerer l’objet technique comme 
utilitaire; l’objet technique ne porte pas en lui a titre de definitions essentielle 
                                               
120 Ibid. 
121 Heidegger, Martin (2000), Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
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son caracter utilitaire ; il est ce qui effectue une opération déterminée, ce qui 
accomplit un certain fonctionnement selon un schéme déterminée.122 
Coinciding instead with Heidegger, we think that is an intentional–technological act, 
Heidegger wrote:  
The Greeks had an appropriate term for “things”: pragmata, that is, that with 
which one has to do in taking care of things in association (praxis). But the 
specifically “pragmatic” character of the pragmata is just what was left in ob-
scurity and “initially” determined as “mere things”. We shall call the beings 
encountered in taking care useful things.123 
 Artefacts and tools are an indissoluble part of technologies, they have been created 
to dock with the human body and suppose a performance of some kind to manoeuvre, 
to couple the one with the other.  
 
 
If we consider the tool as a part of the act of work, they became pragmata, and 
otherwise they are a reference of cognition and then noemata.  
Multistability and brokenness 
Don Ihde discovered an important particularity of the process of developing 
technologies which he named multistability. He explains multistability as the 
phenomena in which the “same technology takes quite different shapes in different 
contexts.”124 Ihde studied different forms of firing an arrow and established that 
“each of these variations, however, serve the same purpose, to fire an arrow. But in a 
new context if one holds the bow in a horizontal position instead, and ‘plucks’ the 
bowstring—we are transforming the bow from its usual use, into a new use, as a sort 
                                               
122 Simondon Gilbert. Du Mode d’existence des Objects Techniques. Paris, 1958 ; p. 246. 
123 Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. New York, 1996. 
124 ”Technologies—Musics—Embodiments”. Don Ihde. Janus Head: 
http://www.janushead.org/10-1/. p. 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: the tool as pragma and the tool as noema 
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of stringed instrument!”125 Ihde then describes what happens in the mind of the 
archer: “Every archer could hear the bow string ‘twang’ when fired. Could it then be 
‘played’?” Ihde then concluded: “Thus the ‘same technology’—a bow—apparently 
fits two radically different trajectories, one of them musical. And this set of different 
trajectories is apparently also very ancient.”126 In our terms what happens in the mind 
of the archer is divided according to the four fundamental alternatives of the 
dialectics of intentionality and knowledge: 1) the acting (intentionality) is redirected 
and the pragma is broken; 2) there is a lack of knowledge that reveals the absence of 
noema; 3) There is a lack of general forms to make the world congruent; 4) There are 
forms to understand the world but there are no adequate pragmatics to make these 
work congruently.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. p. 15. 
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 Apparently the pragma-broken cases (the absence of one pragma) are simple 
cases of broken ontologicity (the absence of pragmaticity in general) and the noe-
ma-broken cases (the absence of one form) are simple cases of broken onticality 
(the general absence of forms). 
Docking and congruence 
If we consider the human body as the primary reference, we can give some of 
the artefacts the category of secondary pragmata. There are artefacts that have been 
developed to dock with the whole body. That is the case of the bed and the lie–
Type of brokenness The type of relationship 
between the noemata and 
the pragmata 
 
Argumentation 
pragma broken The bow (B) is used as a 
harp (H)   
Intentionality is redirected. 
The pragmatics of  the bow’s 
weapon-hood is broken 
 
 
noema broken The bow is used just as a 
bow, only to hear the 
“twang” 
There is a lack of knowledge 
about the bow’s “other face”, 
that is, that of the possibility 
of being converted into a mu-
sical instrument 
 
ontic-broken A harp (a bow-like musi-
cal instrument) that is 
used as a weapon  
The relationship between the 
bow and the harp is not symmet-
rical; in this case the harp cannot 
be a weapon. There is a lack of 
knowledge about how the harp 
and the bow dock with the 
world 
ontology-broken  A bad harp (a bow-like 
musical instrument that 
cannot be used as a harp) 
that can only be used as a 
(bad) weapon 
 
The artefact does not work 
neither as a harp nor as a bow, 
but still is intended to be a 
harp 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Don Ihde’s multistability combined with an  analysis of brokenness  
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down–type group of artefacts. In this case, every point in the human body corre-
sponds to a point of the secondary artefact.  
 
We shall call this docking as point–to–point (or 1–1–congruence). The seat–
type–group of artefacts shows approximately a ½–½–congruence. This group in-
cludes chairs, couches and their like. The docking between the body and the 
secondary pragmata create families and sub–families of artefacts. Some families are 
 
        
                                                                                                                         
Primary pragmata/ noemata 
 
 
The human 
body 
 
Back Legs Head 
Secondary  
pragmata/ 
noemata 
 
Group of 
places to lie 
 
X X X 
 
Beds, 
stretchers 
 
 
Group of 
places to sit 
 
X   
 
Chairs, 
banks, couch 
 
 
Clothes 
 
X X X 
 
  
Table 14: Primary and secondary artefacts 
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related to a third group of artefacts and not to the body as the primary group of arte-
facts does. That is the case of the shelf–type–group, which includes the bookcase and 
the hat–rack. The related group of artefacts includes books and hats. We could say 
that the bookcase has some definable congruence with each book on the self.  
 
 
A cabinet or closet is different from the bookcase not because of their struc-
ture but because the kind of pragma they are intended to preserve. However, a 
closet is also appropriate to save books, more appropriate than a bed or a couch. 
The table that consists only in one and broad “shelf” can also “be used” as a book-
case. Kinship between those artefacts depends on their capability to substitute each 
other in connection with the process in which they were created. The capability to 
substitute each other reveals the genetic process underlying the artefact’s genealogy. 
If we accept that evolution fallows a process from the simple pattern to the com-
plex pattern, then it is acceptable to think that the first “piece of furniture” of 
humankind was the simple flat surface of the “floor”, the foundations of the cave.  
Because a bed can be used as a shelf but a shelf cannot be used as a bed, we can de-
duce that the bed is more primitive than the shelf. We can formulate this law of 
evolution as fallows:  
 
 
 
 
 
Secondary 
pragmata/ 
noemata 
Type of docking 
(congruence) 
 
Tool – group 
Docking with one 
hand 
 
In relation to a third noema: 
hammer, Screwdriver, … 
Docking with both 
hands 
 
A pick, a shovel 
Docking with one 
foot 
A ski, a shoe 
Docking with both 
feet 
A carpet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Types 
of docking (congruence) 
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We can grasp two directions in this development; first a tendency to loose mass 
winning in mobility and second a tendency to a multiplication of artefacts trough a spe-
cialisation of functions and a reduction of pragmaticity. Furthermore, there are 
tertiary artefacts that work in direct contact with the body and other that work indi-
rect with the body. When a tertiary artefact works directly adjacent to the body it 
becomes secondary; that is the case of the comb and of the toothbrush. However, 
that is not the case of cutlery, the set of knife, spoon and fork or that of a drinking 
glass, because those artefacts work as ordinary tools, working “from” the body and 
directed to another tertiary artefact. Cultural artefacts as food, drinks and medicines, 
work directly at the inside of the body, in a kind of internalisation of the process of 
docking. When a tertiary artefact works on another tertiary artefact, we could call this 
a peripheral artefact. These peripheral artefacts as the nail, which is not thinkable with-
out the hammer or the piece of wood, make possible the process of nailing up a shelf. 
 
 
With the term “docking” we refer to two process, first to the processes of ad-
justment in–between artefacts of different dimensionalities and secondly to the 
adaptation process that the body goes through when it tries to match tools, ma-
chines and the raw material during some process of work. The process of docking 
can be described as a movement that develops in many dimensional levels. To work for in-
The utility –that is, its relative pragmaticity– of a piece of furniture determines the 
place of that piece in the genealogical process of the development of household’s 
artefacts; more pragmaticity, means less primitiveness. 
 
 
Tertiary 
 
artefacts 
 
Static docking 
 
                                         
Dynamic docking 
 
Shelf – group 
 
Tool–group 
 
 
Bookcase  
 
Hammer, scissors 
 
Knife,  screwdriver 
 
Tongs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: 
docking of tertiary artefacts 
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stance, supposes a permanent adaptation of the dimensional conditions of the body 
with the dimensional exigencies of tools, machines and raw materials. To initiate the 
study of this adaptation process we have introduced the term “congruence”. The 
mathematical idea of proportionality could be an example of the “congruence” of 
two quantities; it can be understood as the measurement of the relation between those 
quantities. The practical comparison or measurement achieves making the arithmeti-
cal division of the compared quantities. Proportionality became a special kind of 
analogy between two quantities. The measurements or analogies between quantities 
can be applied to concrete quantities as velocities, masses or distances the results be-
ing a value of empiric character. Proportionality between e.g. “a” and “b” usually 
denotes as “a/b” or as “a:b” or also as ”ab  cd”.  The congruence respectively the 
incongruence between terms in a quantitative analogy became clear when they are 
linked through space–dimensions of different dignities. Differences between congru-
ency and incongruence can be presented as the differences between isometric 
comparable terms and non–isometric terms in a relation of proportionality. To make 
our analysis simple, we shall illustrate incongruence referring only to dignity (power) 
and size. We say that, when the artefact is also a real thing, it shows a complex com-
bination of those two kinds of incongruence (in dignity and size) and I call it absolute 
incongruence. Incongruence in dignity can be found in relationships with the same em-
pirical status, as in the relationship between linear–artefacts and volumes. Docking 
artefacts that are incongruent in this sense can be made congruent with the intro-
duction of an adequate constant of proportionality –that is, a quantity assumed to 
have a fixed value in a specified mathematical context. Incongruence in size can be 
found in analogies that have the same empirical status as in the relationship of an ar-
tefact with its components or parts, e.g. between the body and its organs. 
Everyday–artefacts, media-artefacts, or commodities, present a combination of 
these two kinds of empiric incongruence plus others of phenomenal character. Abso-
lute incongruence is the type we cannot simply reduce to empirical categories as 
distance, time, kilogram or velocity. The process of production of e.g. clothes, can 
illustrate what we mean as absolute incongruence and what we mean with absolute 
docking.  
Studies of dimensionality show that any classification, any definition, can 
work as a convention, working in some specific context and during some period. 
However, the impossibility to a definitive classification does not mean that it is im-
possible to manage a successful classification and that classification should not be 
useful. We can make such a classification recurring to a very simple schema as Er-
win Panofsky does when he classifies artefacts as belonging to two classes: vehicles 
of communication, and tools or apparatuses: 
Those manmade objects that do not demand to be experienced aesthetically, 
are commonly called “practical,” and may be divided into two classes: vehicles 
of communication, and tools or apparatuses. A vehicle of communication is 
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“intended” to fulfil a function (which function, in turn, may be the produc-
tion or transmission of communications, as is the case with a typewriter or 
with the traffic light).127 
The world of artefacts has since the 19th Century increased dramatically and if 
we accept that each artefact reveals some unique connections to man’s world, we can 
expect that the world will be increasingly rich and complex. Any effective 
classification should then report the registered uses of names and then try to organize 
this in some suitable theory, which shall survive no longer than the individuals and 
groups that it classifies.  
Docking based on sexual analogies 
During the ontical process that dock artefacts, the human mind identifies ar-
tefacts as male or female if they resemble the male or the female sexual properties. 
We can therefore speak about male–artefacts and female–artefacts. The identifica-
tion happens in two levels: first, we find the form of the artefact and second the 
function of it. The reference that makes the determination of the ontology is the factual 
form of the sexes, the phallus and the vulva or vagina. The reference that determines 
the sexual category by function is the relational dynamics of the act of copulation 
translated to the act of congruence between pragmata: these roles are passive respec-
tively active. Furthermore, artefacts can be bisexual because they act as ‘females’ in 
some situations and as ‘males’ in some other situations. A nail is a she–artefact in 
respect to the hammer (functionally) but a he–artefact in respect to timber (ontolog-
ical and ontical). The process of sexualisation of the everyday world is archaic and 
can be found in any society of any time. The ontological sexualisation of nature 
plays a very important role in the process of “taming natural forces”. Wind and rain, 
mountains and floods have always been sexualized. The same process determines 
the character of jobs, carriers and professions that organizes in connections with 
procedures that we see as male work and female work depending on the dominating 
functions of the procedures used in the working process. According to psychoanal-
ysis, human communication is highly sexualized and artefacts are the natural sexual 
symbols of it. An analysis of the ontological properties of the human body conduc-
es to the conclusion that because the body has the capacity to act on itself, it could 
be seen as a hermaphrodite artefact. In this sense, machines are also hermaphrodites. 
The majority of the secondary artefacts (beds, couches, tables, chairs, etc) can be 
seen as female while tertiary artefacts as tools or machines often are male. While 
tools and machines many times act as male, the commodities produced on the 
working process often acts as female. Bags for example, are “female”: 
Bags are female seeming objects, and have strong associations with female 
                                               
127 Panofsky Erwin (1955). Meaning in the Visual Arts. Sid. 12.  
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experience in many cultures. Few women are able to bear the horror of male 
fingers rummaging in their handbags; there is no man who has never itched to 
do this. In Britain and America, subtle, untaught but unbreakable rules still 
govern the kind of bags that men and women can feel comfortable holding or 
carrying. One of the rules seems to be that the floppier the bag, the less male 
it seems. Another bizarre rule concerns the length of the handle. The longer 
the handles of a bag, the more effeminate the bag, perhaps because the more 
handle there is attached to a bag, the more it can appear to be something 
hanging on to you, rather than something that you are actively holding. And 
then, for reasons which I cannot easily explain, a man's masculinity seems 
more compromised by a string bag than any other kind. But then why do 
women, whom men delight in imagining to be made up almost entirely of 
dark recesses and hidden cavities, usually have no pockets? My father used to 
say that somebody or something was 'as useless as a pocket in a singlet'. But 
such a thing has only to be named for me to be able to imagine its marsupial 
comfort and utility. I would willingly wear a singlet in secret if only to have 
such a thing close to me.128 
Because of the importance of sexuality for the human being, it is almost inevi-
table to use sexuality as the analogical reference to any form of congruence but in 
fact, this explanation is build in the wrong way. What in fact happens is the oppo-
site: sexual organs and the act of copulation are formed in a way that they match the 
ontological properties of the World. 
 
 
 
The importance of the congruence or incongruence of artefacts became 
obvious in games that try to dock artefacts as the “Rock, Paper, and Scissors-
game” in which the artefacts accept some docking alternatives and reject others.  
According to Calvin S. Hall129, in psychoanalysis “one object or activity be-
                                               
128 Connor, Steven. Bags. http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/magic/bags.htm 
129 Hall, C. S. (1953). “A cognitive theory of dream symbols.” The Journal of General Psychology, 48, 169-
186.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: “Rock, Paper, Scissors” 
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comes a stand–in for another object or activity” because some law of resemblance 
as follows:  
1. Association by resemblance in shape to the human sexes. All circular ob-
jects and containers with the vagina, and all oblong artefacts with the penis.  
2. Association by resemblance in function of the human sexes. All objects that 
are capable of extruding something, e.g., gun, a fountain, a pen, a bottle with 
a penis.  
3. Association by resemblance in acting. Any act that separates a part from a 
whole, e.g., beheading, loosing a tooth, an arm or a leg, having a wheel come 
off an automobile identifies with castration. By the same token, dancing, 
climbing stairs, riding horseback, going up and down in an elevator identi-
fies with the coitus.  
4. Association by resemblance in colour. Chocolate identifies with faeces, yel-
low identifies with urine, milky substances identifies with semen.  
5. Association by resemblance in value. Gold identifies with faeces, jewellery 
identifies with female genitals.  
6. Association by resemblance in number. The number three identifies with 
penis and testicles.  
7. Association by resemblance in sound. The blaring of a trumpet or bugle or 
the sound of a wind instrument identifies with flatulence.  
8. Association by resemblance in quality. A wild animal identifies with sexual 
passion, a horse identifies with virility. The Church identifies with virtue, a 
night club identifies with sensuality, a bathtub identifies with cleanliness. 
9. Association by resemblance in personal quality. A Policeman, the army of-
ficer, a teacher identifies with the father, a nurse identifies with mother.  
10. Association by resemblance in structural position. Basement identifies with 
the unconscious mind.  
11. Association by resemblance in status.  The King identifies with father, a 
Queen identifies with mother.  
12. Association of part with whole. A specific accident identifies with difficul-
ties of life, a school test identifies with a test of fitness for life.  
13. Association by contrast. Crowd identifies with being alone, clothed identi-
fies with being naked, to die identifies with being alive.  
We see that the way in which psychoanalysis understands the kinship between 
pragmata and the imaginary, is possible when it in some sense is related to the con-
cept of docking (congruence). The relationship between e.g. rocks, papers and 
scissors is not depending on human sexuality, but sexuality is related to it through 
intentionality and knowledge. This relationship is developed on the artefact’s intrin-
sic (ontological/ontical) properties, properties that change as soon as these artefacts 
are confronted with others.  The properties of the paper in relation to the rock – in 
“Rock, Paper, Scissors” – are different than those of the paper in relation to the 
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scissors.  
 
The docking of devices 
Following Borgmann, we need to distinguish simple artefacts from machines 
and other devices. Machines are not extensions of the body as tools are but surrogates 
of the body. When Karl Marx studied the machines impact on industry he wrote the 
following words: 
All fully developed machinery consists of three essentially different parts, the 
motor mechanism, the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or work-
ing machine. The motor mechanism is that which puts the whole in motion. 
It either generates its own motive power, like the steam engine, the caloric 
engine, the electro–magnetic machine, or it receives its impulse from some al-
ready existing natural force, like the water–wheel from a head of water, the 
wind–mill from wind, etc. The transmitting mechanism, composed of fly–
wheels, shafting, toothed wheels, pullies, straps, ropes, bands, pinions, and 
gearing of the most varied kinds, regulates the motion, changes its form 
where necessary, as for instance, from linear to circular, and divides and dis-
tributes it among the working machines. These two first parts of the whole 
mechanism are there, solely for putting the working machines in motion, by 
means of which motion the subject of labour is seized upon and modified as 
desired. The tool or working–machine is that part of the machinery with 
which the industrial revolution of the 18th century started. And to this day it 
constantly serves as such a starting point, whenever a handicraft, or a manu-
facture, is turned into an industry carried on by machinery. 130 
                                               
130 Das Kapital. Part IV, Chapter 15.  
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As we already pointed out, devices work “from outside” the human world 
and independently of the human body. This property breaks the dependence of the 
tool with the human body restraining the “present–at–hand” relationship described 
by Heidegger. Franz Reuleaux’s (1829–1905) classical work Kinematics of Machinery 
from 1876 introduced a typology of technological “elements” which combined in 
different ways could produce an infinite combination of these elements in kinematic 
chains and machines. His study is one of the most complete earlier studies of dock-
ing in mechanical devices. Franz Reuleaux’s fundamental idea was that all machines 
consist of basic ‘constructive elements’ and in turn they build basic ‘kinematic chains’. In 
the typology of Reuleaux, mechanical parts could be organized in levels of complex-
ity. Some of these have been listed out by Francis C. Moon in his work The Machines 
of Leonardo da Vinci and Franz Reuleaux.131 Francis C. Moon defends the thesis that 
Leonardo had anticipated the codiﬁcation of machine design of the 19th century. 
To show this, Moon follows Ladislao Reti’s comparison between Leonardo’s ma-
chine elements and the classification of Franz Reuleaux. The picture we have of 
Leonardo’s relation to technology is that of a lonely genius working in a desert of 
ideas. That picture has to be changed to a more realistic one, in which the techno-
logical work of Leonardo shall be connected to the technology of the industry of his 
time. According to Francis C. Moon Leonardo owned a very large library with a 
complete list of important works in the topics of science and technology. It is obvi-
ous that Leonardo worked with deep knowledge about the mechanism used in the 
textile industry of his time and in contact with several other people engaged in the 
same matters.  
 
                                               
131 Moon, Francis C. The Machines of Leonardo da Vinci and Franz Reuleaux. Kinematics of Machines from the 
Renaissance to the 20th Century. Springer, 2007. 
 
Table 17: Typology of devices 
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Figure 47: Moon’s comparison of kinematic elements in machine design from the books of Franz 
Reuleaux (on the left) and drawings of Leonardo da Vinci from the Codex Madrid I (on the right).  
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Caring for third-level 
brokenness 
Transcriptional discourse, meaning and synapse 
The transcription of semantic contents into different ontical contents, that is, 
between different cognitive communicative dimensionalities, makes the develop-
ment of knowledge and praxis possible. As “communicative dimensionality”, we 
understand the dimensions of the everyday world. These dimensions are empirical 
and phenomenological and we also understand also them as media of communication. 
Ontical inquiries are concerned with knowledge of facts about artefacts. Following 
Husserl, we understand the sphere of the ontic, as well as knowledge the sphere of 
being. “Ontic”, seen from our perspective, is the being of artefacts before they be-
come pragmata, that is, before they are being used. We say then that transcriptional 
discourse (knowledge and information) is built upon two axes, an ontical and an onto-
logical. The ontical axis works within dimensions and produces meaning while the 
ontological axis, works between dimensions and produce synapse. As “synapse”, we 
understand the conjunction of meanings from different communicative dimensions. 
Meaning can be translated within communicative dimensions –e.g. words can be 
translated into other words– but meaning cannot be translated to another commu-
nicative dimension –e.g. words cannot be translated into images. Instead semantic 
contents can be synapsed into another communicative dimension, e.g. words can be 
synapsed into images. As transcription, we also understand the collection of procedures 
that make possible the existence of semantic contents in communicative levels other 
than language. “To transcribe” is to synapse or conjunct two or more semantic con-
tents from different communicative dimensions. When transcription is studied in 
connection with communication, that is, as the intersubjective process that involves 
groups, then transcription arises as discourse. The discourse is the consequence of the 
“conciliation” between the meaning of an act (its noema) and synapse (the “frac-
talized” noema). This “conciliation” makes the discourse an artefact, and as such, it 
becomes a “medium”. Referring to Rilke and McLuhan, Kittler wrote the following 
lines: 
A medium is a medium is a medium. Therefore, it cannot be translated. To 
transfer messages from one medium to another always involves reshaping 
them to conform to new standards and materials. In a discourse network that 
requires an “awareness of the abysses which divide the one order of sense ex-
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perience from the other,” transposition necessarily takes the place of transla-
tion.132 
 
 
While a translation, is the transference of the meaning of a message from a lan-
guage to another, a transcription is the transference of some ontical properties from a 
communicative dimension to another. The “meaning” of a transcription is the same 
as its “synapse”. The transcription –process converts the semantic content into “syn-
apsing”. Synapse is the semantic level that makes ontology meaningful. Because of 
synapse we understand intuitively that the “key” shall be used to “open” the “lock”. 
How do we know that the key should be used in that way? We know it because be-
hind ontology there is an ontical level that derives from the transcription’s process. 
Because this, we say that there is no “meaning” in Duchamp’s Fountain, there is syn-
apsing. Duchamp’s ready–made, uses transcriptions to make art combining multiple 
                                               
132 Friedrich A. Kittler. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Standford University Press, California, 1990; p. 
266. 
 
 
 
 Figure 48: The ontical axis of meaning and the ontological axis of synapse 
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communicative dimensionalities. As in his Fountain, an existing discourse is used to 
represent a new one; a urinal then, became a fountain.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) 
 
 
 
The semantic transformation is built upon a transcription occurring be-
tween phenomenal congruencies, the opposition upright/invert as well as the oppo-
sition fine/ordinary, etc. In this situation, we are speaking about many 
transcriptions that happened on many levels. We have then many parallel discours-
es, some at the level of ontology and others at the level of onticality. Ontical studies 
of a great interest for our own approach are those that Roland Barthes presented in 
his Systéme de la Mode.133 The studies which Roland Barthes carried out about Fash-
ion, in which he distinguished between “objects, supports and variations” (O, S, V) 
creating a “grammar of Fashion”, are synapse–studies and not simple meaning–
studies. Barthes understood fashion as a language and as many others influenced by 
Ferdinand de Saussure he identified meaning with synapse. However, Barthes man-
aged to indirectly describe synapse. Barthes distinguished between “image–
clothing”, “written–clothing,” and “real–clothing”. Image clothing is presented as 
“photographed or drawn”; written–clothing “is the same garment, but described, 
transformed into language; this dress, photographed on the right, becomes on the 
left: a leather belt, with a rose stuck in it, worn above the waist, on a soft shetland dress; this is a 
written garment.”134 According to Barthes, real–clothing is “the various traces of the 
acting of manufacture, their materialized and accomplished goals: a seam is what 
has been sawn, the cut of a coat is what has been cut; there is then a structure which 
is constituted at the level of substance and its transformations, not of its representa-
tions or significations […].” That identifies the real level with the technological level of 
the manufacturing of clothes. Further, real–clothing cannot exist at the level of lan-
guage, because “language is not a tracing of reality”. This is important to 
                                               
133 English translation: The Fashion System. University of California Press, 1983. 
134 Op. cit., 1990; p. 3-7. 
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differentiate the study of a “system of fashion” and a possible study of a “system of 
clothes”. We can see that Barthes recognized three communicative dimensions and 
they refer essentially to phenomenological foundations: the image; the written descrip-
tion and the dimension of technology that consists of processes, acting and work. 
Barthes described also a fourth level, the world of clothes, in which clothing exists as 
just “clothes”. In fact, the technological level cannot be thought without a product 
that exists independently from the technological means to produce them. A coat 
can be produced by hand or using machines, but it has an ontical existence as just a 
“coat”. Furthermore, Barthes recognized “shifters” or “keys” for the “translation” 
of the semantic content of one level to the other levels. (Barthes used the word 
“translation” referring to what we instead call “transcriptions”). First, he describes 
the shifter that transcribes the technological contents to an image as the “sewing 
pattern”.  Secondly, Barthes describes the shifter that transcribes the technological 
contents into a written text as the “sewing program or formula”; a text without 
nouns or adjectives “mostly verbs and measurements”. Finally, Barthes introduced 
the shifter that allows the transcription of the iconic level into the written level as 
“the anaphoric of language, given either at the maximum degree (‘this’ tailored suit, 
‘the’ Shetland dress) or at degree zero (‘a rose stuck into a belt’).”  In chapter II of 
the same book, Barthes arrived to the conclusion that it would be possible to de-
scribe two “commutative” classes in the structure of fashion–communication135. 
The pair; “clothing” and the “world” constitute the first and the relation between 
“raincoat” and “rain” can illustrate it. The relation of the pair “clothing” and “fash-
ion” constitutes the second “commutative” class. This last pair is connected 
through “purely conventional conformity”. The common element of those two 
pairs is “clothing” as an ontical level of fashion and as a reference to the materiality 
of the real world in which “rain” is also a phenomenon of nature indifferent to any 
human needs.   
 
 
 
                                               
135 Barthes, Roland. Op. cit. p. 19–24. 
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Table 18: Barthes recognized “shifters” or “keys” for the “translation” of the meaning of one level 
to the other levels 
Departing di-
mension  
 
Arriving di-
mension  
 Shifters     
 
From techno-
logical contents 
 
To an image 
 
= 
 
The “sewing Pattern.” 
 
From techno-
logical contents 
 
To a written 
text 
 
= 
 
A “sewing program or formula”; 
a text without nouns or adjec-
tives “mostly verbs and 
measurements.” 
 
 
From the iconic 
level  
 
 
 
 
 
To the written 
level 
 
= 
 
The “anaphorics of language, 
given either at the maximum de-
gree (‘this’ tailored suit, ‘the’ 
Shetland dress) or at degree zero 
(‘a rose stuck into a belt’).” 
 
The unconscious character of Intentionality  
Getting into the analysis of the problem of meaning and synapsing, it is important 
to remember the distinction between the meaning of a message or communicative 
act, and the intention of it. “Meaning” in our analysis will refer to a dictionary and to 
a list of synonyms; it is the consequence of facts of knowledge and never an act of 
intention. While to “mean” is to be in acedia, “to intend” on the other hand, is always 
pure acting (mental or not) directed to produce some results. Intending is an act –an 
acting, or praxis– “mental” or “material”; as in “thinking”, “loving”, “imagining”, 
but also in “working”, “painting” and “performing”. 
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Figure 50: Giuliano and Lorenzo,  meaning vs. sense 
 
 We will use the term “meaning” as a consequence of intentionality, and the 
term “senseful” as a consequence of information; these two as excluding states of 
the mind. “Meaning” is not what we list in dictionaries but “sense” (or “fragmented 
intentionality”.) Meaning is an unconscious process, which we know after its conse-
quences, when it had become “sense”. Because of our understanding of 
intentionality as an unconscious state of the mind, our views differ strongly from 
that of Brentano and Husserl; our notion instead is akin with Freud’s “intentional 
act” as an unconscious act. András Pöstényi136 studied Freud’s idea of intentionality 
and concludes that Freud was strongly influenced by Brentano’s identification of 
the “psychic” with the “meaningful” which conduced Freud to the breakdown of 
the school of psychology that identified the “psychic” with the “conscious”. Freud 
could then conceive unconscious meaningful psychical acts and concluded that if the rep-
resentations in a dream were produced randomly, they would be caused by a 
somatic cause and could not be psychic phenomena. According to Freud, only psychi-
cal phenomena can be interpreted and everything that can be interpreted has to be 
psychic. Because the dream is an intentional act, it is something we do and not some-
thing that happens to us. The act of dreaming then, understands by Freud as “acting”. 
The dreamer is at the same time the “observer”, the “writer” and the “director” of 
the dream. According to Pöstényi, if we say “intention” we are saying “desire” as 
well. Pöstényi concludes that psychoanalysis studied intentions (desires) which are 
in conflict with each other and “without our subjective intentions, preferences and 
purposes, the information collected by the senses should be without consequenc-
es.”137 The dream is a ordered presentation with meaning that can be studied as 
fragmented intentionality in a conscious level. In spite of the common source of 
their thoughts Freud and Husserl followed different paths. Husserl maintained the 
                                               
136At the Introduction of the Swedish translation of Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (Die 
Traumdeutung, 1899). Drömtydning.  
http://www.nok.se/nok/forf/002151/inledn.htm 
137A. Pöstényi; Ibid. 
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connection between the psychic and the meaningful. However, for Husserl, only 
conscious acts can be meaningful. This became later also the position of Jean Paul 
Sartre for whom unconscious mental acts were logically impossible. Sartre criticised 
the psychoanalytical idea of a psychic “censor”:   
How can we conceive of a knowledge which is ignorant of itself? To know is 
to know that one knows […]. All knowing is consciousness of knowing. Thus 
the resistance of the patient implies on the level of the censor an awareness of 
the thing repressed as such, a comprehension of the end toward which 
the questions of the psychoanalyst are leading, and an act of synthetic connec-
tion by which it compares the truth of the repressed complex to the 
psychoanalytic hypothesis which aims at it.138  
“All knowing is consciousness of knowing,” says Sartre, and within our sys-
tem, this would be correct as long as we are talking about the mind being in the 
“mood of knowledge”. Consciousness for Husserl and Sartre is “order” but this 
would imply that the information level of thought would be low, and it could not be 
complex. As we see it, the solution of this question demands the opposite under-
standing: thinking must be very complex expressing in is very low level of order. In 
fact, everybody knows that “smoking is not healthy”, but only those who believe it, 
can stop smoking. Freud broke with the identity psychic–conscious–meaningful and in-
stead used the identity psychic–unconscious–meaningful. As said, we agree with this with 
the additional comment that the unconscious intentional act became senseful and 
analysable in another context than the intentional.  
We shall go further in our study of our paradigmatic dichotomy as the two 
sides of a coin. We shall consider “to intend” as unconscious acting and “to inform” or 
“to know” as conscious meditating, we have, at one side the identities “unconscious-
ness–intending” and at the other side “consciousness–informing”. As we said 
above, intending is an unconscious process that we know after its consequences. As 
we understand intentionality, the process of intending is unconscious but the results 
are not necessarily unconscious. 
  
 
                                               
138 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Pehnomenological ontology. Methuen & Co. Ltd. 
1977. Sid. 53. 
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The world of intentional artefacts is meaningful in their production and use 
and senseful after they have been produced; only then can be listed out “semantical-
ly.” If it is not, it is still intentional, and need to be transformed into a conscious 
content trough an increment of the informational value of the presentation of it.  
Re–dimension through praxis  
The opposition between “intention and order” to “information and disorder” 
can be studied from the point of view of communication of “discourses”. “Inten-
tion” can be seen as the process of communicating through a discourse and 
“information” as the delivered message using a physical vehicle. Discourses are of 
two kinds: those that are intentional and those that are informational. The conver-
sion of an intentional discourse in another intentional discourse (the case of 
linguistic translation) demands the implementation of a synapse. With that term we 
name the process during which an intentional discourse expand to an informational 
fragmenting intentionality and then compress its informational value into a new in-
tentional discourse. The complex process of “expansion” and “compression” 
characterizes the human mind. To transcript through a synapse, is “to put in order” 
or “reorder” the first into the second, suppose to understand the ontological differ-
ences of the used discourse in which the primary discourse is embedded. Synapses 
are reductions of informational levels into intentional contents and vice versa. Each 
discourse produces or transports some specific kind of meaning that –when it has 
been delivered – has been fragmented and reorganized. The word “praxis” cannot 
be secured without an understanding of the capability of thought to re-dimension 
itself in acting reducing original high informational levels into order. “Praxis” is the 
same as “synapsing” supposes that mental contents transcribes into acting and vice 
versa. Specific for the technological process is the concatenation of several synapses 
transcribing the dimensional levels of the original materials into new specific dimen-
sional coordinates specific for the new product. This result follows different steps in 
which each material moves on into different dimensional coordinates. That is what 
constitutes a technological process because any technology is in fact a specific reorgani-
zation of the dimensional coordinates of artefacts and substances. This 
reorganization became possible because the human labour force canalizes muscle 
energy to achieve the goal of the reorganisation of material’s dimensional levels.   
 Let us study this reorganisation of the dimensional levels of the materials in-
volved in the production of goods studying the synapses of a concrete working 
process: that of a baker making bread. During this working process, different prod-
ucts are worked up to produce bread. First, the baker verifies the quality of the 
ingredients and plans the steps of the process. She knows that each ingredient be-
longs to different categories of phenomenal and empirical dimensionalities. First, 
the baker controls that the yeast is fresh. Then she checks the temperature of the 
water used to dissolve the yeast; this temperature is critical. The flour used to the 
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bread is also very important to determine the quality of the final product. When wa-
ter is added to flour, two proteins, glutanin and gliadin combine to form gluten. 
Gluten forms a network of proteins that stretch through the dough like a web, 
trapping air bubbles that form as the yeast ferments.139 The baker sprinkles the yeast 
over the water, and lets this sit for a few minutes. When the yeast mixture rises and 
starts bubbling, the baker measures part of the flour into a bowl and add any other 
dry ingredients or flavourings. Then the baker makes “a depression, or well, in the 
centre of the flour, and adds the dissolved yeast and other liquids. 
 
After that the baker begins to beat the dough to combine the ingredients. The acting 
of beating is the beginning of the high point of the process of reorganisation or re–
dimension of each material into a new synthesis. Gradually the worker adds the rest 
of the flour until the bread dough becomes difficult to stir. At this point, the baker 
flours the work surface and dumps the dough out of the bowl onto the floured sur-
face. She begins kneading the dough. To knead, the baker turns the dough over several times, 
gathering any stray particles. Then the baker repeats this process until the dough is 
smooth, elastic, springy, and no longer sticky. This will take from 5 to 10 minutes. 
At this point the dough will constitute a new and particular combination of the dif-
ferent materials with an own dimensional reference. Further, the baker greases “a 
large mixing bowl lightly with shortening and places the smooth, kneaded dough in-
to the bowl, turning it over so the top is greased as well”. Then the baker covers the 
kneaded dough with a clean cloth and places it in a warm spot. When the dough in-
creases in size until double in bulk the baker punched down the dough, and turn it 
onto a floured surface. Then places the dough in a preheated oven.140 The first 
phase of the working process is the phase of finding the congruency between the dif-
                                               
139 See: http://busycooks.about.com/library/lessons/blbread1012.htm (2008-01-13). 
140 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51: A servant grinding grain to make bread. Egypt, V 
Dynasty 
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ferent materials. The right temperature level, will make the combination possible, it 
guaranties the congruency. The second phase is that of docking, that is the manoeu-
vring of the materials to combine them with each other. In the case of the baker it 
is the acting of kneading the dough. Each working phase of the chain of productive act-
ing supposes a reduction of the level of complexity; the high point of any working 
process is always the phase of docking. Each phase supposes one and unique work-
ing rhythm based on muscle movements or machine movements or on both 
combined. Each point of contact between the different materials is unique and di-
mensional determined. When each point of each material is in the right dimensional 
level, the final product emerges from nowhere and the “magic” of labour becomes 
visible. Labor is the process that reduces the complexity of knowledge and thinking 
into a condensed intentional and meaningful product.  
 
The autonomy of artefacts 
Inquiring how e.g. the “mop” docks with the “floor” during the process of 
cleaning, is a technical question that involves fragmented intentionality while asking 
about how the mop docks with itself is technological because it is asking about the thing as 
embodied intentionality: we say that the artefact is autonomic. This autonomic process 
“creates” the artefact; it becomes a “thing” carrying “purpose”. The autonomic mood 
of thought creates the artefact from being a gathering of molecules to its existence as a 
cultural product. When in the middle of a working process we choose to use a mop 
instead of a brush because of the nature of the floor which we are going to clean, we 
have made a technical decision based on fragmented intentionality. However, if we are 
taking in consideration the “wearing” of the floor or the “wearing” of the mop, then 
we are thinking autonomously. Decisions we make because of technical considerations 
are free from emotional consequences; however, that is not the case of autonomous 
decisions, in which our feelings identifies with the artefact as if the artefact was a part of 
us. If a doctor decides to submit his patient to a surgical operation, he might think of 
it technically because his decision demands from him the best technical solution to a 
technical problem. However, he cannot avoid the autonomous parallel process of 
identifying himself with the patient and feel anguish about the consequences of the 
intervention.  
Some artefacts are easy to be understood as autonomous, as the case of 
machines, robots and computers; these are artefacts that easily can be seen as “living”. 
In the daily process of work, the identification with the artefacts is unavoidable and 
necessary for the quality of the achieved results. During the process of cleaning not 
only the mop is understood as autonomous, dirt itself also has plenty of autonomy. 
From the point of view of “dirt”, bad mops and soft floors are “good” mops. These 
complexities demand that the cleaning process of a bathroom have to be different 
from the cleaning process of a living room or an office. That is because each room 
has its own autonomy, and the dirt of each room is different and demands different 
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autonomic considerations. Technically speaking, “dirt” can be understood both as a 
“substance” and as “particles” (as particles in a scene) and can be object of different 
technical process depending of these considerations. In the first case, as a substance, 
“dirt” shall be treated with chemical procedures; in the second case, dirt is often 
conceived as “dust” and worked out with mechanical methods. The acting of soap is 
chemical; the acting of the mop is mechanical. The soap “reacts” on the artefacts 
against which it is applied; mechanical procedures instead “interact” with the other 
artefacts that are in the same scene. When two substances react on each other, a new 
substance appears. Substances cannot be used as containers and they cannot be 
“formed” at all. Water is a typical substance and the ground material to any chemical 
process of cleaning.  
 
I thing when I am not 
Anticipation depends on the expansion and compression of synapsing. Jung stud-
ied the process of anticipation and gave it the name of “synchronicity”; the 
meaningful coincident, the temporary connection between two autonomously and 
randomly occurrences with connected meaning. Jacques Lacan studied this in the fol-
lowing “sophism”:  
 
§ A man knows what is not a man 
 
§ Men recognize each other because they are men 
 
§ I stipulate that I am a man, because I fear that the other men convince me that 
I am not.141 
 
Transcribing Lacan’s conclusions to our scheme we got the following presen-
tation:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
141 Lacan, Jacques. Escritos., Siglo XXI editores, México, 1972. Our translation; p.36. 
 I think I am 
Figure 52: “I think when I am not; then, I am when I do not think.” 
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For Lacan Descartes’ cogito is modified to satisfy a divided subject in: “I think 
when I am not; then, I am when I do not think.”142 The “think” here stands for 
“knowledge and sense” while the “I am” stands for I believe, “I exist and act in or-
der creating meaning”.  
 
Labour, value and the dimensions of time  
Let us picture a garment worker who is sewing clothes with a sewing ma-
chine. He or she is producing clothes in an increasing amount in quantity.  
 
 
His/her product is increasing “effectively” depending on the increasing quan-
tity of outcasts of labour, and this depends on the growing accuracy of the 
performed technical acting. During the working process, the worker is learning, and 
because of this, less time takes to produce the same quality piece. Therefore, the in-
creasing skills of the garment worker are condensed in a number of pieces of 
increasing quality in less time. How does the worker manage to produce a complex 
piece of clothes that has such a high level of different sizes and shapes? Here is 
when the “magic” of labour comes in. It is not only the technical aspects of labour, 
that is, its functionality, which make this magic, but the plasticity of synapsing in all 
its dimensional complexity. The mind recalls the piece of labour and becomes one with 
it, the mind materializes through the intentional act and becomes a pragma. Let us ac-
cept that the garment worker begins to work with a piece of material at an m–level, 
which is congruent to the size of his, or hers hands and body. When the worker be-
gins the work, the total area becomes the object of the acting of sewing. At the first 
step, the worker recreates on matter the future piece of material understood as a 
whole. The garment worker continues then with a representation of the piece in a 
size–level= m + n, because this size–level is congruent to the size of the needle 
                                               
142 Lacan, Jacques. Escritos. Siglo XXI editores, 1966, p. 202.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53: The Garment Worker, by Judith Weller, 1984 
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he/she is working with.  A third step of the work would be to sew the same area 
but departing now from a more detailed representation facilitated by a tool or a ma-
chine. Let us call this new size–level as m + (n–1). With other words, the garment 
worker changes the scale of the representation of the future piece at the same time 
in which he/she changes the dimensionality of the perspective. The worker goes 
from a larger size of areas to a smaller size of areas, from the 0–dim of pure thought 
to the dimension of matter when the hands become one with the piece of work and 
the mind cannot be distinguished from its object. The worker then is fully engaged 
in his/her product and all his/her existence is pure intentionality. That is when the 
“I” of the worker disappears into the identification of the Ego within the process of 
work. Emulating Jacques Lacan’s adaptation of Descartes’ cogito, “I” affirm that: “I 
work when I am not, then, I am when I do not work.”143 In our words, the “being” 
stands here for “knowledge, information and meaning” while the “working” stands 
for “I believe”, “I exist” and “I work”, in acting, because working is the most com-
plete process of intentionality, the one in which acting definitively materializes. To 
work is to “jump out of subjectivity” paradoxically as a consequence of the stronger 
form of subjectivity: praxis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: “I am when I am not working, then, I am working when I am not.” 
  
 
Changing between the working–mode to the contemplatively–mode demands 
to change between the states of intentionality and the states of information (frag-
mented intentionality). While work is the result of a conglomerate of intentional 
acting, deliberation, on the other hand, is possible, when the referential subject, does 
not modify the existing conditions of the world and remain passive. Whilst with 
work the subject identifies with the world, with deliberation the subject connects 
randomly to the chain of transcendental events. Changing from a state of mind to the 
                                               
143 Lacan, Jacques. Escritos. Siglo XXI editores, 1966, p. 202.  
Lorenzo –   
I exist 
Giuliano –    
I work 
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other causes the temporality of the system to jump forward or backward, depending on 
the direction of the change. Gaining the initiative –that is, when in the act of com-
munication one of the parts changes from pure passivity to work – the consequence 
is a jump into the “future”. “Future” and “past” are defined within the system and not 
in absolute terms, we are talking about the future and the past of the communi-
cating partners. In our analogy, the gardener’s time jumps forward into the future of 
the history of the society in which he/she is alive. During the working process, the 
worker is moving forward according to the rhythm of an historical watch. Seen 
from outside, the time is absolute (Time I) but that time is an illusion. In fact, the 
second diagram (Time II) illustrates what really happens during the working pro-
cess. While the chronological time defines the same rhythm for both discourses, the 
historical time is asymmetric; accelerates for the worker, and brakes for the observ-
er. We may say that, synapsing creates the future increasing the tempo of history. 
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Figure 55: The “worker” and the “deliberator”. The first wins time in respect to the second 
 
In the worker’s case, the information 
(or knowledge) has been trans-
formed into intention and vice versa. 
His alternative has such a safe out-
come that it automatically leads to 
action and time jump forward. 
The deliberator has only pure in-
formation to his disposal, which 
presents a chain of events that is 
highly unlikely and time remains 
unchanged. 
   Time II: phenomenal 
time 
     Time I: chron-
ological time 
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 As Giuliano won historical time and could “read” in Lorenzo’s future, the 
gardener can anticipate the finished product of his work, existing in a future time of 
society. Nevertheless the jump is social, the product of work belongs to a future re-
ality and when it is ready to be used, the whole society jumps forward, entering a 
new stage of development. The condensed time of the process of work, is what we 
usually call “value”. We coincide with Marx and the theorist of political economy 
asserting that work creates value. However, for us, value is not connected only to 
work but to praxis and therefore to intentionality and information and to acting in 
general. To act for us, is to jump into the future and to create value. The value of 
the intentional act is then connected to the size of the jump into the future. The 
larger the jump is, the larger the amount of created value produced.  
A whole technological act characterizes by two fundamental aspects: First: the 
process during which the re–dimension or docking of the involved materials, muscles, 
tools and machines happens in a synapse. Secondly, the jumping in a future time of the 
social reality involved. We say that changing from a state of mind of knowledge to 
the state of mind of productivity and vice versa in a synapse process, causes the 
temporality of the system to jump forward.  
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Epilogue: History and 
phenomenology 
The enigmatic and the descriptive 
According to Nietzsche the pursuit of the origins is metaphysical or “essen-
tialist” “because it implies that events have a “beginning” a privileged point which 
history discovers. History is “metaphysical” in that sense. Genealogy, on the other 
hand will cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every chain of events 
without giving them any privileged position. The Nietzschean words for this differ-
ence are Urusprung and Herkunft.  “Herkunft” means “provenance”, the description 
of family resemblances that connect events in some complex context. In some 
sense, genealogy is always synchronic and descriptive; it is informative, genealogy 
works from the third person perspective. However, history is not genealogy and 
cannot be substituted for it either. Certainly, the question of origins makes history 
the science of paradoxes, the science of interpretation per excellence, a problematic but 
systematized set of experiences and beliefs organized from the private point of 
view. Our choice is to see the epistemology of history as the solving of one special 
kind of riddles that we will call enigmas. Working with history implies working from 
the first person’s perspective with events that demand interpretation; nevertheless, 
history is intentional never descriptive. History has to do with the enigma, Latin ae-
nigma, from the Greek ainigma, “to speak obscurely or speak in riddles”, from ainos 
“fable or riddle”, a word of unknown origin certainly connected to the speaking 
manner of the Gods. While riddles are cognitive problems based on fragmented in-
tentionalities in which some fragments are known and others are not, enigmas are 
based on intentional unconscious acts. The difficulty of a riddle just depends on the 
balance between the known and the unknown. Some riddles are deductive, others in-
ductive. Some riddles have to be solved with experiments, others with interviews, 
others with mathematics and others by research in archives or libraries. However, the 
solution of an enigma (historical), implies the study of all the information available 
and something more. With “more” we mean that which the interpreter gets from his 
or her own phenomenological experience. This “more” is unique and untransferable. An 
enigma is not an abstract cognitive problem, but a concrete existential one, it is a 
cognitive problem converted into a “existential dilemma”. An enigma implies acting, 
the acting of solving it in our own time after a chain of synapses. An enigma is never 
empirical but phenomenal, implies intentionality and not knowledge. Solving an 
enigma implies working out some “missing” existential part of a fragmented material. 
Bartolomé de Las Casas knew this. In his Historia de las Indias, Bartolomé de Las 
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Casas studied, under the subtitle “Old cosmographical news that might have influ-
enced Columbus to perform the travels which ended with the discovering of Indias, 
five different reasons explaining the discovering of America”.144 We know through 
the words of Las Casas that the motives behind Columbus travels were enigmatic 
already in his own time. Four of the reasons that Las Casas speculate with, have to 
do with cosmographic data, such as the roundness of the earth, the distance to In-
dias, etc. Las Casas’ examination is astonishingly modern because he tried to find a 
connection between the scientific knowledge of his time (fragmented intentionality) 
and the historical development (existential context). However, one of Las Casas’ five 
motives is different, more traditional, and paradoxically more interesting to our pur-
pose than the others. According to Las Casas, Columbus could have heard from 
other sailors that “nearly all was already discovered” and that the “only missing part 
was the space between the East Indies and the islands of Cape Verde”. We know to-
day that other sailors had travelled in direction towards the New World. For example, 
the Portuguese João Vaz Corte Real could have been the first modern European to 
visit America. He presumably explored North America in the year of 1472, that is, 
twenty years before Columbus. Many of these travels were “secrets of state”, and 
therefore very little are documented of them. Consequently, it is possible that Colum-
bus got some information about these travels through his contacts with other sailors. 
This is an enigma, which only the experience of Las Casas could tell us something 
about, because Las Casas’ own life belongs to this time and he knew what was pos-
sible and what not. He could interpret the events from the point of view of a 
person who was at the centre of the events and who could connect this event to the 
common sense of the phenomenological experience of these days. The amount of da-
ta to disposal are senseful but only the interpretation of men as Las Casas can give to 
this data the value of an historical interpretation. We could say that there are many 
enigmas connected to the period of the discovering and conquest of America. Be-
side Columbus’ motives, we can refer to Amerigo Vespucci’s bizarre significance to 
the transmission of the earliest information about the magnitude of the discoveries. 
We do not know, for certain, to what extent Vespucci was a liar or to what extent 
he could not reveal secret information. Another example could be the amazing be-
haviour of the Aztecs in Mexico, when they for the first time confronted Hernán 
Cortés and the Spaniards.  
The history of artefacts 
With the word “thing”, we will refer to the artefacts of the everyday life. Then 
we will refer to the “history of the artefact” meaning with that something different 
from the changes of a thing during time. This kind of history is the history of the 
                                               
144 Las Casas, Bartolomé de. Historia de las Indias. Alianza Editorial; Madrid, 1994; p. 368. 
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“thing” understood as phenomenon.  To the history of the thing belongs the study 
of its changes in shape and colour during some periods and depending on social 
and economic aspects. This is sense in which the history of technology has been 
written. That which we want to write about instead, is the history of the phenome-
non associated and hidden behind the thing, the pragma and its relationship to the 
noema. We are interested in studying the changing process of an artefact but in its 
ontical or cognitive praxical aspects and its ontological or intentional praxical aspects 
and not in only its noetic or positive conscious manifestation (as it is apprehended 
by reason). In the case of e.g. garment, we want to know how and why the garment 
we know as a “dress” in time follows some other piece of clothing that we name as 
“tunic”. Our interest is not only in noting the changes in time but to understand the 
underlying praxical process which relates the shapes to the human body and to the 
everyday world. In the case of the media of communication, we are interested to 
know the connections existing e.g. between the telegraph and the telephone. During 
a traditional historical study of the artefact’s evolution (empirical), the centre of the 
attention is concentrated to the social aspects of the changes. We say that the tunica 
diapered in some region because the social needs changed. In the same way, we can 
say that the becoming up and disappearance of the telegraph depended on the act-
ing of economical causes.  However, ontical and ontological aspects are not 
depending exclusively on economic and social factors. The economic and social fac-
tors determine the need of new shape and new content, but this shape and content 
have to be developed in an ontical and ontological matrix that is a priori determined 
by the shape of the human body and the shape of the environment, their respective 
proportions, and the laws of congruence between dimensions. That is why ontical 
and ontological developments have their own “history”. The history of artefacts we 
are trying to develop is a kind of “natural history of the thing”. It is the same “his-
tory” as the history of stones, plants and animals that Linnaeus once studied in 
nature but now in the human world. We are searching for structural laws that per-
mit us to understand why artefacts have the shapes they have and why this 
particular shape is followed by another particular shape and not another. We stud-
ied that e.g. no living form can develop mechanisms as those that characterises 
machines because no living creature can develop gear wheels. Our idea to develop a 
history of the relationship between pragma and noema supposes an idea about time. 
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Cases studies 
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The Accident and the 
Brokenness of History 
 Aristotle understood the word “accident” as an attribute of a class or a thing 
that is not essential. The word comes from Latin accidentum meaning “something 
that happens by chance”145. In everyday modern life on the other hand, we normally 
understand and experience accidents as an unexpected and undesirable event that 
can cause harm in some form, which consequently makes the word negatively 
charged. Further, we give the name “catastrophe” to huge accidents, that is, acci-
dents that affect a large number of people and have huge consequences. 
Catastrophes can in turn be differentiated in to two main groups: man-made catas-
trophes and natural catastrophes. Accidents belong to the first group because they 
are always the consequence of human acting performed by one or more individuals. 
From our point of view and according to our theory of acting, an accident is always 
an intentional act and therefore an unconscious act. For us any act is unconscious 
and the difference between normal acts and accidents is that an accident for us is a 
“broken act”, which is an act that is being directed to achieve a result or a purpose 
but failed to achieve it. The existence of a broken act indicates what we will call par-
apraxis. This can be compared with the corresponding Freudian concept of 
parapraxis which is the consequence of a conflict between unconscious and con-
scious intention. For Freud parapraxis is an error in speech, or in acting. It can be 
understood as a kind of “stumble with an invisible obstacle” outside the range of 
consciousness. That is because to be conscious for Freud is the same as “to see”, 
and to be unconscious means to “stumble blindly” forward. However, Freud left 
the question about the relationship between unconsciousness and acting unsolved. 
For us intentionality is identical with human acting and the unconscious has no oth-
er possible place than in the relationship between the body and the everyday world 
of culture. For us there are two essential states of the mind: the straightforward ex-
perience and the reflective experience, terms introduced by Don Ihde:   
If I begin now to take note of my experience, deliberately trying to find the 
most straightforward experience possible, I may well make a certain discov-
ery. In most of my straightforward experiences, I am certainly not primarily, 
or even self-consciously, attentive to what is going to the matter at hand. 
Thus, if I am chopping wood for the evening fire in Vermont, I am so in-
volved with splitting the wood, that I do not notice much of what goes on 
                                               
145 Online Etymology Dictionary: http://www.etymonline.com/index.php 
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around me, nor do I think self-consciously about how it is that I am splitting 
the wood. In fact, if I do turn critical and self-conscious, while my ax is raised 
to swing, I may miss the log entirely. But after the fact, I may note in this 
simple report that I can distinguish and easily move between what appears to 
be two variations within experience. Straightforward experience, I could and 
did characterize: it was actional, involved, immersed in the project of the 
moment, narrowly focused and concentrated. My thinking about that experi-
ence, also an experience in the general sense (reflective experience), was a 
reflection or a thematizing of the straightforward experience. These two 
modes of experience are familiar and easily alternate in the on- going affairs 
of the day.146
 
 
I have illustrated this dichotomy of the mind with help from a metaphorical 
reference borrowed from Arthur Danto who in his book Analytical Philosophy of Acting 
from 1973 presented an analogy based on the work of Michelangelo. In the year 1520, 
the pope Leo X (Giovanni di Lorenzo de” Medici 1513–23) consulted Michelangelo 
to build a chapel for the Medici family. The pope also wanted Michelangelo to place 
the tomb of his younger brother Giuliano and his nephew Lorenzo in the chapel. The 
genius Michelangelo managed to capture the opposition between acting and thinking 
in the tombs of these two men. On one hand, the athletic Giuliano, a man of acting 
and on the other hand Lorenzo – Il Pensieroso who seems to be lost in deep thoughts, 
unaware of his surroundings. In our book Broken Technologies, we tried to show 
that it is possible to describe the difference between the straightforward experience 
and the reflective experience with the help of probabilities. Straightforwardness is the 
consequence of certainty and on the contrary, reflectivity is the consequence of 
uncertainty. Another way to express the same is to say that straightforwardness is the 
consequence of order and reflectivity is the consequence of information.147 In that 
sense, the Freudian Unconscious is a very rich informational state of the mind in 
which order is impossible. As we say above, the essence of a conscious act is order 
and we understand  “order” as inversely proportional to information; that means that 
if we know that an act produces x bits, it generates an order of 1/x bits.  
Barry A. Turner and Nick F. Pidgeon (T & P) wrote about the relationship 
between information and beliefs in his book Man-made Disasters from 1978.148 Ac-
cording to T & P, it is necessary to distinguish a communication channel from an 
observation channel.149 In a communication channel the system is closed and the 
                                               
146 Ihde, Don. Experimental Phenomenology. An Introduction. State University of New York; 1986, 
p. 45. 
147 Flores Morador, Fernando. Broken Technologies. The Humanist as Engineer. Version 1.1. Uni-
versity of Lund, 2009; p. 131. 
148  Barry A. Turner and Nick F. Pidgeon. Man-made Disasters. 2nd ed. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
First published by Wykeham Publications 1978 Second edition 1997; ISBN: 0750620870. 
149 Turner refers to C. Cherry’s On Human Communication: A review, a Survey and a Criticism. 
______ 
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values between expectations and changes of information are absolute. In an obser-
vation channel on the other hand, the system is open and if the amount of 
information changes a redefinition of the system is required. From our point of 
view, this difference reveals another expression of the above introduced analysis of 
the “divided mind”: on one hand, an intentional state of mind (the communicative 
channel related to order) and on the other hand a cognitive state of mind (the ob-
servational channel related to information). Even if in any case the simplification 
can be risky, the dichotomy helps us to understand how intentionality is related to 
information and intentionality. Changes in order are unexpected outcomes and are 
experienced as informative “surprises”. According to our point of view, changes in 
information determines changes in the degrees of beliefs and therefore to the con-
nected capacity to act. We act when the odds of succeeding to realize our intentions 
are very high, or what is the same, when order is very high and the state of mind is 
that of an unconscious identification with the task; otherwise we wait. “Waiting” at 
the other hand, is the suspension of acting and a very conscious state of mind. The 
query aspect of the scenario of an accident is that the high amount of information 
can paralyze and make preventive acting impossible. We drive the thesis that uncer-
tainty leads to apathy and certainty to acting. Our distinction is relevant for our 
analysis of accidents, because an accident is always the consequence of the broken-
ness of some praxis occasioned by apathy. Preventive acting destined to avoid 
accidents, can only be successful when the general conditions of acting are given. 
These conditions exist if the relationship between the system of beliefs and the pro-
tocol is absolutely congruent. According to our philosophy of acting, technologies 
are working “properly” when an absolute congruency between the system of beliefs 
and the protocol is present. If this congruence is partial or inexistent we say that 
technologies are “broken”. Consequently, to “prevent an accident” means to fully 
anticipate parapraxis following the question of congruence in each level of inten-
tionality. T & P distinguishes three mayor types of events in which uncertainty 
increases:  
The kinds of event which may provoke a higher order of surprise can be 
separated into three groups - which we may label as anomalies, seren-
dipities and catastrophes. All three types of event share the common 
property that the news of their occurrence does not reduce uncertainty, or 
at least, does not do so immediately.150
As T & P understands “anomalies”, “pieces of information which are clearly 
not irrelevant to the concerns of those who receive them, but which cannot be as-
similated into the existing world-view, so that their implications for understanding 
                                                                                                                               
 
London. Chapman and Hall; 1957. 
150 Op.cit. p. 127. 
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and for decision-making cannot be fully assessed at the time of their acquisition.”151 
Anomalies are “disturbing” the worldview but not stressing the actors to perform 
correcting acting. Anomalies are catalogued and saved waiting for a future solution. 
The other two main groups of “surprises” are the serendipity and the catastrophe, the 
first is an unexpected favorable event and the second an unexpected unfavorable 
event. Both of them are attributed to “random factors”.  
In both types of cases, major pieces of information are discovered in un-
expected areas, with implications for the accepted view of the world, and 
the acting-related assumptions flowing from it, so that a revision of expla-
nations previously accepted as satisfactory becomes necessary. In both 
cases, the consequences draw attention to the discrepancy between the 
view of the world enshrined in the relevant sets of premises upon which 
decisions are based, and the additional external factors which now have to 
be recognized 152
For T & P the surprising content of extreme changes in the previous world-
view has to do with the discovering of “major pieces of information in unexpected 
areas”. However, these surprises have to be taken already as “anomalies” because 
any anomaly is the manifestation of some case of incongruence. If any correction of 
the events can be performed to avoid accidents, these corrections will be possible as 
long as the anomalies of the events do not paralyze acting drowning it into pure in-
formation. In other words, the methods developed to achieve the security of any 
system, imply a permanent reinforcing of the system of beliefs and of its coherence 
with praxis through a congruent protocol. Let us now introduce a table with a more 
systematic approach to the problem of accidents and errors:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
151 Ibid
152 Ibid. 
Type of broken-
ness 
Example 
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Table 19: Accidents and the type of brokenness 
 
The “new information found in unexpected areas” may be enough to paralyze 
acting; in that case other routines (maybe security protocols) have to be implement-
ed to create the condition of engagement. In any organizational (informational) 
system, congruence (order) changes continuously (because of entropy). The simple 
“pass of time” makes these changes; in the sense that the social conditions of the 
system are changing with time.  
 
Order-broken 
and/or  protocol broken.  
Tentative program-
ming: 
 
Prototypes, Beta-
versions. The system of be-
liefs and/or  
is not clearly estab-
lished. 
 
Prototype or trial product of a 
computer program. The ideas of the 
task and how to solve them are not 
presented unambiguously.  
 
At the centre is the relationship 
between a Beta-version and an Alfa-
version of a program. It is a kind of 
self-reflexion in programming language. 
 
Ontically broken 
 
Deficient balance be-
tween the system of beliefs 
and the protocol.  
 
A program which is insufficient 
for the intended task or the contrary, a 
program which is too complex for a 
task.    
Ontological bro-
ken  
Incongruence be-
tween the system of beliefs 
and the protocol. No con-
gruence between program 
and hardware. 
 
A program which is less power-
ful (or the contrary, more powerful) 
that the hardware can bear 
Time- broken Obsolete System of 
beliefs and/or protocols.  
An outdate program that need 
to be surrounded by a outdate envi-
ronment.  
 
Value broken Amateur system of 
beliefs and/or protocols 
(programming). 
Programming which is intended 
to work in a non-professional envi-
ronment.  
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The Metaphysics of Sexual 
Technologies and Brokenness 
There are certainly many possible definitions of “sexual technology” and we 
will discuss some of these in this paper. Of course it depends on what we under-
stand by “technology”. In this book I have been using a definition which belongs to 
Svante Lindqvist153 who defines technology very intuitively as “those activities, di-
rected towards the satisficing of human wants, which produce change in the 
material world.” He also says “the distinction between human “wants” and more 
limited human “needs” is crucial, for we do not use technology only to satisfy our 
essential material requirements.” In the case of sexuality, humans do not exercise 
sexuality with the only aim of reproduction. Consequently, from this perspective, a 
sexual technology could be defined as those activities, directed towards the satisfic-
ing of human sexuality that are intended to produce changes in the material world 
that manage to satisfy these wants producing simultaneously changes in the material world. Any 
definition of technology implies the incursion in metaphysical considerations con-
cerning different aspects of sexual technologies and its evolution. Technologies in 
general, are “effective procedures” directed to achieve a praxical result. We can as-
sume that human intentionality imbedded in sexual tools, could be described as the 
“effective procedures” that work beyond human capabilities through the sexual 
tools. However, a sexual tool or a sexual machine can do worse than the human 
body or than another tool or machine. When tools or machines do worse than the 
human body does, or when they do better than the human body but worse than 
other tools or machines, they became broken technologies; otherwise they are full tech-
nologies. We can use this principle to define operationally what a “full technology” is 
and what distinguish it from a “broken” one. Another approach to a definition of 
sexual technologies is their usefulness which improves studying the interacting be-
tween the artefact and its user. In engineering, the usefulness of an artefact is 
determined by two qualities: its utility and its usability. In the case of sexual technolo-
gies and sexual artefacts their usability is broken in all or some of these aspects if 
they are not more efficient to use; they are not easier to learn and they are not more 
satisfying to use. Of course there are other ways to define brokenness that are histor-
ically related. For instance, let us consider the case of old technologies, as the 
condom. This technology still “works” today and it could be used in the same way 
                                               
153 Lindqvist, Svante. Technology on Trial. The Introduction of Steam Power Technology into Sweden 1715-1736. 
Uppsala Studies in History of Science I, Uppsala 1984; p. 14. 
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that it was used hundred years ago. Why should it then be called “broken”? The an-
swer is “because of its age”, we would say that it belongs to a world that does not 
exist anymore. Then, it could be described as “historically-broken”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But, what about other old sexual technologies, e.g. the introduction of 
spermatocidal substances in the vagina such as sodium carbonate, acacia gum, lemon 
juice, stones and other natural substances to prevent pregnancy? They are in some 
sense old technologies too, but we notice that they are different from cases like that 
of the condom. We know that the old condoms are the same as old chemical 
contraceptives, the product of a world that has disappeared; however, we notice that 
an important aspect of these two technologies is their efficiency to achieve the 
intended goal independently of history. A condom is an old technology but it is the 
product of an idea (noema) and praxis (pragma) which is adequate to the surrounding 
world independently of historical time. We name this adequacy as “congruency” and 
these technology as “perpetual”; we say that the condom and the world still “dock 
congruently” independently from the historical period in which it is used. At the 
other hand, in the case of old contraceptive chemistry, while the pragma 
(methodology) of using chemical substances inside the vagina is still contemporary, 
the foundational ideas of acting need to be changed completely because these old 
technologies were based in inadequate chemical and medical knowledge.  
The fact that old technologies of sex should be included in the family of full 
respectively broken technologies actualizes the importance of history in this study. 
We know that the condom is a historic vestige of another time, but—pragmatically 
considered—it is still going on, and it could be implemented at any time in any fu-
ture situation. In the condom’s ontology is something that is historically-free. So, 
what is old in it is some particular materialization (pragma) of the condom-noema; 
Figure 56: “Casanova (1725-1798) men-
tioned condoms several times in his 
exhaustive memoirs. However, he was 
not enthusiastic about them. He did not 
appreciate the value of the condom until 
later in life. He used to inflate condoms 
to amuse the ladies and test them for 
holes.” 
H. Youssef (Institute of Obstetrics & 
Gynecology, Hammersmith Hospital, 
London), Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine Volume 86 April 
1993.Presentation  from Casanova's mem-
oirs.  (The British Library London). 
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specifically the material used to produce it. “Sexual technology” for us means the 
development of “sexual effective procedures” that work within and beyond the 
human capabilities. In this sense, broken sexual technologies can also be seen as the 
result of the situation in which sexual effective procedures of any kind, do worse 
than the human body does, or when they do better than the human body, they do 
worse than other sexual effective procedures. 
 
First-level of techno-sexual brokenness 
Let us now consider another example, the “sexual technologies of poverty” 
which for us define a family of broken technologies. Any materials that society dis-
cards as garbage are suitable for being reprocessed as technologies of this category. 
What is broken here is the amount of forms (noemata) that are available to be used as 
sexual artefacts and tools. Using a “bottle” as a “dildo” could be a good example of 
how this technology redirects intentionality. The immediate question is the following: 
what dildo-like-qualities does the “bottle” have? Moreover, what is it that is not working 
properly here: is it the knowledge of the possibilities of the bottle respectively the dildo’s 
possibilities to “dock” properly which is inadequate? Is this case, as in the case of old 
contraceptive chemistry, a case of lack of knowledge? Alternatively, is it the system of 
beliefs, which is not congruent with the tools? Can it be so that “deprived” people be-
lieve that a bottle is the same as a dildo? The answer is simpler, deprived environments 
do not offer the full range of tools that match the everyday world of “regular” envi-
ronments. There are no problems with the system of beliefs or with the implied 
knowledge; what happens in fact is that the technical means that are of disposal are 
incomplete to match the world of garbage. But this insufficiency is noematic; an initial 
lack of “forms” demands the recourse of a redirection of intentionality. Because of 
this case of brokenness, it is necessary to distinguish between that which depends on 
knowledge and that which depends on praxis. Knowledge can be manifested as a clear 
idea or form about how the laws of the world work. I call this clear idea a “noema”. 
For example, to have “virtual sex” with an avatar implies the material connection 
from a person to the digital projection of an alter-ego that it is nowhere placed, is a 
sexual technological idea that belongs to the fantastic. The idea or noema of this tech-
nological procedure exists but not its “pragma”. As pragma, we understand the 
sexual technological procedure itself, which permits the idea or noema to be realized. 
We say that sexual fantastic technologies are pragma-broken because “they know 
what they want” but they do not know “how to manage” to produce these out-
comes. To realize avatar-sex properly, will demand the development of a 
“touchable” avatar technology which does not yet exist otherwise would it be a var-
iant of masturbation. An opposite situation is that of magical sexual technologies. They 
have a pragmatic solution (that is the “sexual ritual”) but they have not a clear sexu-
al noema or sexual cognitive base to produce this. The acting of having sex with a 
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surrogate partner to “fertilize” a third partner is a sexual magical procedure that 
shows a “precise procedure” for the expected outcomes of this praxis. To drink 
magical potions to stimulate sexual powers also belongs to this family of technolo-
gies. In this procedure, the connection between the involved bodies is too equivocal, 
and therefore is not congruent with the world. We say that the magician “knows 
how to do” but does not know “what he/she wants,” and that magical sexual tech-
nology is noema-broken. We find that other cases of sexual implementing that are 
more complex than the fantastic and magical, cases in which both the noema and 
the pragma are—in some degree—congruent with the world. That is the situation 
of the chemical technologies that prevent pregnancy discussed above, which show 
the full presence of both noema and pragma. In any case, we can say that this pres-
ence is weak. We deduce that their weakness affects their wholeness but more in 
respect to their pragmatic aspects than to their noematic aspects. It is possible to 
say that preventive chemical technologies are ontological-broken because they do not 
work properly in spite of having a nearly clear idea about how they should work. On-
tological-brokenness is a higher level of the pragma-brokenness. It is a matter of 
degrees that makes the one different from the other. Preventive chemical technolo-
gies are a more pragmatic-open than the case of the fantastic erotic avatar. Following 
the same path, we say that the sexual technologies of poverty are ontical-broken be-
cause they are weaker in respect to their noematic aspects than to their pragmatic 
aspects. The bottle can be used as a dildo, but it does not match properly the idea of a 
dildo. Noema-brokenness, pragma-brokenness, ontical-brokenness and ontological-
brokenness constitute for us the first-level of the brokenness of the world. 
 
Second-level of techno-sexual brokenness 
In the case of obsolete sexual technologies as the condom; the problem de-
serves a deeper analysis because there is nothing wrong with their noematic and 
their pragmatic aspects. These levels work “properly” notwithstanding that these 
technologies, are archaic. Historical-brokenness cannot be explained in terms of 
noematic and pragmatic aspects or with reference to their onticality or ontologicity. 
We identify this second-level of sexual brokenness as the level in which what is broken is 
dimensional. It is a kind of sexual brokenness that affects the dimensions of time and 
space, of duration and extension. Explaining that condom-technologies are “old” is 
to say nothing new; to solve this problem we need to introduce the idea of enigma or 
“historical riddle”. We mean that out-dated sexual technologies are enigmatic in the 
sense that they work “properly” but only in a reconstructed scenario. In some cases the 
reconstruction needs to be significant and in some cases will be impossible. For in-
stance, if some primitive plant used as preventive chemical technology become 
extinct, the situation makes the preparation of this kind of preventive technology 
impossible. We can reconstruct the sexual procedure and the preventive chemical 
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technology, but we will never manage to restore the authentic phenomena into our 
own reality. Of course, our analysis is an historical one too, and what we classify 
and organize depends on our perspective of the historical facts. That which for us is 
broken today was certainly not broken for men in another time-scenario.  
 
Third-level of techno-sexual brokenness 
  
In the highest level of brokenness, we find the third-level of brokenness, in 
which technology is intended to affect sexual behaviour in the social and cultural 
level. We are thinking of a special kind of sexual procedure, which involve gender as-
pects. As a typical case of gender technologies the case of sexual reassignment surgery 
can be considered. This kind of surgery converts a man who is “living as a woman” 
into a woman, and a woman “living as a man” into a man. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57: The three levels of sexual 
brokenness. 
 
Magic sex 
Insufficient 
knowledge 
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Typology of sexual technologies 
At this point of our investigation, it is necessary to initiate a preliminary clas-
sification of some different approaches to the study of sexual technologies recurring 
to the idea of “docking”. With the term “docking” we refer to two processes, first to 
the processes of adjustment in–between artefacts of different dimensionalities and 
secondly to the adaptation process that the body goes through when it tries to 
match tools, machines and the raw material during some process of work. As we 
have said above,154 we have classified the artefacts of the worlds as primary, second-
ary and tertiary. For example in a sexual context the penis pump is a secondary artefact 
that consists of a cylinder that is fitted over the penis, with a manual or motorized 
pump to create suction.  
 
 
 
 
 
The pump removes gas molecules from the inside of the cylinder creating a 
partial vacuum around the penis. We can say that the pump is a peripheral artefact to 
the cylinder which is secondary artefact to the penis. In the same manner, sexual bod-
ies, artefacts and devices can be studied from the point of view of their docking 
properties: 1) The first and most common conception of techno-sex is when the 
sexual praxis is reduced to a methodology; when the sexual intercourse is conceived as 
an “effective procedure”; for example the perspective of the Kama sutra. The ap-
proach is that of listing all the possible docking alternatives between human bodies. 
The human body acts direct on other human bodies and can be described as a pri-
mary-to-primary docking.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
154 See above the section with the title: “Docking and congruence”. 
 
Figure 58: A penis pump 
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2) The second most common approach is that of technological devices used as 
sex tools. In this case, the artefacts act as an extension of the human body, as the 
hammer is an extension of the arm.  For example: the dildo acts as a technological 
surrogate of the penis and therefore the praxis can be considered a secondary-to-primary 
docking. As we said above, when a tertiary artefact works directly adjacent to the 
body it becomes secondary. 3) A third group consists of technological resources that 
improve sexuality. For example, the Viagra or the penis’ pump. This group can be 
divided in mechanical and chemical. The Viagra works internally and then can be 
considered a secondary artefact, participating indirectly in the sexual act. The same 
can be said about the penis’ pump but in this case the grade of congruence is minor. 
4) A fourth group consist of contraceptives and in general artefacts that prevent 
pregnancy. This group can also be divided in mechanical and chemical. These 
technologies have an important but indirect influence in the sexual intercourse. 
However, their docking path is secondary-to-primary. 5) Technologies that only indirectly 
influence the sexual life. For example the development of the bicycle which 
influenced in women’s use of trousers and the general impact on women’s dressing 
mode.  A bicycle and other means of transportation, is also a secondary artefact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59:  Monuments from the Khajuraho Temple, at the In-
dian state of Madhya Pradesh. 
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Belonging to this group are artefacts that have been developed to serve spe-
cific gender roles. For example, the development of home machines at the 
beginning of the 20th Century. The group of artefacts that are aimed to support 
pregnancy and child delivery; this group of technologies are also indirectly connect-
ed to sexuality towards its consequences.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sexual imagery  
The human mind identifies artefacts as male or female if they resemble the 
male or the female sexual organs and their properties. We can therefore speak about 
male–artefacts and female–artefacts. The identification happens in two levels: first, 
Figure 60: The bicycle. 
Susan Anthony, one of America's 
most influential suffragettes said: 
She who succeeds in gaining the 
mastery of the bicycle will gain 
the mastery of life. In her opin-
ion, “the bicycle had done more 
for the emancipation of women 
than anything else in the world. It 
gives a woman a feeling of free-
dom and self-reliance.” (Bonnie 
Alter). 
http://www.treehugger.com/ 
 
 
Figure 61: Giving birth. 
A woman giving birth on a 
birth chair.  
 
From: Eucharius Rößlin, 
Der Swangern frawen vnd he-
bamme(n) roszgarte(n). 
Hagenau: Gran, um 1515. 
Wikimedia Commons. 
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we find the form of the artefact and second the function of it. The reference that 
makes the determination of the ontology is the factual form of the sexes, the phallus 
and the vulva or vagina. The reference that determines the sexual category by function 
is the relational dynamics of the act of copulation translated to the act of congru-
ence between pragmata: these traditional roles are passive respectively active; dry 
respectively humid, rigid respectively stretchy. Furthermore, artefacts can be bisexual 
because they act as ‘females’ in some situations and as ‘males’ in some other situa-
tions. A nail for example, can be seen as a she–artefact in respect to the hammer 
(functionally) but a he–artefact in respect to timber. The process of sexualisation of 
the everyday world is archaic and can be found in any society of any time. The on-
tological sexualisation of nature plays a very important role in the process of 
“taming natural forces”. Wind and rain, mountains and floods have always been 
sexualized. The same process determines the character of jobs, carriers and profes-
sions that organizes in connections with procedures that we see as male work and 
female work depending on the dominating functions of the procedures used in the 
working process. According to psychoanalysis, human communication is highly 
sexualized and artefacts are the natural sexual symbols of it. An analysis of the onto-
logical properties of the human body conduces to the conclusion that because the 
body has the capacity to act on itself, it could be seen as a hermaphrodite artefact. In 
this sense, machines could also be seen as hermaphrodites. Many secondary arte-
facts (beds, couches, tables, chairs, etc.) can be seen as female while many tertiary 
artefacts as tools or machines often are seen as male. However there are plenty of 
exceptions; bags for example, can be seen as “female” by a kind of sexual definition 
transmissible by usage: 
Bags are female seeming objects, and have strong associations with female 
experience in many cultures. Few women are able to bear the horror of male 
fingers rummaging in their handbags; there is no man who has never itched to 
do this. In Britain and America, subtle, untaught but unbreakable rules still 
govern the kind of bags that men and women can feel comfortable holding or 
carrying. One of the rules seems to be that the floppier the bag, the less male 
it seems. Another bizarre rule concerns the length of the handle. The longer 
the handles of a bag, the more effeminate the bag, perhaps because the more 
handle there is attached to a bag, the more it can appear to be something 
hanging on to you, rather than something that you are actively holding. And 
then, for reasons which I cannot easily explain, a man's masculinity seems 
more compromised by a string bag than any other kind.155 
According to Calvin S. Hall156, in psychoanalysis “one object or activity be-
                                               
155 Connor, Steven. Bags. http://www.bbk.ac.uk/english/skc/magic/bags.htm 
156 Hall, C. S. (1953). “A cognitive theory of dream symbols.” The Journal of General Psychology, 
48, 169-186.  
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comes a stand–in for another object or activity” because some law of resemblance 
as follows: 1) Association by resemblance in shape to the human sexes. All circular 
objects and containers with the vagina, and all oblong artefacts with the penis. 2) 
Association by resemblance in function of the human sexes. All objects that are ca-
pable of extruding something, e.g., gun, a fountain, a pen, a bottle with a penis. 
3)Association by resemblance in acting. Any act that separates a part from a whole, 
e.g., beheading, losing a tooth, an arm or a leg, having a wheel come off an automo-
bile identifies with castration. By the same token, dancing, climbing stairs, riding 
horseback, going up and down in an elevator identifies with the coitus. 4) Associa-
tion by resemblance in colour. Chocolate identifies with faeces, yellow identifies 
with urine, milky substances identifies with semen. 5) Association by resemblance in 
value. Gold identifies with faeces, jewellery identifies with female genitals. 
6)Association by resemblance in number. The number three identifies with penis 
and testicles. 7) Association by resemblance in sound. The blaring of a trumpet or 
bugle or the sound of a wind instrument identifies with flatulence. 8) Association by 
resemblance in quality. A wild animal identifies with sexual passion, a horse identi-
fies with virility. The Church identifies with virtue, a night club identifies with 
sensuality, a bathtub identifies with cleanliness. 
We see that the way in which psychoanalysis understands the kinship between 
pragmata and the imaginary, is possible when it in some sense is related to the con-
cept of docking (congruence).  
 
Multistability in sexual technologies 
Don Ihde discovered an important particularity of the process of developing 
technologies which he named multistability. He explains multistability as the phe-
nomena in which the “same technology takes quite different shapes in different 
contexts.”157 Applying the concept of multistability to the field of sexual technolo-
gies, an example could be the discovery of the possible use of a bottle as a dildo; a 
very possible scenario for a family of brokenness that we have called “technologies 
of poverty”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
157 Don Ihde. Janus Head: “Technologies—Musics—Embodiments”: 
http://www.janushead.org/10-1/Ihde.pdf p. 13. 
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In our terms what happens with the bottle could be studied step by step ac-
cording to the four fundamental alternatives of the dialectics of intentionality and 
knowledge that we presented in our work Broken Technologies: 1) the acting (inten-
tionality) is redirected and the pragma of the bottle is broken; 2) there is a lack of 
knowledge that reveals the absence of a noema that match the new use of the bottle 
as a dildo and then experimenting is necessary ; 3) The other way around; there is a 
lack of knowledge about how the dildo and the bottle dock together with the world. 
4) There are artefacts that cannot match the one or the other properly. 
 
Type of brokenness The type of relationship  Argumentation 
pragma broken The bottle is used as a 
dildo 
Intentionality is redirected. 
The pragmatics of  the bot-
tle, its bottle-hood is broken 
noema broken The bottle is used just as 
a bottle, only to explore 
its dildo-hood 
There is a lack of knowledge 
about the bottle’s “other 
face”, that is, that of the pos-
sibility of being converted 
into a sexual tool. 
ontic-broken The other way around: 
A dildo (a bottle-like 
sexual tool) that is used 
as a bottle (to drink-like 
activities) 
The relationship between the 
bottle and the dildo is not 
symmetrical; in this case the 
dildo cannot be used to drink-
like activities. There is a lack 
of knowledge about how the 
dildo and the bottle dock to-
gether with the world  
ontology-broken  A bad dildo (a bottle-like 
sexual tool  that cannot 
be used as a dildo ) and 
that can only be used as 
a (bad) bottle 
 
The artefact does not work 
neither as a dildo nor as a 
bottle, but still is intended to 
be a dildo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 20: Don Ihde’s concept of multistability combined with the analy-
sis of brokenness in technology 
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Heuristic properties  
Sexuality is female and male and a study of sexual technologies must 
considere these two aspects of praxis. Obviusly, for example, it is not the same to 
“penetrate” than to “be penetrated”, and even if these two roles—the female and 
the male—are independient of the actual sex of the practitioners, it is necessary to 
study from which perspecive the sexual device has been conecieved.  Because of the 
importance of sexuality for the human being, it is almost inevitable to use sexuality 
as the analogical reference to any form of congruence transcribed as the property of 
“initiative” and related properties as “complementary”, “participative” and “recep-
tive”. This underlying sexual congruency can be followed in games such as “rock, 
paper and scissors.” The relationship between rocks, papers and scissors is not de-
pending on human sexuality, but sexuality is related to it through intentionality and 
knowledge. This relationship is developed on the artefact’s intrinsic (ontologi-
cal/ontical) properties, properties that change as soon as these artefacts are 
confronted with others.  The properties of the paper in relation to the rock are dif-
ferent than those of the paper in relation to the scissors. One artefact is acting on 
the other according to its ontological properties causing a relation of dominance 
and subservience which in fact is characteristic for any form of communication in 
which one part drives the initiative and the other part is the follower. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We will analyze the phenomenological features of the traditional game ‘Rock, 
Paper and Scissors’ in respect to these properties. The point of departure of the re-
ductive work of analysis is always the world as we have apprehended intuitively 
during our childhood. This world is presented to us as ‘natural’ and Husserl referred 
to this original presentation as the “natural attitude”. In the traditional game ‘Rock, 
Paper and Scissors’, artefacts are imitated by the movement of the hands. The struc-
ture and process of the game is depicted in the following Presentation: 
 
 
 
Figure 62: “Rock, Paper and Scissors” 
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The game assumes that the artefacts are congruent with the human hands. 
This knowledge about the congruence-status is part of the common sense of the 
everyday world. Let us see the combination of these individuals in a game-structure. 
The game as it is, shows to us—through its materiality and concreteness—three ar-
tefacts that are related to each other according to some rules of dominance that are 
techno-sexual. That means that these properties are determined by means of sexual heuristics. 
We understand ‘heuristics’ as the study of the act of discovering the inner congruence of 
the world the necessary step before the development of any technology. The word 
comes from the Greek heuriskein, which means ‘to discover’ or ‘to find’. We think 
that heuristics depends on phenomenology and hermeneutics working together; as 
Don Ihde has observed: 
If phenomenology is the archaeology of getting back to the ‘thing themselves,’ 
hermeneutics is the archaeology of unlayering meaning-sediments originally as-
sociated with texts, but to become a broader unlayering of philosophical 
traditions.158 
Our work will follow this double path in two steps; the first step entails, de-
signing an eidetic reduction that can lead us to the grammar of connectedness and then a 
hyletic reduction that can lead us back to “the thing themselves” or examples of con-
nectedness. An eidetic reduction of the game presented, will give us the 
understanding of these phenomenological rules making them visible. The first step 
of the eidetic reduction needs to deconstruct the references to concrete bodies 
(rocks, papers and scissors). The eidetic reduction reduces the materiality of the ar-
tefacts (their hyle) to pure sexual imagery (heuristic relations of congruence). To 
                                               
158 Ihde, Don. Expanding Hermeneutics. Visualism in Science. 1998; p. 80. 
Figure 63: We symbolize ‘domi-
nance’ with ‘D’ and reproduce the 
mechanism of the game as follows:  
Rock ‘D’ Scissors / Scissors ‘D’ 
Paper / Paper ‘D’ Rock 
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reproduce this process we will change the three artefacts to three substituting sym-
bols e.g. A, B and C. This first reduction reveals their mutual relationships. We 
notice that the rock ‘blunts or breaks’ the scissors, the scissors ‘cut’ the paper and 
the paper ‘covers’ the rock. In other words, ‘blunting or breaking’, ‘cutting’ and 
‘covering’ have to be related to the ‘heuristic properties’ that we are searching for. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Now we ask ourselves if we can find some other artefacts to play the game. We can 
try to find other adequate artefacts using the trial and error method introducing new 
artefacts and checking if the technology of the game still works. This is essential for 
phenomenology as methodology, and is known as the study the variations of a 
phenomenon. For example, we can substitute the paper with a glass bottle. We discover 
that a glass bottle is not congruent with the rock and the scissors in respect to the rules 
of the game. We deduce then that according to the game, there is some kind of 
“hierarchical” structure among artefacts that the glass bottle does not fulfil. We say 
that the games-rules are broken and the glass bottle is a broken artefact in respect to 
the game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64: Eidetic reduction,  
A ‘D’ B / B ‘D’ C / C ‘D’ A 
Figure 65: Hyletic reduction; 
the glass bottle is not a solu-
tion for the general congruence 
of the game 
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This second reduction moves then, from the essential sphere to the concrete 
sphere, an acting based in a previous eidetic reduction. We call this second change 
in perspective a hyletic reduction. During this second moment, the essential features 
shall be reversed to create a new hyletic content, a process of embodiment of the 
eidetic content in a new materiality. Getting back to our example, we need to find 
three new artefacts that fulfil the principles derived from the eidetic reduction and 
which intend to be congruent with the eidetic model ‘Rock > Scissors/Scissors > 
Paper/Paper > Rock’. We know that the relationship developed between the arte-
facts’ heuristic properties, change as soon as these artefacts are confronted with 
others. We say that the heuristic properties of the paper in relation to the rock are 
different from those of the paper in relation to the scissors but they must be invari-
ant properties that can be found and which can be found in other artefacts. In other 
words it is necessary to find the rules that regulate the three artefacts to find other 
artefacts that fulfil the games rules. In doing so, we will find three other artefacts 
which present the same reciprocal congruence. We can try to be more selective in 
the choice of a new artefact: we can substitute the scissors with an axe because the 
axe “cuts” as the scissors does. However, we notice immediately that to use an axe 
instead of scissors produce a new kind of brokenness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another try: if we can use paper to wrap up a rock, then we can use paper to 
wrap up the Reichtag, and the Reichtag will break the scissors.  
 
Figure 66: The axe is not a solution of the ‘equation’ of the game. 
Not every way “to cut” is equivalent to any other.  In other words, 
“to cut” is not a single praxis and it cannot be reduced to a universal. 
 
  
226 
However, in spite of being theoretically adequate, the Reichtag is not working 
properly.159 We noticed that “size” is important for congruence and it is something 
inappropriate in docking artefacts of critical size differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As we said before, to find new artefacts to play the game we need to perform 
a second reduction - which is the inverse of the eidetic- which we named “the hylet-
ic reduction”. We assume that the heuristic properties of the paper in relation to the 
rock are different than those of the paper in relation to the scissors, but that they 
express invariants that can be found in other artefacts. These invariants are the heu-
ristic properties. We discover that some artefacts are the centre of acting and name 
these as initiatory. An artefact is initiatory if it is the point of departure of a human 
acting and essential for the performing of the acting. Otherwise, it is receptive. In our 
actual game the rock is initiatory respect to the scissors which are receptive respect to 
the rock; further the scissors are initiatory respect to the paper which is receptive to the 
scissors and finally the paper is initiatory resect toe the rock which is receptive respect 
to the paper. After studying the cases of invariance (try and error method) we find 
that a new adequate set of artefacts could be the following: ‘Water > Fire/Fire 
>Sponge/Sponge>Water.’ 
 
                                               
159 Christo and Jeanne-Claude wrapped the Reichstag in Berlin in 1995. 
 
Figure 67: Because its size, the Reichtag cannot substitute 
the rock. 
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Trying to play the game with sexual tools the following could be a solution: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beside these two acting-roles we find artefacts that are indirectly connected to 
human acting and call it complementary if its role in the implementation of an acting is 
secondary to the one that is initiatory. However, the rules of the game are based only 
in the heuristic properties of initiative and receptiveness.  In general terms and be-
side this particular game, studying the acting general the four heuristic properties are 
Figure 68: We can see that these three new artefacts are 
both initiatory and receptive in an adequate form for the 
rules of the game 
 
Figure 69: the heuristic properties of the sexu-
al game 
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relevant. For example, studying the acting of ‘nailing a shelf to a wall’, we find that 
the hammer is the initiatory artefact and the shelf is the receptive artefact; the nails are 
the complementary artefact and the wall where the nails go into to hold the shelf, is the 
participative artefact.  We can thereafter classify the kind of the human body and the 
artefacts that are related to sexuality, defining four fundamental heuristic properties 
of the human body respectively sexual artefacts. For instance, studying the acting of 
using a penis pump the cylinder is the Initiatory body and the penis is the Receptive 
body. The pump is the Complementary body and the Gas molecules inside the cylin-
der are the Participative body.  
 
 
 
Table 21: The dialectics of multistability  
 
Heuristic properties are related to praxis. Initiatory, receptive, complementary and 
participative are some examples of heuristic properties. The glass bottle, the axe and 
the wrapped Reichtag are three examples of artefacts that are incongruent with the rules 
of the studied game from the point of view of their heuristic properties. The glass 
bottle is not initiatory respect to the rock and is not receptive respect to the scissors. 
The axe could be seen as receptive and initiatory but in an unacceptable way because its 
pragma (the way and context in which it is used). Our conclusion is that to be initiato-
ry is a general power dependent on the heuristic properties of the artefact to be 
receptive. The axe is initiatory to other artefacts different from the paper and the rock. 
Finally, the Reichtag is not a ‘wrappable’ artefact, because ‘to wrap’ is related to smaller 
objects. These artefacts break the game down and convert the game into a case of 
The dialectics of multistability 
Depending of human acting: An artefact is ‘Initiatory’ if it is the point of departure of a human 
acting; otherwise it is ‘complementary’. 
 
Independent of 
human acting 
 
An artefact is ‘par-
ticipative’ if it acts 
directly upon an-
other artefact and 
it is ‘receptive’ if it 
receives the acting 
of another. 
 
 
Initiatory -A 
 
 
Complementary -B 
 
Participative -a 
 
Initiatory/ Participative 
– 
Male condom 
 
Complementary/ Participa-
tive – 
Penis pump 
 
Receptive -b 
 
Initiatory/ Receptive 
Female condom 
 
Complementary/ Receptive 
Spermicide substances  
& Personal lubricants 
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broken technology.  
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